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&1E.'10RAND~IOFCONTRACT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GNEN that the real property and improvements 
thereon known as 2002 N. 21st. Street, Boise, Ada County, Idaho, more 
particularly described as follows: 
See Exhibit "A" attached he records of Ada County, Idaho; 
are subject to the terms and conditions of an unrecorded Real Estate 
Contract dared May 1998. The parties to the contract are: 
NAOMI LOillSE CAi'\1PBELL, AN ONMARlUED WOMAN,.. as 
''Vendor," and WlLLIAl\-1 J. CAi\.tPBELL, a single man, as 
"Purchaser." 
VENDOR: 
~·~~ 
NAOMI LOUISE CAMPBELL 
PURCHASER: 
~PB~ 
l~~ I RECORDEO·REOUESTOF 
AOA COUIHY RE'.COROE!V ' d) ~ J.OAVID NAVARRO ' CT 
BOISE. IOAHO fEE v OEPUTY 
L998JN-2 Pt! l4:li5 980534· 7 
MEMORANDUM OF CONTRACT- P. I 
000400 
STATE OP CALIFORNIA ) 
COUNTY OF k,s AN;£'-~ ss. 
On this~ day of May, 199S, before me, the oodersigned, a Notary Public in 
and for said State, personally appeared Naomi Louise Campbell, a11 unmarried woman. 
kaowo or identified to me to be the pe:rsoa whose name is 3ubscribed to the foregoing 
instrument. and acknowledged to me that they executed (be same. 
lN WITNESS WHBREOP, l have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal, 
the day and year in this certificate first above written. 
STATEOFIDARO ) 
) ss. 
CO{JNTY OF ADA ) 
Notary Public for /Idaho, 
Residing at ise/ Idaho. '-Cf J 
Commissfon expir~: / / - 2 0 ~ , 
On this +:+-- day of May, 1998, before me, tl!.e undersigned. a Notary Public in 
and for said State, personally appeared William J. Campbell, a single man. known or 
identified to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the foregoing 
instrument. and acknowlerlged to me that ,he executed lhe same. 
MEMORANDUM OF CONI'RACT • P. 2 
1daho, 
Idaho. 
seal. 
000401 
All-Pwposa Acknowledgam81lt 
State of UL/f 6/tNIA 
CoUI1tyof Lq> ANGEL.£,£ } 
.,. 
on f/.1«'t 11t, /j2,8,bstorams, l.vH'~Y J; i)gNIJI 
I I pacsooally app831'ad. NAoN , L CLJI 5 E. 0 H'/J8£ LL 
~sonaUy known ta ma • or • 0 proved to me on the basis oi satisfactocy evideoca to b~ the parsaC1(S) 
whose name( s) i!/ara subscnoecl lo the witJiin instrum6!'11 and adcnowtedged 
to me that he/she/they axecuted !he same In his/her/their autholized 
cap2city(!e.!), and that by his/her/their slgnattua(s} on the instrument 
lhe pa<sofl(sl, or the entll'/ upon behalf of which the persaI1(s) acts-0, 
executed the instrum8!'1L 
000402 
EXHIBIT A 
t1MIGl:L I 
COMMENCING AT THE QUARTEH CORNER COMMON TO SECTIOl'8 l3 ANO J4, TOWNSHIP 4 
NORTH, RANGE 2 EAST, BOISE MERIDIAN, ADA COUNTY, lDAffO; TitENCE 
sourn O DEGREES 06' E.AST 932.9 FEET, BEING ON THE CENTER LWE Of 20TH 
STREET; THENCE 
NORTH 89 DEGREES 20' WEST 192.0 FEET TO THE REAL POINT OF BEGINNIN~; THENCE. 
NORTH 89 DEGREES 20' WEST 100 FEET; THENCE 
NORTH O DEGREES 06' WEST 35 FEET; ilifHCE . 
SOUTH as DEGREES 20· EAST A DISTANCE OF 100 FEET; THENCE 
SOUTH O DEGREES os•':EAST 35 FEET TO THE REAL POINT OF BEGINNING. 
ANO 
COWENCIUG AT TiiE QUAHTEJl CORNER COw.lON TO SECTIONS 33 ANO 341 TOWMSlilP 4 
NORTH, RANGE 2 EAST, BOISE MERIOIAN, .ADA COUNTY, IDAHO; THENCE : 
SOUTH 00 DEGREES 06' EAST 932.9 FEET.TO A POINT, BEING ON THE CENTERLINE OF 
20TH STREET, THENCE 
NORTH 89 DEGREES 20' WEST 154.55 FEET TO AN IRON Pitt, IBE REAL POINT OF 
BEGINNING; IBENCE 
NORTH 89 DEGaEES 20• WEST 137,42 FEET TO AN rRON PIN (FORMERLY 137.45 
FEET); THENCE . 
SOUTH 00 DEGJ:iEES oa• EAST 50.0 FEET TO AN IRON PIN; THENCE 
SOUTH. -89 DEGREES 20' EAST 131. 45 FEET TO AN IRON PIN; TitENCE 
NORTH 00 OEGaEES 06' WEST 50.0 FEET TO AN IRON PIN, THE REAL POINT OF 
BEGINNIN3. 
, EXCEPT OITCH ANO ROAD RIGlff OF WAY. 
PARCEL U 
A TRACT OF LAND Sll1JATED IN THE NORTHEAST 1/4 Of THE SOUTHEAST 1/4 OF 
SECTION 33 1 TOWNSHIP 4 NORTH, RANGE 2 EAST, BOISE MERIDIAN, ADA COUNTY, 
IOAHO, l.lORE PARTICUUJILY DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS; BEGINNING Al THE EAST l/4 
CORNER OF SAID SECTION 33, THENCE 
SOUTH O OEGFIEES 06' E.AST ALONG THE EAsT LINE OF SAID SECTCON 33 A OIS1ANCE 
OF 835.4 FEET; THENCE . 
NORllt 89 DEGREES 20' WEST A DISTANCE OF 192.00 FEET TO THE REAL POINT OF 
BEGIHNING; TKENCE 
NOSITlt 89 DEGREES 20' WEST A orSTANCE Of 100.00 FEET; THENCE 
SOUTH O DEGREES 06' EAST, A DISTANCE OF 62.5 FEET; THENCE 
sourn 89 DEGREES 20' EAST A DISTANCE OF 100.00 FEET; llfENCE 
NORTH O DEGSlEES 06' WEST, A DISTANCE Of 62 .5 i'EET TO THE REAL POINT Of 
· BEGINflING. ' 
EXCEPT DITCH AAO ROAD RIGHTS OF WAY. 
SNO OF LEGAL DESCRIPTIOH 
000403 
EXHIBIT ''D" 
000404 
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EXHIBIT ''E" 
00040'7 
Talking Points: "Good Fences !\,fake Neighbors" 
We're sorry things escalated. on Wednesday. We're here to talk about the situation 
because it makes sense for a lot of reasons to be sensible and try to work it out. 
Whatwewant 
1. Bill to stop turning his truck around oq our ptoperty; 
i.l- Concerns: safety of our cbildren, their toys/bikes 
b. Desires: regain use & enjoyment of our property; . 
c. It is not appropriate to do so 
2. Relocate Bill's access towards the street to enter just near the tree; 
a. Concerns: same as above, safety etc, 
b. Desires: same as above, including use ofpaddng:space, basketball area .... 
3. Bill removes or relocates his no trespass/other signs to a location within his 
property instead of in front of our property. 
a. Rationale: we do not want it in front of our property 
b. Additional rationale: it confuses our invitees/guests & makes them foet not 
welcome on OUR property 
4. Tidy up the wood to prevent or minimize wasp/bee hive infestation 
Win-\Vin Propgsition 
1. If we can agree, this can be a win-win situation for all of us; if we have to sue, we 
lµ.ve a lawyer who is ready to go and ,win. the law:;;uit based on pur rights under 
Idaho law to relocate the access over our property, but the lawyers we hire will be 
the primary winners 
2. Maintain neighborly relations, instead of protracted & costly legal battle 
3. How can we make this project worthwhile for Bill? 
a. We can pay to pave Bill's new driveway 
b. Note: he is getting a new priVaGy fence for free 
c. We would consider assisting the clean up of his yard to create a turnaround 
spot on his property · 
d. It will make his property more:desirab!e & private (including in case of 
future sale) · 
e. Per access agreement, he must share equally in the the costs of constructing 
and maintaining the driveway, always 
1. His truck is/will continue to ca:us(? excess wear & tear on the driveway; 
which i3 already cra~ked~ entrance 
2. Ifhe turns in sooner, he wiUbave less area to pay to maintain 
I 
i 
L 
l 
! 
I 
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000409 
IDAHO 
SURVEY 
GROUP 
Project No. 09-044 
DESCRJPTION FOR 
ACCESS (OPTION 1) 
MANNING PROPERTY 
I~ SO £as, W,rcn:,1~, ~~ 
Su11e I SO 
Meridi.l~. l,bho 8)641 
Phone (208) 846-8~70 
Fax (208) 8f:H.. S)99 
Apnl 14. 2009 
An access located m the of the SE1/4 of Section 33, T.4N., R.2E., B.M., Boise, 
Ada County, Idaho more particularly described as follows: 
Commencing al the NE comer of Lot 1, Block 10 of Elm Grove Addition as filed in 
Book 5 of Plats at Page 242 records of Ada County, Idaho; 
thence along the West right-of-way line of N. 21 st Street North 00°00'00" East, 
9.02 feet: 
thence leaving said West right-of-way line South 89°46'52~ East , 23.95 iee1 to 
REAL POINT OF BEGINNING of this access; 
thence North 00°00'00" East, 3.87 feet to the beginning of a non-tangent cuNe to 
the right; 
thence along said curve 27.40 feet, said curve having a radius of 26.00 feet, a 
central angle of 60°23'00" and a long chord of 26.15 feet which bears North 61°20'33"' 
East; 
thance South 00"11 ·or East, 12.01 feet to the beginning of a non-tangent curve 
to the left; 
thence along sa id curve 12.24 feet. said curve having a radius of 14.00 feet, a 
central angle of 50°04'49'' and a long chord of 11.85 feet which bears South 6r58'08~ 
West: 
thence North 89°46'52v Wesl 12.00 feet to the REAL POINT OF BEGINNING. 
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EXHIBIT FOR 
MANNING ACCESS 
LOCATED IN THE SE 1 / 4 OF 
SECTION 33, T.4N., R.2E., B.M., 
BOISE, ADA COUIHY, IDAHO 
2009 
OPTION 
Ut!PLATTEO 
t.l,'lt/fil~i:I YttOPfJtli 
201,}(lH..iWTTST, 
...................... l,."" ____ 5 eu·,,:;·1:,2· E :so.7•' ------,---......t""'----....J-..:::~-...,,.:;.....;ll.lll;;._.,.i,:;..,..; ___ _ 
·"-' 
~I 
...................................................... """' ; "°"""''"'''/j[ ·)i"-" O+l 
8W~10 I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
l 
·---------~----------,.--.. ~-~--·----~--------~-------.. -----.. ---... ~ ~ 
: ~ 
ELM GROVE ADDITION 
jw 
r·s 
s I"' 
~. B 
r ., 
I 
········-··················-··-·········----·-···--~ .... ······--····i 
SCALE: 1 • = 3()' 
.F"O\/,W 1/2" ;w;;.:; Fit< 1-J; NO~EA 
f~O :i/iil~ !A~ t"..; ~ t,OTCO 
SEf t/l IH<N-1 ~!'I 111th W Pt.S 11',UJ 
f:. CA:.OJLATTJ.)t-QNr 
____ .,. _ _..,.......,.,. ____ UvJl,OARY' UNt 
U.:NILkl..W; 
--•---- N'f'k0»1o11>1l cou: or '1ltl:'wt'\W11Y 
%' WC ft,lHl:SS ~LK 
Ll 
!K.-·-.-
I '.1 '. 1-'._ ' 
SURVEY 
GROUP, P.C. 
14!50 E. WATl:i.RTOWER ST, 
SUITE: 150 
t.1i:FlJ;:)JAi-,j, !01.JiJ fi;)&,,j2 
(2DD) U4H570 
EXHIBIT "G" 
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IDAHO 
SURVEY 
GROUP 
Project No. 09-044 
DESCRIPTION FOR 
ACCESS 
MANNING PROPERTY 
Suire 150 
Phone 1108) 84b-8:i7D 
Fax (208) 8345399 
July 29, 2009 
An access located in the of the SE1/4 of Section 33, T.4N., R.2E., B.M., Boise, 
Ada County, Idaho more particularly described as follows: 
Commencing at the NE corner of Lot 1, Block 10 of Elm Grove Addition as filed in 
Book 5 of Plats at Page 242 records of Ada County, Idaho; 
thence along the West right-of-way line of N. 21st Street North 00°00'00" East, 
9.02 feet; 
thence leaving said West right-of-way line South 89°46'52" East, 38.03 feet to 
REAL POINT OF BEGINNING of this access; 
thence along a non-tangent curve to the right 8.89 feet, said curve having a 
radius of 30.00 feet, a central angle of 16°58'20" and a long chord of 8.85 feet which 
bears North 47°09'51" East to a point of reverse curve; 
thence along said reverse curve 3.35 feet, said curve having a radius of 10.00 
feet, a central angle of 19°10'43" and a long chord of 3.33 feet which bears North 
46°03'40" East; 
thence South 00° 11'07" East, 8.37 feet; 
thence North 89°46'52" West, 8.92 feet to the REAL POINT OF BEGINNING. 
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BI_OCK 10 
EXHIBIT FOR 
JlJANNlNG ACCESS 
LOCATED IN THE SE 1/4 OF 
SECTION 33, T.4N , R.2E., B.M. 
DO/SE, ADA COUNTY, IDAHO 
2009 
UrJPLATTED 
MANNl~IC PF?OP[~TY 
2000 N '1ST ST 
PPQPOSED ACCESS ON 
iJMm1Nr. P ARCE:L 
,.,, \/ ' ~, 
ml 
/
'1,PtS H47 I 1 
l / ;~";Js\ I / I'>--) 
'1· I I / ... ,.-·' '"" 
I I / \--,o·-+-~-Y--" 
F'OlNT or COMMENCMENT 
I I \ I 
------------------- -------------------------------- -- ------ --- ------1 ~ i ~ !~ ~ i 
I tu I VJ i~ ;i; I 
0 
ELM GROVE ADDITION 
• I- lw; 
: g (/1 l 81 ·o ;::; j'g ~ 
... p - ,), ~ 
"'":g ·-/gm 
1~ 
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I 
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----------------------------------- ,,, __ ,., .. 
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N 
SCALE: 1'' ~ 30' 
0 f"OVr/0 T /:::!" 1r;,0~1 PIN 
G) f"OUNO .5/A" IP.ON 
~ CAL CL/LA IT:O f'Ol~T 
------------- BOL/NOARY LINE 
- - -- - - .- - --- - --~ - -- CENTERLINE 
-,~ ·--- -----<"-·----- APP/'10-Xl'-IAT[ EOC:E Of r,ov...-n,,nt 
---------------- PROPOSED ACC[SS 
t IDAHO ld:' 'A.TCRTOWERS! 
~ SURVEY ~~' ,,IDAHOfJ517 GROUP p C (2C5)8,16-8570 ~-l·\a. -----· _._. ______ _ 
JOSEPH L. ELLSWORTH, ISB #3702 
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS, TALBOY & DEFRANCO P.L.L.C. 
I 031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83 712 
Phone: (208) 336-1843 
Fax: (208) 345-8945 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THOMAS CRELLIN MANNING and ) 
JULIE ANN MANNING, husband and ) 
~fe, ) 
) 
Case No.: CV OC 2009 0007350 
ANSWER TO 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL, an unmarried ) 
Individual, and NAOMI LOUISE ) 
CAMPBELL, an unmarried individual, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
_______________ ) 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
COMES NOW William J. Campbell ("Campbell"), Defendant in the above-
entitled action, by and through counsel, Joseph L. Ellsworth, and hereby answers the 
AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND QUIET TITLE 
(''Amended Complaint") filed by Plaintiffs in the above-referenced action. 
Answers to Allegations Contained in the Amended Complaint 
Campbell replies to the allegations contained in the numbered paragraphs of the 
Amended Complaint as follows: 
000415 
ANSWER 
1. Campbell denies each and every allegation, statement, matter, and thing in 
said Amended Complaint contained except as herein after expressly admitted 
or otherwise alleged. 
2. Campbell admits the allegations of paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of the Amended 
Complaint. 
3. In reply to paragraph 5, Campbell admits that a deed is attached to the 
Amended Complaint but is without specific knowledge as to any of the 
remaining allegations contained in said paragraph. 
4. In reply to paragraph 6, Campbell admits that a quitclaim deed is attached to 
the Amended Complaint and that Naomi Campbell is the grantee under said 
deed. Campbell is without specific knowledge as to the whether the deed 
contains a complete and accurate legal description of the property. 
5. Campbell admits the allegations of paragraphs 7, 8, and 9 of the Amended 
Complaint and alleges that he is the owner of the property subject to a real 
estate contract with Naomi Campbell. 
6. In reply to paragraphs 10 - 12, Campbell admits that he accesses his property 
over a portion of a driveway also used by the Mannings. Campbell alleges that 
he has a written grant, or easement, for the access to his property and that an 
illegible copy of this agreement is apparently attached as Exhibit D to the 
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. Campbell admits that the written agreement 
was executed on or about August 9, 1952 and alleges that such agreement is 
still in full force and effect. Campbell denies the conclusory legal allegations 
made by Plaintiffs with regard to the legal import of this agreement. 
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ANSWER 2 
7. In reply to paragraphs 13 - 17, Campbell admits that he had some firewood in 
his yard and that he does enjoy archery but denies any trespass or other 
conduct that was unlawful. Campbell denies the allegation that there is a hole 
in his yard. 
8. In reply to paragraphs 18 - 22, Campbell admits that the Plaintiffs have 
children and that he has had some conversation with the Mannings about their 
desire to terminate the only access to his house and properties. Campbell 
denies all other allegations. 
9. In reply to paragraph 23 - 41, Campbell admits that the Plaintiffs hired a 
ANSWER 
fence-building contractor who was working in Campbell's driveway on or 
about January 7, 2009. Campbell inquired as to what they were doing and an 
employee indicated he was marking the driveway for fence posts that would 
be installed across Campbell's driveway that same morning. Campbell 
informed the employee that he lived in the house and that the driveway was 
the only access to his property. The employee informed Campbell that he was 
instructed by the Mannings to build a fence across the concrete driveway. 
Campbell advised the employee to leave and parked his vehicle across the 
drive to stop the illegal construction. Julie Manning then contacted the police 
and tried to have Campbell arrested for parking on the driveway of the access 
to his own property. Campbell does admit that he later built some planter 
boxes on his own property and placed them well within his own fence line. 
Campbell admits that Plaintiffs approached him with a "talking points" memo 
but denies each and every other allegation in said paragraphs on the grounds 
000417 
3 
that such allegations are factually incorrect or irrelevant to any known claim 
contained in the complaint. 
10. In reply to paragraphs 42 - 52, Campbell denies that his use of the driveway 
under the written easement agreement is "adverse" to Plaintiffs' use or that 
they are entitled to quiet title to any interest belonging to Campbell. Campbell 
alleges that it is factually and legally impossible for the Plaintiffs to quiet title 
in land that was granted to Campbell as a matter of law. Campbell denies that 
the Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory judgment for anything and contends 
that l daho Code 5 5-313 has no application to a written grant, license, or other 
use agreement that may exist between private land owners; that any such 
statute would be unconstitutional if enforced to take, alter or amend the 
private contractual rights as exist in this case. Campbell further alleges that 
the existing access may not be relocated without substantial damages to the 
rights of Campbell. Campbell denies each and every other allegation 
contained in these paragraphs. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Plaintiffs purchased their property with full knowledge of the common 
driveway and the access in favor of Campbell. The driveway was recently improved 
during the construction of Plaintiffs' home and it was plainly evident when the Plaintiffs 
purchased their home that the driveway was a shared, common driveway. The use 
000418 
ANSWER 4 
agreement ofrecord and the driveway has existed in its current location for more than 
fifty years. 
The Plaintiffs' claims are barred under the equitable doctrines of waiver, latches, 
and/or estoppel. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Campbell is entitled to recover from Plaintiffs his reasonable and necessary 
attorney's fees, plus costs, and sanctions pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-120 and 12-
121, 12-123, and Rule 54(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and all other 
applicable provisions of Idaho Law. 
PRAYER 
WHEREFORE, Campbell demands relief against the Plaintiffs as follows: 
1. That the claims made against Campbell in the Amended Complaint be dismissed 
with prejudice. 
2. That Campbell be awarded his costs and attorney's fees incurred in defending the 
Complaint. 
3. That this Court grant Campbell such other and further relief as it deems just and 
equitable under the circumstances. 
DATED this ;7V......-day of December, 2009. 
~) 
B~---/vU 
JOSEPH L. ELLSWORTH 
Attorney for Defendants 
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ANSWER 5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I 
I hereby certify that on this cl-f' day of December, 2009, I served a true and 
correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method indicated below and 
addressed to the following: 
Thomas E. Dvorak 
Givens Pursley LLP 
PO Box 2720 
Boise ID 83701 
ANSWER 
v' us Mail 
__ Hand Delivery 
Facsimile: 
000420 
6 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
l"ll 0 
-e,i~~--RM __ ---+--
//, 
./: 
f 't 2010 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAWISTRJCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY QF ADA 
THOMAS CRELLIN MANNING and, 
JULIE ANN MANNING, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL, an unmarried 
Individual, and NAOMI LOUISE 
CAMPBELL, an unmarried individual, 
Defendants. 
, 
Case No. CV OC 0907350 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike, Defendants' 
Motion to Strike, Defendants' Motion to Modify Order Setting Proceedings, and Plaintiffs' Motion 
to Amend Complaint. The Court heard oral arguments on the motions on November 30, 2009. 
Thomas Dvorak appeared for the Plaintiffs and Joseph Ellsworth appeared for the Defendants. The 
Court pronounced its ruling from the bench granting the motion to amend and took the remaining 
matters fully under advisement at that time. 
Non-parties Paul and Mary Boyd and Frank and Ida Mattison owned adjoining properties. 
The Mattisons' property appears to have been landlocked. The Boyds built a driveway on their 
property and the Mattisons wished to use the driveway to access their property. On July 29, 1952, 
the two couples entered into an agreement under which the Mattisons paid $112.50 for "a right to 
use the driveway jointly" with the Boyds. 
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In 1993, Defendant William Campbell and his then wife, Michelle Campbell, purchased 
some, but not all, of the Mattisons' property. On December 23, 1997, the Campbells executed a 
quitclaim deed which transferred their interests in this property to Defendant Naomi Campbell, 
William Campbell's mother. Naomi Campbell lives out of state and does not reside on the property. 
William Campbell asserts an ownership interest in the property pursuant to a May 1998 recorded 
Memorandum of Contract, resides on the property, and conducts his plumbing business from the 
property. 
In May 2006, non-parties Benjamin and Emily Schwartz purchased the Boyd property, 
remodeled the residence, eliminated the carport which was accessed by the shared driveway, built a 
new garage on the other side of the residence, and repaved the disputed driveway. On October 13, 
2008, the Plaintiffs Thomas and Julie Manning purchased the Boyd property from the Schwartzes. 
Shortly thereafter, the parties began to disagree over the use of the driveway and other issues. 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE 
A District Court's determination of whether testimony offered in connection with a motion 
for summary judgment was admissible is reviewed by an abuse of discretion standard. ~McDaniel v. 
Inland Northwest Renal Care Group-Idaho, LLC, 144 Idaho 219, 221, 159 P.3d 856, 858 (2007). 
The abuse of discretion standard requires a multi-tiered inquiry: 1) whether the lower court correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion, 2) whether the court acted within the boundaries of such 
discretion and consistently with any legal standard applicable to the specific choices before it, and 
3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise ofreason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. 
Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94,803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). The admissibility of evidence is a 
threshold question that a court must answer before determining whether the evidence is sufficient to 
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create or negate a genuine issue for trial. Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning Mining Co., 122 Idaho 
778, 784, 839 P.2d 1192, 1198 (1992). 
When considering evidence presented m support of or in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment, a court can only consider material which would be admissible at trial. Gem 
State Ins. Co. v. Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 175 P.3d 172 (2007); I.R.C.P. 56(e). Affidavits 
supporting or opposing a motion for summary judgment must set forth admissible facts, must be 
made on personal knowledge, and must affirmatively show that the affiant is competent to testify to 
the matters stated therein. Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 869, 452 P.2d 362, 
366 (1969); l.R.C.P. 56(e). 
I.R.C.P. 56(e) states: 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that 
the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto 
or served therewith. 
Plaintiffs move to strike portions of the Affidavit of William Campbell as inadmissible 
hearsay, conclusions, and opinions as to the significance of evidence. Plaintiffs also assert that 
Campbell is not competent to testify as to the location of the alleged easement because he is not a 
licensed surveyor. 
In Paragraph 12 of the Affidavit of William Campbell, the affiant states, "To the best of my 
knowledge, this common driveway has been in existence since 1952 when the easement agreement 
was executed." This statement establishes only that Defendant's knowledge is that the common 
driveway has existed since 1952. The Court is not required to consider it for the legal conclusion 
that an "easement" was created by the 1952 Agreement. Campbell's characterization of the 
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Agreement as an easement agreement is not binding on the Court. Plaintiffs' motion to strike 
Paragraph 12 of the Affidavit of William Campbell is DENIED. 
The first sentence of Paragraph 13 asserts Defendants' position that there is no way to 
relocate the driveway without substantial property damage and diminution of value to the 
Camp bells' property. In Idaho, the owner of property may testify as to its value and is presumed to 
be familiar with the property's current value. Weaver v. Village of Bancroft, 92 Idaho 189,439 P.2d 
697 (1968); Rankin v. Caldwell, 15 Idaho 625, 99 P. 108 (1908). As an owner of real property, an 
opinion that his property value would be diminished by the moving of a driveway would be within 
his personal knowledge. Similarly, an opinion as to whether the driveway could be moved without 
damage to the property would be within the personal knowledge of an owner. These opinions are 
properly in the affidavit. Plaintiffs' motion to strike the first sentence of Paragraph 13 of the 
Affidavit of William Campbell is DENIED. 
In the second sentence of Paragraph 13, the affiant states, "The Boise City Fire Department 
has also informed me that any such relocation would not comply with the fire code as the tum 
would be too tight for equipment to reach my property in the event of an emergency." The Court 
agrees that this statement constitutes inadmissible hearsay. "Hearsay is a statement, other than one 
made by the declarent while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted." Idaho Rule of Evidence 80l(c). Defendants seek to admit a statement 
allegedly made to William Campbell by an unidentified member of the Boise City Fire Department 
for the truth of the matter that any change of the driveway would violate the Fire Code. This 
statement is impermissible hearsay. Plaintiffs' motion to strike this statement is GRANTED. 
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DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO STRIKE AND TO DIS UALIFY GIVENS PURSLEY FROM 
ACTING AS COUNSEL IN THIS MATTER 
Defendants seek to strike the Affidavit of Eric Nelson, the Affidavit of Scott Beecham, and 
the opinion letter of Frank Lee as inappropriate and violating the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Defendants contend that it is inappropriate under Rule 3.7 for these individuals to testify as 
witnesses in this case because they either are attorneys or agents of Plaintiffs' attorneys. Further, 
Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' counsel has an ongoing conflict of interest by acting in multiple 
roles that should disqualify Plaintiffs' counsel from any further activity in this case. 
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants have not provided a valid reason to strike the Affidavit of 
Scott Beecham. Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Beecham has been retained by Plaintiffs as an expert and is 
not affiliated with or an employee of Givens Pursley. The Court finds that the record provides no 
support for the contention that Mr. Beecham in an employee or agent of Plaintiffs' counsel any 
more than any engaged expert witness. The affidavit establishes that Mr. Beecham is a member of 
an independent development company called Landworks, LLC. (Affidavit of Beecham, 1 6d.) 
Defendants did not challenge the qualifications of Mr. Beecham as an expert witness nor did 
Defendants challenge any particular statements made in the Affidavit of Scott Beecham. 
Defendants' motion to strike the Affidavit of Scott Beecham as inappropriate for the Court's 
consideration is DENIED. 
Defendants ask the Court to strike the opm10n letter of Frank Lee from the record as 
inappropriate because it was written by an attorney working for Givens Pursley. This letter is 
attached as Exhibit E to the Affidavit of Scott Beecham in partial support of his expert opinion. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 703 provides that an admissible expert opinion may be based upon 
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otherwise inadmissible facts or data if that data is of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in a 
particular field. Plaintiffs contend that the letter need not be stricken because Plaintiffs have no 
intention of calling Mr. Lee to testify in this matter. Idaho Rule of Professional Responsibility 
3.7(b) states, "A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm 
is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule l.7 or Rule 1.9." It has 
been represented to the Court that it is unlikely that Mr. Lee will be called as a witness in this 
matter. There has been no assertion or evidence to support an assertion that the representation of 
Plaintiffs by the attorneys of Givens Pursley would be directly adverse to the interests of another 
client or that the representation of Plaintiffs would be materially limited by the lawyer's 
responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person, or by the personal interests of the 
lawyer. There has been no assertion or evidence to support an assertion that representation of 
Plaintiffs is materially adverse to the interests of any of Givens Pursley' s prior clients. Rule 3. 7 does 
not require the striking of the opinion letter written by Mr. Lee and addressed to Scott Beecham. 
Plaintiffs also draw the Court's attention to the fact that the letter is hearsay. The Court finds 
that research conducted by a land use attorney is of the sort a land use expert would reasonably rely 
upon in forming an expert opinion. The hearsay letter itself would not be admissible at trial and 
could not be relied upon by the Court in making its findings of fact and conclusions of law at the 
trial of this matter. The Court hereby strikes the letter of Frank Lee as inadmissible hearsay. Under 
IRE 703, the opinion of expert witness Scott Beecham is not rendered inadmissible by the striking 
of this letter. 
Finally, Defendants seek to strike the Affidavit of Eric Nelson, asserting that the affidavit 
would be inappropriate for the Court to consider because Eric Nelson is a paralegal employed by 
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Givens Pursley. Plaintiffs contend that nothing in Rule 3.7 requires disqualification of the attorney 
or finn where a non-attorney employee of the firm has information that makes him a material 
witness. The Affidavit of Eric Nelson contains a description of his experience reading and 
reviewing deeds and title records; a description of the activities he performed to trace the title of the 
two relevant properties and to search for a document which would address the driveway access 
issue; a summary of the results of his search; copies of the deeds and title records used; and 
illustrative exhibits created by the affiant. Based upon Mr. Nelson's thirty years of experience in 
reading and reviewing deeds and title records, the Court finds that Mr. Nelson is qualified to testify 
as to the results of his title searches of the involved properties. Defendants' motion to strike the 
Affidavit of Eric Nelson is DENIED. 
Finally, Defendants contend that the attorneys and staff of Givens Pursley are acting as 
attorneys, expert witnesses, and fact witnesses in pending litigation and that this creates an 
impermissible conflict of interest requiring disqualification of the firm from further activity in this 
action. Having found that Mr. Beecham is not an agent of the firm, the Court need only determine if 
an employee of a firm acting as a fact witness constitutes an impermissible conflict of interest. Rule 
3.7(b) allows an attorney to act as an advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the firm is likely 
to be called as a witness unless precluded by a conflict of interest arising under Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9. 
Above, the Court detennined that there was no contention or evidence in the record to support a 
contention that representation of Plaintiffs presents a conflict of interest under Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9. 
Defendants assert that these multiple roles played by agents of Givens Pursley prejudice the 
rights of Defendants, arguing that Defendants "have no access to these witnesses." As Mr. Beecham 
is an expert witness engaged by Plaintiffs, Defendants may depose Mr. Beecham as they would any 
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other expert witness. Further, Defendants had the opportunity to engage their own agent to research 
the chain of title of these properties in an effort to clarify the meaning and history of the Agreement. 
Comment 5 to Rule 3.7 provides guidance to the Court, stating: 
Because the tribunal is not likely to be misled when a lawyer acts as advocate in a 
trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm will testify as a necessary witness, 
paragraph (b) permits the lawyer to do so except in situations involving a conflict of 
interest. 
In the case at hand, the Court will be the trier of fact. There is little likelihood that the Court will be 
misled by counsel acting as an advocate for Plaintiffs and counsel's employee acting as a fact 
witness on the chain on title as it relates to documents including reference to the Agreement. 
Defendants' motion to disqualify Givens Pursley from any further action in this matter is DENIED. 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO MODIFY ORDER SETTING PROCEEDINGS 
In their Motion to Modify Order Setting Proceedings, Defendants requested that the Court 
modify the discovery deadlines and disclosure of expert deadlines to thirty days prior to trial. 
Defendants filed no memorandum in support of this motion and provided no reason for the request 
in the motion itself. At oral argument, Defendants argued that they had sought to avoid the expense 
of obtaining experts until after the summary judgment motion was heard, but Defendants also 
acknowledged that experts would be a necessity in this litigation. Additionally, Defendants orally 
expanded the motion to modify the order setting proceedings to include a motion to vacate the trial 
date. Plaintiffs strenuously objected to the motion to shorten the discovery and expert witness 
disclosure deadlines, asserting that the Order was entered on September 8, 2009; that the parties had 
agreed to the trial date; and that Plaintiff had followed the scheduling order and should not be 
penalized for Defendants' choice to disregard the order. Plaintiffs further objected to Defendants' 
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oral motion to vacate the trial date as that argument had not been previously raised and Plaintiffs 
were unprepared to argue such a motion. 
The Court finds Defendants have not provided good cause to modify the scheduling order. 
The Court imposes such deadlines in an effort to streamline litigation, provide equitable deadlines 
for both parties, and advance the resolution of the matter in an orderly fashion. The parties were free 
to discuss the scheduling order and trial strategy between themselves and stipulate to alter the 
deadlines. Here, shortening the deadlines is likely to lead to further disagreement as the parties 
struggle to find and prepare rebuttal experts within thirty days of trial if additional discovery is still 
being conducted. 
In an effort resolve this dispute between neighbors in a timely fashion and in an effort not to 
increase the contentiousness of this matter, the Court finds that Defendants have not provided good 
cause to vacate the trial date. Defendants' motion to modify the scheduling order and Defendants' 
motion to vacate the trial date are DENIED. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). If the evidence reveals 
that no disputed issues of material fact exist, then only a question of law remains. First Sec. Bank of 
Idaho, NA. v. Murphy, 131 Idaho 787, 790, 964 P.2d 654, 657 (1998). The moving party is "entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law" because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing 
on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. 
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). A district court is empowered to grant summary judgment to 
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a nonmoving party in appropriate circumstances. Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co., 99 Idaho 
462,476,583 P.2d 997, 1011 (1978). 
Generally, when considering a motion for summary judgment, the court liberally construes 
the facts in favor of the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable factual inferences in favor of that 
party. See Williams v. Blakley, 114 Idaho 323, 324, 757 P.2d 186, 187 (1988); Blake v. Cruz, 108 
Idaho 253, 255, 698 P.2d 315, 317 (1985). However, an exception to this rule occurs "where the 
evidentiary facts are undisputed and the trial court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact, summary 
judgment is appropriate, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences because the court alone will 
be responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences." Riverside Development Co. v. 
Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519, 650 P.2d 657, 661 (1982); see also Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898, 
900, 950 P.2d 1237, 1239 (1997). "[T]he judge is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be 
drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts." Blackmon v. Zufelt, 108 Idaho 469,470, 700 P.2d 91, 
92 (Ct. App. 1985) (citing Riverside Development Co., 103 Idaho at 519,650 P.2d at 661). 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) provides that an adverse party may not simply rely upon 
mere allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth in affidavits specific facts showing there is a 
genuine issue for trial. See Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 211, 868 P.2d 1224, 1227 (1994). 
The affidavits either supporting or opposing the motion must set forth facts that would be admissible 
in evidence and show that the affiant is competent to testify. Id., I.R.C.P. 56(e). To withstand a 
motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party's case must be anchored in something more 
than speculation; a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue. Zimmerman v. 
Volkswagon of America, Inc., 128 ldaho 851, 854, 920 P.2d 67, 69 (1996). 
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WHETHER THE 1952 AGREEMENT CONSTITUTES AN EASEMENT 
OR A REVOCABLE LICENSE 
Defendants seek judgment on the pleadings that there is no action for quiet title or for 
declaration of any kind on the basis that there is a written easement of record which governs the 
construction, maintenance, and usage of the driveway. Plaintiffs seek summary judgment that the 
Agreement created a revocable license to use the driveway or an easement that is terminable upon 
the owner of the servient estate ceasing to use the driveway. 
The 1952 Agreement states: 
That Paul S. Boyd and Mary M. Boyd in consideration of $112.50, lawful 
money of the United States, to them in hand paid by Frank N. Mattison and Ida Grace 
Mattison, do here-by grant unto Frank N. Mattison and Ida Grace Mattison, for all 
ordinary purposes a right to use the driveway jointly with Paul S. Boyd and Mary M. 
Boyd, the same including all rights of ingress and egress over the same, the said 
driveway running and leading from the end of North 21st street of the city of Boise, 
Idaho, in a northerly and southerly direction, far enough to allow the said second 
parties herein to enter upon their premises, which adjoin the premises of the first 
parties on the East side of said premises. 
The parties shall be entitled to use the driveway in common, and the expense 
of constructing and maintenance of said driveway shall always be equally borne by 
both the parties hereto. Should the land subject to this right of way ever cease to be 
used as a driveway, then in such a case, the full right and title shall revert to the 
present owners or their successors in title. 
An easement is the right to use the land of another for a specific purpose that is not 
inconsistent with the general use of the property by the owner. Akers v. D.L. White Const., Inc. 142 
Idaho 293, 301, 127 P.3d 196, 204 (2005). An express easement, being an interest in real property, 
may only be created by a written instrument. Shultz v. Atkins, 97 Idaho 770, 773, 554 P.2d 948, 951 
(1976) (citing LC. § 9-503; McReynolds v. Harrigfeld, 26 Idaho 26, 140 P. 1096 (1914)). "No 
particular forms or words of art are necessary [to create an express easement]; it is necessary only 
that the parties make clear their intention to establish a servitude." Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. 
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Lmvrence, 143 Idaho 704, 707, 152 P.3d 575, 579 (2007)(quoting Benninger v. Derifield, 142 Idaho 
486, 489, 129 P.3d 1235, 1238 (2006)). "An express easement may be created by a written 
agreement between the owner of the dominant estate and the owner of the servient estate." Capstar 
Radio Operating Co., 143 Idaho at 707, 152 P.3d at 579. 
The Court finds that although the instrument fails to explicitly use the term easement, the 
instrument is an agreement between the owner of the dominant and the owner of the servient estate 
which makes clear an intention to establish a servitude. In the agreement, the Boyds "granted" the 
Mattisons a "right to use the driveway jointly." The agreement states that "[s]hould the land subject 
to this right of way ever cease to be used as a driveway, then in such a case, the full right and title 
shall revert to the present owners or their successors in title." This language indicates an intention to 
bind the land and the future owners of the land, reinforcing the creation of a servitude. That "full 
right and title" to the land will "revert" back to the owners is further indication that more than a 
limited, revocable right of use for the Mattisons was intended. 
In Abbott v. Nampa School Dist. No. 131, 119 Idaho 544, 548, 808 P.2d 1289, 1293 
(1991 ), a general grant of easement was defined as an "easement granted or reserved 
in general terms, without any limitations as to its use .... " Accordingly, Abbott sets 
forth several rules governing this type of easement, which apply to the present case. 
First, "use of the easement includes those uses which are incidental or necessary to 
the reasonable and proper enjoyment of the easement, but is limited to those that 
burden the servient estate as little as possible." Id. Second, such easements are "of 
unlimited reasonable use." Id. Third, these easements "are not restricted to use merely 
for such purposes of the dominant estate as are reasonably required at the time of the 
grant or reservation, but the right may be exercised by the dominant owner for those 
purposes to which that estate may be subsequently devoted. Thus there may be an 
increase in the volume and kind of use of such easement during the course of its 
enjoyment." Id. Fourth, and significantly, "absent language in the easement to the 
contrary, the uses made by the servient and dominant owners may be adjusted 
consistent with the normal development of their respective lands." Id. at 548-49, 808 
P.2d at 1293-94. Thus, use of a general easement may be enlarged beyond the 
purposes originally required at the time the easement was created, so long as that use 
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is reasonable and necessary and is consistent with the normal development of the 
land. 
l'vfcFadden v. Sein, 139 Idaho 921, 924, 88 P.3d 740, 743 (2004). 
The parties to this agreement did not simply grant an easement of general use, but instead 
placed limitations on its use. The agreement provides for joint use of the driveway for "ordinary 
purposes" of "ingress and egress" only "far enough to allow the said second parties herein to enter 
upon their premises, which adjoin the premises of the first parties on the East side of said 
premises." The Court finds that the 1952 Agreement created an express easement for the limited 
purpose of allowing the residents of the adjacent premises the ordinary use of a driveway for ingress 
and egress far enough to allow the residents to enter onto their property. 
Plaintiffs next argue that even if the Agreement created an express easement, that the 
easement terminated when Plaintiffs ceased using the property as a driveway. The Agreement states 
"[ s ]hould the land subject to this right of way ever cease to be used as a driveway," all rights revert 
to the current owners. The parties made sure to state which parties were affected in by each 
provision of the agreement. For example, the agreement provides that the Boyds granted the right to 
use to the drive way to the Mattisons far enough to allow "the said second parties" to enter the 
premises adjacent to the premises of the "first parties." The agreement goes on to state that the 
expense "shall always be equally borne by both the parties hereto." Had the parties intended that the 
easement would be terminable upon notice by one party, the agreement would reflect that intention. 
Moreover, the Agreement might easily have stated "[s]hould the land subject to this right of way 
ever cease to be used as a joint driveway." The Court finds that the express language of the 
Agreement did not create an easement which is unilaterally revocable upon notice. 
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Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted in part and denied in part. The 
Court finds that this dispute is governed by an express limited easement which is not unilaterally 
revocable upon notice. Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claim for quiet title is GRANTED. 
However, Plaintiffs' second cause of action for declaratory judgment is not disposed ofby a finding 
of an express easement, as the requested declarations seek clarification of the scope of the easement. 
Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claim for declaratory judgment is DENIED. 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs seek summary judgment on six aspects of their claim for declaratory judgment: 1) 
that the Court must declare the scope and boundaries of the easement; 2) that Defendants have the 
exclusive maintenance obligation due to the Defendants' changed use; 3)that Defendants must come 
forward with a proposed legal description of the easement; 4) that the dominant estate is limited to a 
single residence; 5) that Defendants are not permitted under the easement to park or tum upon the 
Plaintiffs' property or to post signage and a mailbox upon the Plaintiffs' property; and 6) that 
Plaintiffs' have the right under Idaho Code § 55-313 to move the access. 
Idaho law requires that a judgment which determines an easement in real property must 
describe the interest with such certainty that the rights and liabilities are clearly fixed. Bethel v. Van 
Stone, 120 Idaho 522, 528, 817 P .2d 188, 194 (Ct. App. 1991 )(remanding for additional evidence to 
determine the precise location of the easement). More than once an Idaho appellate Court has 
remanded a case to the trial court to determine and describe the location and extent of the easement. 
See Bedke v. Pickett Ranch & Sheep Co., 143 Idaho 36, 137 P.3d 423 (2006); Sinnett v. Were/us, 83 
Idaho 514,365 P.2d 952 (1961); Kosanke v. Kopp, 74 Idaho 302,261 P.2d 815 (1953). 
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Neither party has presented evidence to the Court to support a legal description of the 
precise location of the easement. The language of the Agreement provides that the right extends 
only "far enough to allow the said second parties herein to enter upon their premises." Neither party 
has presented evidence from which the Court could make a determination as to the length of the 
easement. Therefore the Court finds that the precise location and legal description of the easement 
remain issues for trial. 
Plaintiffs seek declaratory judgment that due to the changed circumstances under which 
Plaintiffs no longer use the driveway, Defendants are exclusively required to maintain the driveway. 
The Agreement states, "the expense of constructing and maintenance of said driveway shall always 
be equally borne by both the parties hereto." Plaintiffs cite no Idaho law providing for a judicial 
modification of an express easement in contravention of the plain language of the agreement. 
Plaintiffs' motion for declaratory judgment that Defendants are exclusively required to maintain the 
driveway is DENIED. 
Plaintiffs assert that Defendants have the burden of performing a survey and establishing the 
location of the easement as the party claiming the easement and standing to benefit from the 
easement. Defendants assert that Plaintiffs have the burden of paying for a survey as they brought 
the suit and have the burden of proof on their claims. Plaintiffs stand to benefit from the Court's 
legal description of the easement as it will allow them to plan the use of their remaining property. 
Defendants stand to benefit from the Court's legal description of the easement as it will allow them 
to be aware of the scope of their easement. The Agreement provides for joint maintenance of the 
driveway, therefore the Court orders the parties to equally share the cost of the survey. Plaintiffs' 
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motion for declaratory judgment that Defendants have the burden of performing a survey and 
establishing the location of the easement is DENIED. 
Plaintiffs seek declaratory judgment that the dominant estate is limited to a single residence. 
There is some evidence in the record to support an inference that Defendants plan to divide their 
property, build at least one additional residence, and have the driveway serve to access each 
residence. Additionally, Plaintiffs have provided evidence to suggest that the parcel owned by 
Defendants is not exactly the same parcel owned by the Mattisons at the time the Agreement was 
made. 
An easement does not include the right to enlarge the use to the injury of the servient land. 
Merrill v. Penrod, 109 Idaho 46, 704 P.2d 950 (Ct.App.1985). The degree of change that will be 
allowed in the use of an easement differs with the manner in which the easement was conveyed, the 
language of the conveyance, and the use of the servient estate before and after the grant of the 
conveyance. Abbott v. Nampa School Dist. No. 131, 119 Idaho at 548, 808 P.2d at 1293. Absent 
language in the easement to the contrary, the uses made by the servient and dominant owners, as a 
rule, may be adjusted consistent with the normal development of their respective lands. Id. (citing 
Boydstun Beach Ass'n v. Allen, 111 Idaho 370, 378, 723 P.2d 914, 922 (Ct.App.1986)). Use of an 
easement appurtenant to an identified dominant estate to serve a parcel other than that dominant 
estate is impem1issible as a matter oflaw. Christensen v. City of Pocatello, 142 Idaho 132, 136, 124 
P.3d 1008, 1012 (2005). 
Given that the right was granted to the Mattisons for the ordinary use of a driveway for 
ingress and egress "far enough to allow the said second parties herein to enter upon their premises, 
which adjoin the premises of the first parties on the East side of said premises," the Court finds that 
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the parties intended the right to be limited to a single family residence adjoining the servient 
property on the east side. That Defendants' property has increased in area subsequent to the 
execution of the Agreement is further indication that the parties did not provide for expanded use of 
the driveway for additional families. Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment that the dominant 
estate is limited to a single residence is GRANTED. 
Plaintiffs seek declaratory judgment that Defendants are not permitted under the easement to 
park or tum upon the Plaintiffs' property or to post signage and a mailbox upon the Plaintiffs' 
property. 1 Defendants have not responded to this portion of Plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment. The Agreement expressly provides for a right of ingress and egress over the driveway and 
for maintenance of the driveway. No portion of the agreement provides for a right to use Plaintiffs' 
property for executing three point turns, to park on Plaintiffs' property, to place signs onto 
Plaintiffs' property, or to place a mailbox on Plaintiffs' property. Plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment that the easement does not include a right to park upon or tum a vehicle around on the 
Plaintiffs' property or a right to place any signage or a mailbox on the Plaintiffs' property is 
GRANTED. 
Finally, Plaintiffs seek declaratory judgment that Plaintiffs' have the right under Idaho Code 
§ 55-313 to move the access. Defendants assert that § 55-313 is not applicable to the situation at 
hand in the face of an express easement and that its application would amount to a taking of 
1 The Court acknowledges that Plaintiffs also seek summary judgment holding that Defendants may not place signage in 
front of the Plaintiffs' property or "at any other location or manner that creates confusion as to whose property the 
signage and mailbox refers." To the extent that Plaintiffs seek such relief, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not 
established that Defendants have placed signage in front of, but not on, Plaintiffs' property. Additionally, the Court finds 
that the Agreement does not address whether Defendants may place signage upon their own property, though it may be 
confusing to passersby. Finally, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not brought a cause of action under which to seek 
such relief. 
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Defendants' property. Further, Defendants assert that any change in location of the driveway would 
cause injury to Defendants' property and would lower the value of the property. Plaintiffs dispute 
that any change of location would decrease the value of Defendants' property or cause injury to 
Defendants' property. 
A grant indefinite as to width and location must impose no greater burden than is necessary. 
Coulsen v. Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co., 47 Idaho 619, 628, 277 P. 542, 545 (1929). "Where a 
conveyance of a right of way does not definitely fix its location, the grantee is entitled to a 
convenient, reasonable, and accessible way within the limits of the grant." Bethel v. Van Stone, 120 
Idaho 522, 527-28, 817 P.2d 188, 193-94 (Ct. App. 1991)(quoting Quinn v. Stone, 75 Idaho 243, 
246-47, 270 P.2d 825,826 (1954). Idaho Code§ 55-313 provides that an owner may change access 
to private lands, but that section indicates a consideration that others would have an interest in a 
driveway by providing that the change may not be made in a manner which would "otherwise injure 
any person or persons using or interested in such access." 
Because the grant was not specified as to size and location, the Court finds that in order to 
minimize the burden to Plaintiffs' estate, Plaintiffs would be entitled to move the location of the 
access in such a way that it is convenient, reasonable, accessible, within the limits of the grant, and 
not injurious to Defendants' property. Whether Defendants' property would be injured by the two 
plans proposed by Plaintiffs is highly contested. Whether either of Plaintiffs' proposed plans are 
convenient, reasonable, accessible, and within the limits of the grant also remain questions of fact 
for trial as there has been conflicting evidence presented on these issues. 
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Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment entitling them to choose between the two accesses, 
allowing them to implement the plan of their choosing, requiring Defendants' to cooperate in such a 
process, and decreeing the costs involved in such a move is DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this/ 't ~[January 2010. 
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1031 E. Park Blvd. 
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Fax: (208) 345-8945 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH ,JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THOMAS CRELLIN MANNING and ) 
JULIE ANN MANNING, husband and ) 
wife, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL, an unmarried ) 
individual, and NAOMI LOUISE ) 
CAMPBELL, an unmarried individual, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
___________ ) 
Case No.: CV OC 2009 0007350 
DEFENDANT'S LIST OF 
POTENTIAL TRIAL 
WITNESSES 
COMES NOW Defendants, by and through attorney of record, Joseph L. 
Ellsworth, and hereby provides the following list of potential trial witnesses: 
1. William J. Campbell 
2. Naomi Campbell 
3. Emily Schwartz 
4. Fire Marshall Mark Senteno 
5. Gregg Carter 
DATED this bay of February, 2010. 
q.~~~ 
Jseph ~Ilsworth ~ -=-==---
Attorney for Defendants 
DEFENDANT'S LIST O_F POTENTIAL TRIAL WITNESSES 
000441 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this_!}__ day of February, 2010, I served a true and 
correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method indicated below and 
addressed to the following: 
Thomas Dvorak 
Givens Pursley 
PO Box2720 
BoiselD 83701 
US Mail 
~and Delivery 
Facsimile: 338-1300 
Molly Reyd, Legal Assista9'1'} 
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JOSEPH L. ELLSWORTH, ISB #3702 
~. DA';iD ELLSWORTH, KALLAS, TALBOY & DEFRANCO, P.L.L.C. 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 6y CARLY LATH,10f-1E Ccr-',/,Y 
Boise, ID 83 712 
Phone: (208) 336-1843 
Fax: (208) 345-8945 
ATTORJ\TEY FOR DEFENDANTS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THOMAS CRELLIN MANNING and ) 
JULIE ANN MANNING, husband and ) 
wife, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
VS. ) 
) 
WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL, an unmarried ) 
individual, and NAOMI LOUISE ) 
CAMPBELL, an unmarried individual, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
_______________ ) 
Case No.: CV OC 2009 0007350 
DEFENDANT'S LIST OF 
POTENTIAL TRIAL 
EXHIBITS 
COMES NOW Defendants, by and through attorney of record, Joseph L. 
Ellsworth, and hereby provides the following list of potential trial documents: 
1. Agreement, recorded as Instrument No. 334924 in the records of Ada County, 
Idaho. 
2. Each and every document in the chain of title of Plaintiffs' or Defendants' 
property. 
3. 911 Call memorandum that provides a summary of the telephone call made by 
Plaintiff Julie Ann Manning on or about January 7, 2009. 
4. Note in the handwriting of one of the Plaintiffs that accompanied a tin of 
cookies. 
5. Email or other correspondence between the Mannings and Defendant William 
Can1pbell. 
6. Easement description provided by Gregg Carter. 
7. Each and every document or photo provided in Defendant's Response to 
Discovery Request. 
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I hereby certify that on this 'J day of February, 2010, I served a true and 
correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method indicated below and 
addressed to the following: 
Thomas E. Dvorak 
Givens Pursley LLP 
PO Box 2720 
Boise ID 83701 
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VHand Delivery 
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GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
60 I West Bannock Street 
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Telephone: 208-388-1200 
Facsimile: 208-388-1300 
Attorneys for Tom and Julie Manning 
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[N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THOMAS CRELLIN MANNING and 
JULIE ANN MANNING, husband and 
wife, 
Case No. CV OC 0907350 
Plaintiffs, PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT LIST 
V. 
WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL, an unmarried 
individual, and NAOMI LOUISE 
CAMPBELL, an unmarried individual, 
Defendants. 
COME NOW, Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys of record, Givens Pursley LLP, 
and hereby submits their Exhibit List as of February 9t11, 2010. Plaintiffs reserve the right to 
withdraw, revise, or supplement any of these exhibits, and/or to submit further exhibits to 
conform to proof presented at the time of trial. 
Plaintiffs' Description Stipulated Date Admitted Exhibit Offered 
1. Boise Intranet Map overlaid on aerial photo 
(offered for demonstrative purposes) 
2. Boise Intranet Map overlaid on aerial photo 
(offered for demonstrative purposes) with 
handwritten numbering 
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Plaintiffs' Description Stipulated Date Admitted Exhibit Offered 
3. Illustrative map depicting proposed 
driveway changes, view facing N.E. 
( offered for demonstrative purposes) 
4. Illustrative map depicting proposed 
driveway changes, view facing N. N. E. 
( offered for demonstrative purposes) 
5. Illustrative map depicting proposed 
driveway changes, view facing W. 
( offered for demonstrative purposes) 
6. lllustrative map depicting proposed 
driveway changes, view facing N.W. 
( offered for demonstrative purposes) 
7. Original Parcel Configuration l 952 
Diagram, prepared by Gregory S. Carter 
8. Current Parcel Configuration, prepared by 
Gregory S. Carter 
9. Idaho Survey Group Description for Access 
(Option l) Manning Property, dated April 
14,2009 
10. Idaho Survey Group Description for Access 
Manning Property, dated July 29, 2009 
11. Idaho Survey Group Description for Access 
Manning Property, dated February 9,2010 
12. Photographs of Property 
(12.1-
12.65) 
13. Documents attached to Affidavit of Eric B. 
Nelson filed on October 14, 2009 
13.1 Reference map created by Eric B. Nelson 
depicting current configuration of property 
as of September 1, 2009 
13.2 Reference map created by Eric B. Nelson 
depicting configuration of property at the 
time of the 1952 Agreement 
13.3 Deed between Peter and Nina Jensen and 
Frank and Ida Mattison, dated April 19, 
1950 
13.4 Deed between Peter Jensen and Nina Jensen 
dated April 26, 1951 
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Plaintiffs' Description Stipulated Date Admitted Exhibit Offered 
13.5 Deed between Nina Jensen and Frank and 
Ida Mattison, dated June 18, 1952 
13.6 Decree Establishing Record Title to 
Community Property filed in the Estate of 
Ida Grace Mattison, recorded October 2, 
1965 
13.7 Warranty Deed between Nina Jensen and 
Jack and Barbara Mattison, dated March 7, 
1968 
I 
13.8 Warranty Deed between Frank Mattison and 
Jack Mattison and Chester and Eulah 
Thomas, dated June 8, 1968 
13.9 Warranty Deed between Chester and Eulah 
Thomas and Denis and Karen Hoekler, dated 
June 12, 1974 
13.10 Warranty Deed between Barbara Mattison 
and Chester and Eulah Thomas dated June 
26, 1974 
13.11 Warranty Deed between Denis and Karen 
Hoekler and Nathan and Marjorie Talbot, 
dated September 23, 1975 
13.12 Warranty Deed between Nathan and 
Marjorie Talbot and Alphonse Roy Ill, dated 
November 26, 1976 
13.13 Warranty Deed between Nina Jensen & A. 
Kenison Roy III, dated June 28, 1979 
13.14 Certificate of Marshal's Sale filed in A. 
Kennison Roy Ill bankruptcy, dated October 
1982 
13.15 Warranty Deed between Nina Jensen & A. 
Kenison Roy Ill 
13.16 Trustee's Deed between First American 
Title Company and LOS Life Insurance 
Company, dated April 7, 1983 
13.17 Warranty Deed, Instrument No. 8337595 
13.18 Deed between Lawyers Title Insurance 
Company and Marcelynn Rothermal, dated 
May 2, 1983 
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Plaintiffs' Description Stipulated Date Admitted Exhibit Offered 
13.19 Warranty Deed between Marcelynn 
Rothe1mal and Marcel ynn Rothermal and 
Clarence Rothennal, dated August 22, 1983 
13.20 Warranty Deed between Marcelynn 
Rothermal and Anthony and Vikki 
McQueen, dated November 21, 1986 
13.21 Warranty Deed between Anthony and Vikki 
McQueen and William and Michelle 
Campbell, dated April 29, 1993 
13.22 Quitclaim Deed between Michelle Campbell 
and William Campbell and Naomi Campbell 
dated December 23, 1997 
13.23 Memorandum of Contract between Naomi 
Campbell and William Campbell dated May 
22, 1998 
13.24 Deed between Edward and Virginia Siebert 
and Paul and Mary Boyd, dated January 11, 
1950 
13.25 Agreement between Paul Boyd and Frank 
Mathison, dated July 29, 1952 
13.26 Deed of Distribution by Personal 
Representative between William Boyd as 
Personal Representative of the Estates of 
Paul and Mary Boyd and Mary Paula Boyd 
Davis, dated January 29, 1987 
13.27 Deed of Distribution by Personal 
Representative between William Boyd as 
Personal Representative of the Estates of 
Paul and Mary Boyd and First Security 
Bank, dated January 29, 1987 
13.28 Quitclaim Deed between Mary Paula Boyd 
Davis and Mary Paula Davis, dated February 
23, 2006 
13.29 Warranty Deed between Mary Paula Davis 
to Emily Stenger-Schwartz and Benjamin 
Schwartz dated May 26, 2006 
14. Warranty Deed between Benjamin Schwartz 
and Emily Stegner-Schartz and Thomas and 
Julie Manning recorded October 14, 2008 
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Plaintiffs' Description Stipulated Date Admitted Exhibit Offered 
15. List of talking points created by Thomas & 
Julie Manning and delivered to Bill 
Campbell on February 22, 2009 
16. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' 
Discovery Requests dated July 8, 2009 
(offered for impeachment purposes) 
17. Home Occupation Application submitted by 
Bill Campbell, dated October 6, 2009 
18. Letter to Joseph Ellsworth from Thomas 
Dvorak dated October 16, 2009 
19. Boise City Planning and Development 
Services letter of denial to Bill Campbell 
dated October 21, 2009 
20. Application for Appeal submitted by Bill 
Campbell, dated November 2, 2009 
21. Boise City Planning and Development 
Services letter of appeal denial to Bill 
Campbell dated December 8, 2009 
22. Isuzu Commercial Vehicle Specifications 
23. F. Scott Beecham's biography dated October 
14, 2009 
24. List of land entitlement work completed by 
LandWorks LLC dated October 14, 2009 
25. Gregory G. Carter's biography dated 
October 14, 2009 
26. Photograph of sign left in Manning· s yard 
27. ACHD Driveway Approach Request 
completed by Tom and Julie Manning, 
dated September 1, 2009 
28. ACHD Approval, dated November 3, 2009 
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DATED this 9th day of February, 2010. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 9th day of February, 20 IO, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to the persons listed below the method indicated: 
Joseph L Ellsworth 
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defranco P.LL.C. 
l 031 E. Park Boulevard 
Boise, ID 83712 
Facsimile: 345-8945 
Attorney for Defendants William J. Campbell 
and Naomi Louise Campbell 
><:-Hand Delivery 
Facsimile 
~ Overnight Courier 
U.S. Mail 
Thomas E. Dvorak 
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Thomas E. Dvorak (ID State Bar ID# 5043) 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
Telephone: 208-388-1200 
Facsimile: 208-388-1300 
Attorneys for Tom and Julie Manning 
FILED PM. ____ _ 
Ff:9 0 9 
,J. ~f\VID NAVARRO, Cle1t-. 
6yi'l,GAROEN 
fl~PUW 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THOMAS CRELLIN MANNING and 
JULIE ANN MANNING, husband and 
wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL, an unmarried 
individual, and NAOMI LOUISE 
CAMPBELL, an unmarried individual, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0907350 
PLAINTIFFS' WITNESS LIST 
COME NOW, Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys of record, Givens Pursley LLP, 
and hereby discloses the following as witnesses who may be called at trial in this action: 
1. Tom Manning, Plaintiff 
2. Julie Manning, Plaintiff 
3. William Campbell, Defendant 
4. Naomi Louise Campbell, Defendant 
5. Gregory C. Carter, expert retained by Plaintiffs 
6. Ben Schwartz, sold property to Plaintiffs 
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7. Emily Stegner-Schwartz, sold property to Plaintiffs 
8. Dr. Paul Baehr, neighbor adjacent to Plaintiffs' property 
9. Margie Baehr, neighbor adjacent to Plaintiffs' property 
10. Eric B. Nelson, Givens Pursley LLP Real Estate paralegal and expert on behalf of 
Plaintiffs 
l l. Scott Beecham, expert retained by Plaintiffs 
12. John Wakelum, inspected tree located on border of properties 
13. City of Boise employee of Planning and Zoning to authenticate records; 
14. Ada County Highway District employee to authenticate records; 
l 5. Plaintiffs reserve the right to call any witness identified by Defendants, without 
waving any objection to Defendants' witnesses. Plaintiffs intend this disclosure to 
include witnesses, who have been previously identified by either party, or any 
witness who is needed to lay a foundation for any exhibit, as well as any witness for 
the purpose of impeachment or rebuttal. 
DATED this 9th day of February, 2010. 
PLAINTIFFS' WITNESS LIST- 2 
GIV~~ 
Thomas E. Dvorak 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 9th day of February, 2010, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to the persons listed below the method indicated: 
Joseph L. Ellsworth 
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defranco P .L.L.C. 
1031 E. Park Boulevard 
Boise, ID 83712 
Facsimile: 345-8945 
Attorney for Defendants William J Campbell 
and Naomi Louise Campbell 
½Hand Delivery 
Facsimile 
_ Overnight Courier 
U.S. Mail 
Thomas E. Dvorak 
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GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
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Telephone: 208-388-1200 
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Attorneys for Tom and Julie Manning 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUl\JTY OF ADA 
THOMAS CRELLIN MANNING and 
JULIE ANN MANNING, husband and 
wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL, an unmarried 
individual, and NAOMI LOUISE 
CAMPBELL, an unmarried individual, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0907350 
PLAINTIFFS' PRETRIAL 
MEMORANDUM 
Comes now the Plaintiffs, Dr. Tom and Julie Manning, by and through their counsel of 
record, and hereby file this Pretrial Memorandum 
INTRODUCTION 
According to the Memorandum Decision and Order filed on January 19, 2010 
("Memorandum Decision") by this Court, there are only two remaining factual issues requiring 
trial, namely (a) the location of the easement, and (b) whether either of Plaintiffs' two proposed 
locations for relocation of the driveway are convenient, reasonable, accessible and within the 
limits of the grant. Plaintiffs submit that out of both fidelity to the language of the original 1952 
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Driveway Agreement, and in light of current circumstances including safety considerations, 
either of the alternate locations sought by Plaintiffs would be a suitable location for this 
easement in the first instance. If the Court determines, however, that the easement should 
instead be located in the vicinity of the current driveway, the Plaintiffs contend (a) that they have 
a right to move said easement to one or the other proposed locations sought in the Amended 
Complaint; and (b) that Defendants cannot show material injury under the applicable statute such 
that would bar Plaintiffs from exercising their right to move the location of the easement. 
A Reasonable Determination of Location Would Place the Original Easement at 
Either of th·e Locations that Plaintiffs Have Asked to Which it Be Moved. 
The 1952 Driveway Agreement at issue in this case does not provide for a precise 
location. It has some language, however, which should aid in determining where it should go on 
the grow1d. Language that this Court did repeatedly cite in the Memorandum Decision. The 
1952 Driveway Agreement provides the use of the driveway is to be in a ''northerly and 
southerly direction, far enough to allow [Campbell] to enter upon [his] premises, which adjoin 
the premises of [the Mannings] on the East side of [the Manning] premises." The Court 
interpreted this language to mean that an easement was created "for the limited purpose of 
allowing the residents of the adjacent premises the ordinary use of a driveway for ingress and 
egress far enough to allow the residents to enter upon their property." Memorandum Decision at 
p. 13. The Court also found that the access was limited to "to a single family residence adjoining 
the servient property on the east side" and noted that use of an easement to serve another parcel 
besides the dominant estate is impermissible as a matter of law. Memorandum Decision at p. 17. 
It is Plaintiffs' position then that the law of this case is that the location of the easement is to be 
limited to only so much of the servient estate as is necessary at the present time (i.e., the time 
today that we are locating the easement), as is necessary to access the southern parcel of 
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Defendants' property. The Court will recall that the southern parcel is the only parcel that was 
owned by the parties benefited by the Driveway Agreement in 1952. 
Where the easement grants "only a right of ingress and egress, it is the right of passage, 
and not any right in a physical passageway itself, that is granted to the easement holder." Lewis 
v. Young, 92 N.Y.2d 443,449, 705 N.E.2d 649 (NY Ct. App. 1998). Thus, the easement 
holder's continued use of the access in a particular way will not alter the servient owner's right 
to relocate, and mere use is neither hostile nor adverse. Id. at 452. In defining the easement 
location, the Court should take into consideration "the condition and use of the servient premises 
and the purposes the easement was intended to serve," while understanding the grantee is entitled 
to a reasonable way. State ex rel. Hillhouse v. Hunter R~[fety Elevator, Inc., 636 S. W.2d 400, 
402 (Mo. Ct. App. (1982). Thus, the location of the easement shall meet the reasonable 
convenience of both parties, and both parties' rights shall be considered. 0 'Brien v. Richter, 455 
S.W.2d 473 (1970); Gardner v. Webster, 64 N.H. 520, 15 A. 144, 145 (1888). This is in accord 
with the Idaho law cited by this Court in the Memorandum Decision: 
A grant indefinite as to width and location must impose no greater 
burden than is necessary. Coulsen v. Aberdeen-Springfield Canal 
Co., 47 Idaho 619,628,277 P. 542,545 (1929). "Where a 
conveyance of a right of way does not definitely fix its location, 
the grantee is entitled to a convenient, reasonable and accessible 
way within the limits of the grant." Bethel v. Van Stone, 120 Idaho 
522, 527-28, 817 P .2d 188, 193-94 (Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Quinn 
v. Stone, 75 Idaho 243, 246-47, 270 P.2d 825, 826 (1954). 
Memorandum Decision at p. 18. 
In the present case, continued past use of the same path does not fix an otherwise 
undefined location because the physical driveway itself does not particularly locate legal 
boundaries of the passage way. It is only because of the present litigation that this Court has the 
occasion to locate the driveway easement on the ground today, and the Court should take into 
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account existing facts and circumstances, in light of the expressed and implicit intent of the 
express language of the 1952 Driveway Agreement in determining that location. The actual use 
of the driveway is only one factor that the Court need look at, and is a factor that the Court has 
discretion to place limited importance upon. For this and the following reasons, the Court should 
only place minimal weight on the actual location of the use of the easement over time and 
instead look to other factors. 
First and foremost, the driveway in question no longer proceeds in a north and south 
direction. The garage on the Mannings' property is now located on the west side of the property 
and the driveway sweeps in an arc to the west to get to the Mannings' garage. A branch of the 
driveway heads east in arc to serve the dominant estate. 
A second factor to consider in modern times is that the Ada County Highway District, 
which has jurisdiction over unopened right of way abutting both properties on their southern 
border, appears to be willing to allow use of enough of its right of way so that not as much of the 
Manning property is necessary. This fact makes use of less of the Manning property necessary, 
in keeping with and honoring the intent of the "far enough as" language of the original Driveway 
Agreement. Certainly, it is believed that ACHD has already given written approval to the use of 
the right of way for Campbell's use. But in any event, even if more process is needed before 
ACHD to obtain approval, the Court can require Campbell to reasonably cooperate in the 
approval process before ACHD can designate an alternate location for the easement in the event 
that ACHD does not give approval. 
Further, in 1952, there were relatively no zoning regulations. Since that time, a panoply 
of regulation has developed, including regulation regarding the minimum width of a driveway in 
the City of Boise, which is placed at 9 feet. See Boise City Code Section 11-10-04.02.G and 11-
10-04.03.J.2. A copy of the relevant code provision is submitted with this Memorandum for 
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ease of the Court's reference. This width should be considered by the Court in any event in 
determining how wide the easement granted should be determined to be. 
A fourth factor the Court should consider is safety. Although he does not have this right 
as part of the access foreseeable to a single family residence, nor has he been given permission 
by City zoning authorities, Mr. Campbell has continued to use the driveway for ingress and 
egress for his seven ton plumbing truck. This truck appears to be his sole means of 
transportation. The Court can and should consider safety of the members of the household of the 
servient estate, which at this time includes small children, in locating this easement on the 
ground as close to the dominant estate as is practicable. 
Based on the forgoing, the Mannings would respectively submit that the location of the 
easement conferred by the 1952 Driveway Agreement should in this year 20 IO - 58 years after 
the original agreement was silent upon the same - be determined by the Court to lie in one of the 
following locations, with first priority being given to the first stated location, second priority to 
the next, etc: 
1. At the alternative location sought by the Mannings' Amended Complaint using 
the ACHD right of way and described in said Complaint ("ACHD Location"); 
2. At the alternative location sought by the Mannings' Amended Complaint 
without using the ACHD right of way and described in said Complaint 
("Alternate Non-ACHD Location"); 
3. At a variation of the forgoing two locations that takes into account any facts 
raised at trial that affect location, but still honors the intent of the original 
agreement, with Surveyor Greg Carter to be instructed by the Court on any 
variations from the Alternate ACHD Location ("To Be Determined Alternate 
Location"); 
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4. At the southeastern most nine feet of the existing driveway's arc to the east, 
i.e., to the Campbell property, as will be described by Surveyor Greg Carter at 
trial ("Existing Driveway Location"). 
It is submitted that the Court is not rigidly locked into declaring the Existing Driveway Location 
as the current location of this easement. The law allows this Court flexibility to site the easement 
in a location that fits with the current use and regulation of the properties and avenues that are 
currently available for access. The ACHD Location and Alternate Non-ACHD Location most fit 
this bill. In the event that the Court through testimony determines that there is an issue with 
either of those locations, this Court itself has the discretion to instruct the surveyor how to locate 
the To Be Determined Alternate Location in a way that modifies either the ACHD Location or 
Alternate Non-ACHD Location. 
B. The "Injury" Described Under Idaho Code Section 55-313 Must be Material and 
Substantial Before It Works a Bar on the Servient Estate Owner's Right to Move 
the Easement 
In the event the Court determines that the Easement should be sited at the Existing 
Driveway Location or other location not sought by the Mannings in the lawsuit, then Idaho Code 
Section 55-313 gives the Mannings the right to relocate the easement at issue. Specifically, the 
Idaho Code allows the person controlling "any access ... constructed across private lands," the 
right "to change such access to any other part of the private land," as long as the change does not 
.. injure any person ... using ... such access." LC.§ 55-313. In interpreting that code section, this 
Court found "that in order to minimize the burden to Plaintiffs' estate, Plaintiffs would be 
entitled to move the location of the access in such a way that is convenient, reasonable, 
accessible, within the limits of the grant, and not injurious to Defendants' property." 
Although Section 55-313 does not indicate the level of injury that is necessary to negate 
the right to relocate, reason and interpretation dictate that the injury must be substantial. Even 
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where a servient estate owner is not trying to move an easement, the law affords the servient 
estate owner great flexibility in what use the servient owner can make of the easement premises, 
drawing the line at "material" interference. Conley v. Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 265, 272, 985 P.2d 
1127, 1134 (1999) ("[T]he owner of the servient estate is entitled to use the estate in any 
manner .. . which does not materially interfere with the use of the easement by the dominant 
estate owner.") (emphasis added); Boydstun Beach Association v. Allen, 111 Idaho 370, 377, 723 
P.2d 914,921 (Id. Ct. App. 1986). Idaho courts have not specifically defined "injury" under 
Section 55-313, but it stands to reason that this same "materiality" requirement comes into play 
in determining the level of injury that must be present before a servient estate owner is stopped 
from exercising the right to move the easement under§ 55-313. "[A] general grant of an 
easement is not restricted to the use reasonably required at the time of the grant," and thus, any 
argument that any variation and relocation is injurious or impermissible has no merit. Argosy 
Trust ex rel. Its Trustee v. Wininger, 141 Idaho 570,573, 114 P.3d 128, 131 (2005). 
The idea that injury must be substantial before the right to relocate is eliminated is also 
supported by reasonable statutory construction principles. To allow injury to mean any minimal 
grievance less than substantial injury would negate the purpose of the statute and render it 
wholly absurd. Inherent in any relocation is the element of change, and with change comes the 
need for additional effort to incorporate something different into one's daily routine. This could 
be viewed as injury and nullify the statute by effectively eliminating the right of relocation, 
because any movement of the easement location would be "injurious". Even if short term injury 
was considered enough to avoid relocation, the right to relocate would never be exercised 
because any relocation demands effort and resources to make it work which creates a short tenn 
hardship until such relocation becomes established. Here, it is incumbent upon this Court to give 
a statute an interpretation which will not render it a nullity. State v. Patterson, 148 Idaho 166, 
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219 P.3d 813 (Id. Ct. App. 2009); State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641,646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (Id. Ct. 
App. 2001). 
Interpretation of the level of injury required before the right to relocate cannot be 
exercised follows the general rules of interpretation for any statute, and "[ c ]onstructions that 
would lead to absurd or unreasonably harsh results are disfavored." In re Idaho Dept. of Water 
Resources Amended Final Order Creating Water Dist. No. 170, 148 Idaho 200,220 P.3d 318, 
328 (2009); In re Daniel W,. 145 Idaho 677,680, 183 P.3d 765, 768 (2008); State v. Doe, 140 
Idaho 271,275, 92 P.3d 521,525 (2004); State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680,690, 85 P.3d 656,666 
(2004); Gavica v. Hanson, 101 Idaho 58, 60,608 P.2d 861, 863 (1980). The "elementary rule" 
in Idaho, is that '·a statute should be construed so that effect is given to all provisions, so that no 
part thereof will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section will 
not destroy another." Norton v. Department of Employment, 94 Idaho 924,928,500 P.2d 825, 
829 (1972). Surely the legislature did not intend to create a right to relocate which could be so 
easily taken away with a complaint of any injury whatsoever. When determining the meaning of 
a statute, the Court must also consider the "reasonableness of proposed constructions," and "the 
public policy behind the statute." Hayden Lake Fire Prat. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 398-99, 
111 P.3d 73, 83-84 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Schwartz, 139 
Idaho 360,362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003)). Ultimately, this Court shall "construe [the] statute so 
that effect is given to [ all of] its provisions and no part is rendered superfluous or insignificant," 
and determine a substantial level of injury is required before the already hindered servient 
owners are stripped of the right to relocate the easement. Moreland v. Adams, 143 Idaho 687, 
690, 152 P.3d 558, 561 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Idaho Cardiology 
Assocs., P.A. v. Idaho Physicians Network, Inc., 141 Idaho 223,226, 108 P.3d 370,373 (2005)). 
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Besides (a) logical extension to the context of moving an easement of the right of a 
servient estate owner to make full use of the easement premises as long as the same can be 
accomplished without ··material" injury, and (b) a common sense interpretation of the language 
of§ 55-313, additional support is present for the substantial injury standard in the form of 
persuasive authority from other jurisdictions. The Restatement (Third) of Property further 
defines injury to the dominant owner and allows the owner of the servient estate to change the 
location of an easement as long as the changes do not "(a) significantly lessen the utility of the 
easement, (b) increase the burdens on the owner of the easement, or (c) frustrate the purpose for 
which the easement was created." Restatement (Third) of Property§ 4.8(3) (emphasis added). 
These parameters indicate that some sort of substantial and material injury is needed to limit the 
relocation rights of the servient owner. The proposed easement location shows no potential to 
"frustrate the purpose," of the easement, but rather furthers the goals of the grant, as the current 
access point is much further than necessary for ingress and egress and conflicts with the "far 
enough" language in the grant. This right of relocation is especially important when the servient 
owner can show the easement has become more burdensome. Ogden v. Bankston, 398 So.2d 
103 7 ( 1981 ). Plaintiffs indeed have shown the burden of allowing the current access over the 
driveway to continue. 
In interpreting the Restatement (Third) of Property, one court has explained that the 
owner of the servient estate should be able "to make the fullest use of his ... property ... subject 
only to the requirement that he ... not damage other vested rights holders." MP.M Builders LLC 
v. Dwyer, 442 Mass. 87, 91, 809 N.E.2d 1053, 1057 (2004). Certainly there will be no actual 
damage to the "ingress and egress" right of Defendants, and Plaintiffs are entitled to relieve the 
current burden in a manner reasonable to both parties. Moreover, the easement language is to be 
given its plain and ordinary meaning. Lago v. Guerrette, 219 Conn. 262, 268, 592 A.2d 939, 
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942 (Conn., 1991) (The language of the grant will be given its ordinary import in the absence of 
anything in the situation or surrounding circumstances which indicates a contrary intent.); 
lvfackin v. Mackin, 186 Conn. 185,439 A.2d 1086 (1982). Here, the easement is only to give 
"ingress and egress," and just "far enough to allow [the other party] to enter upon their 
premises.'' 
This change in location is necessary and can and should be made now "to permit normal 
use or development of the servient estate.'' Restatement (Third) of Property § 4.8. Although a 
dominant owner is entitled to a reasonable way across the land, it "should cross no more of the 
[servient O\\lner's] land than is reasonably necessary." Gardner v. Webster, 64 N.H. 520, 15 A. 
144, 145 (1888). The current location of the easement imposes a greater burden than is necessary 
on Plaintiffs in direct conflict with the applicable law, and Plaintiffs have offered an alternate 
route that does not substantially injure Defendants and actually more closely adheres to goals of 
the original grant. Argosy Trust ex rel. Its Trustee v. Wininger, 141 Idaho 570, 572, 114 P.3d 
128, 130 (2005); See also Conley v. Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 265,270, 985 P.2d 1127, 1132 (1999) 
("A grant indefinite as to width and location must impose no greater burden than is necessary."). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also agreed that when an easement does not define the access 
location, "the law bounds it by the line of reasonable enjoyment," which means an easement 
must not interfere with the servient owner's rights. Quinn v. Stone, 75 Idaho 243, 246, 270 P.2d 
825, 827 (1954). 
Plaintiffs' adjusting the access point for the easement does not substantially injure 
Defendants because it does not alter the fact that Defendants have a right to ingress and egress 
across Plaintiff's land. In truth, Plaintiff's adjustment furthers the goals of the easement 
language as the ingress and egress of Defendants is only to be "far enough" to allow the access. 
PLAINTiffS' PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM - 10 000464 
1¥ 
DATED this L day of February, 2010. 
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GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
{ 
as E. Dvorak 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
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2. The parking facility for such proposed joint use is no further than 600 feet from the 
building, structure or use for which the off-street parking is required; and 
3. The parties concerned in the joint use of off street parking facilities shall submit a written 
agreement in a form to be recorded for such joint use, approved by the City Attorney as to form 
and content, and such agreement, when approved as conforming to the provisions of this Chapter, 
shall be recorded in the office of the County Recorder and copies thereof filed with the Planning 
and Development Services Department. 
The Planning Director will review the application relative to the approval criteria and make a 
determination of approval or denial within fifteen ( 15) calendar days of receipt of application and 
will submit the findings and conclusions, with required conditions, in writing to the applicant. In 
the event the Planning Director approves said application, a radius notice will be sent informing 
owners of properties within 300 feet of the subject property of the Planning Director's decision 
and of their right to appeal that decision pursuant to Section 11-03-07.01 of this ordinance. 
(6065, Amended, 06/05/2001; 5895, Amended, 02/23/1999) 
Section 11-10-04 PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PARKING AREAS 
(5777, Amended, 01/28/1997) 
Section 11-10-04.01 Ingress and Egress 
Access driveways providing reasonable access to required private or public parking areas 
including garages may extend through the front or street side setback in a perpendicular manner provided 
they comply with section 11-10-04.03.I. Driveways which extend through the setback in other than a 
perpendicular manner may be approved if due to physical limitations of the site or for aesthetic or safety 
purposes. The Planning Director may approve such unusual driveways upon a determination that the 
following are true: 
1. The driveway is clearly for access to a garage or parking area; and 
2. The proposed driveway does not have a negative impact on adjacent properties; and 
3. The driveway is required because of physical limitations of the site; or 
4. The driveway is required to enhance the aesthetics of the site such as preserving existing trees; or 
5. The driveway is required for safety reasons such as avoiding backing into a busy street or a street 
with limited motorist visibility. 
Driveways which are not approved by the Planning Director require a variance from the 
Planning & Zoning Commission or Hearing Examiner. 
(6315, Amended, 04/20/2004; Ord. 5919, Amended, 07/28/1999; 5777, Amended, 01/28/1997) 
Section 11-10-04.02 Residential District Parking 
Public or private parking areas and parking spaces shall not be permitted in any required yard of 
any residential land use district, except as follows: 
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A. Trailers, camp trailers, boats, boat trailers, recreational vehicles and all other vehicles not in daily 
use are restricted from parking in the front and street side yard setbacks or adjacent street for 
more than forty eight ( 48) hours. 
B. Alley loaded parking and parking structures may encroach into rear or interior side setbacks per 
section 11-04-04. 0 l.B. 
C. Open air public or private parking areas and service drives, which are utilized in conjunction with 
any building or use permitted in a residential land use district, shall be permitted in side yards that 
do not abut a street; provided that a minimum five foot (5') wide landscaping and screening area 
be constructed and maintained adjacent to the adjoining property line as provided for in Section 
I 1-10-4.4. No vehicle or the parking thereof shall be permitted in said minimum five foot (5') 
wide landscaping and screening area. In the case of detached single family residential uses in the 
R-IA, R-IB, R-IC, R-2 and R-3 districts, a three foot (3') wide landscaping and screening area is 
required. 
D. Cars, trucks, trailers, boats, boat trailers and recreational vehicles shall not be parked on: 
I. Required yard areas; and, 
2. Unimproved parking areas; and, 
3. Areas not designed for vehicle parking; and, 
4. The required side and rear yard setbacks; and, 
5. Adjacent residential zoned street for more than forty eight (48) hours. 
E. No commercial vehicle or trailer shall be parked, stored, or otherwise left unattended at any place 
in a residential district whether on a lot or on the public right-of-way for over two (2) hours 
except while actually engaged in pickup or delivery activities, or during the course of actual 
construction, alteration or repair of buildings and structures or any other permitted use in the 
immediate proximity. 
F. All parking areas, driveways, and other vehicular access, for single family or two-family 
residential uses, shall be paved of asphalt, concrete, or other hard surface material approved by 
the Planning director. Other residential uses are subject to standards in accordance with Sections 
I 1-10-04.03 and I I-J0-04.04. 
G. Driveways for single family or two-family residential uses shall be a minimum of nine feet (9') 
wide. Driveways or service drives for other residential uses are subject to Section 11-10-04.03.J. 
H. Interior garage dimensions shall comply with Section 11-10-04.04.A. l. 
J. Driveways are permitted in the front and street side setbacks in accordance with Section 11 -10-
04.01. 
J. For single family residential uses, individual driveways in the front setback shall not exceed a 
width of thirty-three feet (33') within the setback. For the purpose of this section, individual 
driveways are those vehicular access ways separated from any other vehicular access way by a 
minimum of five feet (5') of landscaping or similar material not designed to accommodate 
vehicles. More restrictive standards shall prevail where applicable. 
K. The Planning Director may permit up to one half(l/2) of the parking required for a single family 
or two-family residential use to conform to compact parking stall dimensional standards on lots 
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having topographic or other physical constraints. However, interior garage dimensions must 
comply with Section ll-10-04.04.A. l and the requirements of this section. 
L. Parking on substandard lots of record is regulated by section 11-04-14.03 F. 
( 6461, Amended, 04/04/2006; 6315, Amended, 04/20/2004; 6127, Amended, 02/26/2002; 6096, Amended, I 0/23/200 I; Ord. 
5919, Amended, 07/28/1999; 5777, Amended, 01/28/1997) 
Section 11-10-04.03 Required Findings 
A. Service drives: (1) may not adversely affect access or good public transportation planning to 
adjacent property and to the area travel networks, (2) may not landlock adjacent property due to 
topographic or parcel layout, and (3) may not interfere with the continuity of public streets. When 
public streets are feasible and necessary to the proper development of the public street system as 
determined by the Highway District, then public streets shall be required. 
B. Service drives shall be designed and constructed to facilitate the flow of traffic, provide 
maximum safety for traffic ingress and egress, and provide maximum safety for pedestrian and 
vehicular traffic on site. 
C. The service drive must not encourage or promote the use of the service drive as a "pass-through" 
between public streets. 
D. Grade: Maximum grade for service drives shall be ten percent (10%) unless specifically 
approved by the City Engineer and the Boise City Fire Chief. A maximum grade of two percent 
(2%), unless specifically approved by the Highway District and City Engineer, shall be required 
for the initial 80 feet from the intersecting curb to provide a landing at the junction of the service 
drive and the public right-of-way. 
E. Where determined by the City Engineer for drainage control, vertical curbing is required. 
F. Except single-family or two-family dwellings on a single lot, parking spaces in groups of three or 
more (3+) shall be served by a service drive designed to prevent backing onto a public street. 
G. Service drives shall comply with the requirements of the Fire Department. 
H. Service drives shall be designed to intersect the public right-of-way at a 90 degree angle or as 
near to that angle as possible. Discrepancies shall require review and approval by both the City 
Engineer and the Highway District. 
I. A service drive, which provides access to any type or degree of development from a local street, 
shall be setback a minimum of fifty feet (50') from an intersection of public streets as depicted in 
the following manner. Under unusual circumstances, the Planning Director may waive this 
requirement. 
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LOCAL STREET ~- -50' -- -
SIDEWALK 
STREET YARD 
PROPERTY Lll'iE 
SERVICE DRCVE SETBACK 
J. Service Drive Widths: 
1. Drive through lanes and associated escape lanes shall each be a minimum of ten feet (10') 
wide. 
2. A driveway for a single-family dwelling and for a two-family dwelling may be a 
minimum of nine feet (9') wide. 
3. One-way service drives without parking on either side shall be a minimum of ten feet 
(10') wide. Two-way service drives without parking on either side shall be a minimum of 
twenty feet (20') wide. 
4. Garages shall be setback twenty feet (20') or greater, or between 3-8 feet from the edge of 
the service drive. The combined width of the service drive and the garage setback shall be 
a minimum of twenty-eight feet (28'). 
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5. Except at the intersection of a service drive and public road, the service drive shall be 
narrowed to twenty feet (20') where occupied by a crosswalk. 
6. Twenty-four feet (24') of clear width shall be maintained between building 
appurtenances, such as carport overhangs, that border service drives. 
CARPORT 
PARKING ST ALL SERVICE DRIVE 
22' WIDE 
CARPORl 
PARKlNG STALL 
(6315, Amended, 04/20/2004; 5777, Amended, 01/28/1997) 
Section 11-10-04.04 Parking Area and Service Drive Improvements 
All public or private parking areas and parking spaces shall be designed and laid out to conform 
to the minimum standards required by this Chapter and in accordance with the minimum standards for 
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parking lot design as follows: 
A. Minimum dimensional standards for parking lot designs are stated in "TABLE 12, Minimum 
Standards for Parking Lot Design." 
1. The minimum unobstmcted interior width of a two-car private residential garage shall be 
twenty (20) feet. The minimum unobstmcted depth of the stalls must be 20 feet for the 
first stall and may be 16 feet for the second stall. These dimensions must be kept clear of 
any permanent obstmctions including, but not limited to, mechanical units. 
2. Vehicle backup areas shall be provided. This area may include the width of a service 
drive or alley. 
TABLE12 
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR PARKING LOT DESIGN 
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR STANDARD VEHICLES 
Parking Stall Width Curb Length Per Stall Depth Driveway 
Angle Car 
E 
A B C D 
oo 9'- 0" 23'- 0" 9'- 0" 12'- 0" 
20° 9'- 0" 26'- 4" 15'- 3" 11 '- 0" 
30° 9'- 0" 18'- 0" 17'- 8" 11 '- 0" 
40° 9'- 0" 14'- 0" 19'- 6" 12'- 0" 
45° 9'- 0" 12'- 9" 20'- 5" 13'- 0" 
50° 9'- 0" 11 '- 9" 21 '- 0" 14'- 0" 
60° 9'- 0" 10'- 5" 21'- 10" 16'- 0" 
70° 9'- 0" 9'- 8" 21'-10" 18'- 0" 
80° 9'- 0" 9'- 2" 21 '- 4" 20'- 0" 
90° 9'- 0" 9'- 0" 20'- 0" 22'- O" 
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR COMP ACT VEHICLES 
Width 
Parking Angle Stall Width Curb Length Per Stall Depth Driveway 
Car Width 
A B 
C D E 
45° 7'- 6" 10'- 611 16'- 0" 11 '- O" 
60° 7'- 6" 8'- 9" 16'- 9" 14'- O" 
75° 7'- 6" 7'- 10" 16'- 4" 17'- 5" 
90° 7'- 6" 7'- 6" 15'- 0" 20'- 0" 
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B. Surfacing: All parking lots, service drives, vehicle storage areas, and vehicle sales lots shall be 
paved and constructed to meet the Highway District's and Boise City Fire Code standards, 
whichever is more restrictive, for base course and asphaltic concrete mat thickness; curbs and 
gutters where applicable; utilizing the appropriate traffic index. The design shall be prepared by a 
licensed, professional engineer. 
Exceptions: Gravel surface may be utilized within industrial zones for enclosed storage yards or 
grounds maintenance areas and for recreational vehicle storage lots approved through the 
Conditional Use Permit process. Gravel surface may be allowed in commercial zones where the 
outdoor storage use has been approved through a Conditional Use Permit. Within the commercial 
zones, storage yards must be enclosed by a 6 foot high, solid fence and may not be located in 
front of the main building. All areas must obtain approval from the Boise City Fire Department 
and the Boise City Public Works Department. 
Note: Regardless of the zone or use, all required parking shall be paved, all of the Highway 
District's requirements for access and paving shall be met, and landscape buffers and landscape 
yards shall be provided as required by the Zoning Ordinance. If the driveway is serving as a 
required fire lane, it must be paved. 
Maintenance of gravel areas should utilize the Best Management Practices set forth in the "Boise 
Storm Water BMP Guidebook" and the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality "Catalog of 
Stormwater BMPs for Cities and Counties." 
C. Grading: Except parking areas for single-family and two-family dwellings, parking areas shall be 
graded to prevent storm water runoff from crossing the sidewalk or from rum1ing onto adjacent 
properties or rights-of-way. 
D. Bumper: All parking areas shall be provided with a substantial wheel restraint which will prevent 
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cars from encroaching upon abutting private and public property or overhanging beyond the 
designated parking stall dimensions or as allowed by Section 11-10-4.4E, except that the 
requirements of this subsection may be waived by the Commission or the Design Review 
Committee for proper cause. 
E. Bumper Overhang: When the Commission or Design Review Committee approves parking stall 
dimensions that allow bumper overhang onto a sidewalk or landscape strip, the parking stall 
dimension may be reduced two feet (2') in length if two feet (2') in width is added to the required 
sidewalk or landscape strip. Bumper overhang shall not damage landscaping. 
F. Landscaping and Screening: All parking and storage areas (except those in conjunction with 
single family residences) including vehicle sales areas, truck parking areas, bus parking areas and 
service drives shall meet the following standards: 
1. Along all streets there must be provided a continuous landscape area in accordance with 
the following standards. 
(a) The Commission or Committee shall require street trees with a minimum size of 
2" caliper in the landscape area. Tree type to be in accordance with the "Boise City 
Street Tree Planting and Selection Guide." 
(b) Shrubs, lawn or other ground cover approved by the Commission or Committee 
shall be installed in all landscape areas. Landscape plants shall not include plastic or 
other artificial materials. The use of rock mulch shall be allowed at the discretion of the 
Design Review Committee. Only natural colored rock mulch shall be allowed with no 
patterning of the material. 
( c) All landscaped areas shall be provided with an underground irrigation system. 
2. A minimum 5-6 ft. high solid screen shall be provided when a parking lot is adjacent to 
residential land uses. This screen may include fencing, walls and/or landscape 
combinations that will provide a dense barrier. 
3. A minimum of 5% of the parking lot area, including drives, shall be landscaped with 
interior planters. Perimeter required landscaping shall not constitute part of the 
percentage. 
The Commission or Committee may approve a transfer of all or part of the required 
interior landscaping to other areas of the site. 
4. Existing healthy trees should be retained as approved by Boise Community Forestry and 
the Design Review Committee/Commission and be considered in the design and grading 
of the property. 
The Planning Director may grant up to a 10% reduction m the required number of 
parking spaces in order to preserve an existing tree(s). 
G. A clear vision triangle shall be observed in regard to all visual barriers including all vegetation 
( except deciduous trees pruned at least 8 ft. in height above the sidewalk and 14 feet above the 
roadway), walls, signs, vehicles, solid fences or other sight obstructions exceeding three (3) feet 
in height. 
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H. Lighting: Any lights provided to illuminate any public or private parking area or vehicle sales 
area shall be so arranged as to reflect the light away from any abutting or adjacent residential land 
use district or residential use. 
I. Marking: All parking spaces shall be substantially marked in compliance with the provisions of 
this Ordinance. The edge of a service drive shall be marked when bordered by garages that are 
setback from said service drive. 
J. Ingress and egress of parking structures shall be designed with due regard for visibility and 
safety. 
K. A "Travel Safety Plan" identifying the traffic sign needs of a development shall be submitted with 
the development application for review by the Planning Department. The plan shall show sif,'11 
types and locations for parking and no parking areas; speed; stop; and cautionary signs for the 
safe flow of pedestrian, bicycle, and vehicular traffic. 
L. Pedestrian Access: The development shall provide sidewalks and crosswalks that completely link 
transit stations, parking areas, buildings, open spaces and adjacent pathways. Sidewalks shall be 
at least four feet ( 4') wide, sited and illuminated to provide safe passage and observation of the 
pathway route. Sidewalk crossings of service drives shall be provided and clearly distinguished 
from the service drive. 
M. Service drive and parking lots shall allow public access to places of public use and/or interest. 
N. Utility Location: Residential projects, that at a later date may be subdivided, should place utilities 
in the roadway or in easements parallel and next to the roadway. Projects that are later subdivided 
and do not comply with this recommendation may be subject to sif,'Ilificant reconstruction and 
relocation costs. 
0. As a means to improve traffic safety and to improve the visual quality of an area, the number of 
driveway intersections with public or private roadway in residential projects shall be minimized. 
Use of parking courts, alleys and common driveways is strongly encouraged. 
P. Service drives that serve more than 40 dwelling units will be designed based upon the standards 
of this ordinance and by a traffic plan prepared by a traffic engineer, submitted to and approved 
by the Planning Division and the Public Works Department for the interior roadway and parking 
system. The required transportation plan shall include the following information: The adequacy 
of approach streets and highways to accommodate development traffic; the need to expand or 
modify existing facilities; the locations and design of development driveways; pedestrian and 
bicycle facilities; consideration for service/emergency vehicular movement; safety for vehicular 
and pedestrian traffic; livability of the residential environment; economy of land use, construction 
and maintenance; and recommended street layout and dimensional standards. This requirement 
may be waived when it can be shown by the applicant that no section of on-site roadway will 
exceed 240 vehicles per day. 
(Ord. 6564, Amended, 05/15/2007; 6386, Amended, 02/22/2005; Ord. 5919, Amended, 07/28/1999; 5895, Amended, 
02/23/l 999; 5865, Amended, 09/29/1998; 5777, Amended, 01/28/1997; 5233, Amended, 05/08/1990) 
Section 11-10-04.05 Off-street Parking and Loading Requirement Schedule 
Parking spaces required for designated uses are set forth in Table 13. 
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JOSEPH L. ELLSWORTH, ISB #3702 
ELLS\VORTH, KALLAS, TALBOY & DEFRANCO P.L.L.C. 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83712 
Phone: (208) 336-1843 
Fax: (208) 345-8945 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS 
4',J<:.r~. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THOMAS CRELLIN MANNING and 
JULIE ANN MANNING, husband and 
wi,fe, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL, an unmarried) 
Individual, and NAOMI LOUISE ) 
CAMPBELL, an unmarried individual, ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
Case No.: CV OC 2009 0007350 
DEFENDANTS' TRIAL 
MEMORANDUM 
COMES NOW William J. Campbell and Naomi Louise Campbell ("Campbell"), 
Defendants in the above-entitled action, through counsel, Joseph L. Ellsworth, and hereby 
submits this trial memorandum to the court. 
CURRENT STATUS OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is a case involving a written easement for a common driveway in existence and 
use in the exact formation since July 29, 1952. Bill Campbell has personally used this 
express easement for more than seventeen years (longer than any prescriptive period under 
Idaho Law) and without anyone's permission. These facts are undisputed. 
000477 y DEFENDANT'S TRIAL MEMORANDUM 
/1. 
The Plaintiffs ("Mannings") are the next-door neighbors to Bill Campbell and Naomi 
Campbell. Bill Campbell has occupied the property for seventeen years and has been using 
the driveway the entire time. See Affidavit of Bill Campbell. 
The driveway is a joint or common use driveway that has been governed by a 
written agreement between the neighbors since July 29, 1952. The agreement drafted by 
local attorney Paul S. Boyd created a perpetual right to use the common driveway by his 
then neighbors, Frank and Idaho Mattison. The agreement states in pertinent part: 
That Paul S. Boyd and Mary M. Boyd in consideration of $112.50, lawful money 
of the United States, to them in hand by Frank N. Mattison and Ida Grace 
Mattison, do hereby grant unto Frank N. Mattison and Idaho Grace Mattison, 
for all ordinary purposes a right to use the driveway jointly with Paul S. Boyd 
and Mary M. Boyd, the same including all rights of ingress and egress over the 
same, the said drive-way running and leading from the end of North 2l5t street 
of the City of Boise, Idaho, in a northerly and southerly direction, far enough to 
allow the said second parties herein to enter upon their premises which adjoin 
the premises of the first parties on the east side of the premises. 
The parties shall be entitled to use the driveway in common, and the expense of 
constructing and maintenance of said driveway shall always be equally borne 
by the parties hereto. Should the land hereby subject to this right of way ever 
cease to be used as a driveway, then in such a case, the full right and title shall 
revert to the present owners or their successors in title. Exhibit 1 to the Affidavit 
of Bill Campbell 
The Mannings purchased the property from Benjamin and Emily Schwarz on 
October 13, 2008. In April, 2009 the Mannings filed this legal action for quiet title and 
declaratory judgment terminating the easement, or relocating the easement to their desired 
location, through the Campbells' front yard. 
The Campbells filed a responsive pleading and 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. This 
is the equivalent of a motion for summary judgment. Miles v. Idaho Power, 116 Idaho 635, 
778 P.2d 757 (1989). This motion was filed August 24, 2009 with supporting memorandum 
of law. The matter came before the court on November 30, 2009. The court ruled on the 
motion to dismiss on January 19, 2009. The matter is set for trial on February 16, 2010. 
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In its Memorandum Decision the court granted Defendant Cambells' Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings, in part, ruling that there is an "express limited easement which 
is not unilaterally revocable." Memorandum Decision at p. 14. 
The court left open for trial the issue of whether the easement can be relocated under 
a statute, LC. 55-313. The Mannings contend this statute allows the easement to be moved 
off of their property and onto the property of the dominant estate, thus reversing or 
eliminating the easement in their favor. The Campbells strongly disagree. 
Issues Remaing for Trial 
1) Should the Mannings be allowed to present evidence at trial of an alternative 
easement over the Campbell Property? 
The Campbells respectfully ask the court to further define or clarify the remaining 
issues for trial. In the court's decision the court correctly stated "The Plaintiff's cite no 
Idaho Law providing for judicial modification of an express easement in contravention of 
the plain language of the easement." Memorandum Decision at p. 15. Despite this ruling 
and the court's finding of an express easement, the matter continues to trial for the court's 
determination of whether this easement can be relocated, potentially onto the Campbells 
(the owner of dominant estate) and constituting a complete reversal or judicial 
modification of an existing express written easement. The Camp bells contend that there is 
no legal authority in Idaho allowing such a modification or even the admission of such 
evidence at trial. 
Idaho cases involving relocation of an express easement are limited. In the second 
appeal of Benninger v. Derefield, 179 P.3d 336 (ID 2008) the Idaho Supreme Court noted in 
a footnote that: 
The district court noted that Derifield's improvements to the driveway have 
relocated the driveway from its historical position. Nonetheless, the district court 
held the relocation can stand and that the scope of the easement will apply to the 
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driveway as currently positioned. The scope of the easement is based on the district 
court's determination of the width of the driveway during the prescriptive period. 
FNl Benninger, Supra. 
In Turner v. Cold Springs Canyon Ltd. Partnership 143 Idaho 227, 
141 P.3d 1096 (Idaho 2006) the Idaho Supreme examined and upheld the existence 
of an express easement noting: 
The 1981 Stipulation provides that the road "may be modified and relocated as the 
Defendant Annette Castle may desire in accordance with her own personal reasons 
or any prospective plan for development" of the Cold Springs property. The right to 
modify or relocate the road is limited to the "personal reasons" of Annette Castle. 
She is no longer the owner of the property. The right to relocate the road no longer 
exists. 
Although these cases are not directly on point, it is clear that courts will not rewrite 
express or established prescriptive easements once they are established. The courts can 
look at actual use to determine the intent of the parties in defining the scope and placement 
of the easement. In this case, the easement is very well drafted and reflects usage in the 
same spot since 1952. 
An extremely important point for the court to consider is the complete lack of any 
statutory authority to move an easement on to the lands of another private party, 
especially the dominant estate. Under LC. 55-313 the plain language of the statute states: 
"The person or person owning or controlling the private lands shall have the right at their 
own expense to change such access to any other part of the private lands, but such change 
must be made in such a manner as not to obstruct motor vehicle travel, or to otherwise 
injure any person or persons using or interested in such access." 
An express easement can be one created or modified by use, agreement, or under 
limited circumstances by statute, but there is no legal authority for the proposition 
promoted by 1-fannings in this trial. There is no case, statute, or even a comment by our 
courts that would support the wholesale move of an easement onto the land of the 
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dominant estate. Compare the Supreme Court's analysis of the driveway dispute in the 
Benninger cases and other easement cases it is difficult to understand how it is that this 
matter is proceeding to trial. This is an extremley well drafted easement in the same 
location for more than half a century. The Campbells ask for an immediate order of 
clarification prohibiting the introduction of any evidence relocating this easement, 
particularly on their land. There is no legal support for this theory under any Idaho Case or 
statute. 
2. Did the court err in limiting the scope of use of the existing easement? 
Campbell agrees that the court correctly ruled that the exact scope and definition of the 
existing easement should be clarified by a legal description that better defines the existing 
easement. While this is a finely drafted easement and the use has been in place for fifty 
years, the authority of the Supreme Court necessitates the need for a surveyor's 
description. Beyond that, Campbell argues that the court has unduly limited their rights of 
reasonable and fair access under the case law of Idaho. 
This court correctly recognized that an easement must be construed to allow the 
11 grantee convenient, reasonable and accessible right of way within the limits of the grant." 
Bethel v. Stone 120 Idaho 222 (Ct. App. 1999). In Abbott v. Nampa School Dist. No. 131, 
119 Idaho 544, 548, 808 P.2d 1289, 1293 (1991), the Idaho Supreme court stated that a 
general grant of easement was defined as an "easement granted or reserved in general 
terms, without any limitations as to its use." See also McFadden v. Sein 139 Idaho 21, 88 
P.3d 740 (2004). The scope and use of an easement is not an issue in this case as the 
Defendants seek to use the existing driveway for access to their property, as has always 
been the case. However, in Abbot, the Idaho Supreme Court summarized the basic 
principals of a grant of easement under Idaho Law: In other words, an easement granted or 
reserved in general terms, without any limitations as to its use, is one of unlimited 
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reasonable use. It is not restricted to use merely for such purposes of the dominant estate 
as are reasonably required at the time of the grant or reservation, but the right may be 
exercised by the dominant owner for those purposes to which that estate may be 
subsequently devoted. Thus, there may be an increase in the volume and kind of use of 
such an easement during the course of its enjoyment. 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses 
§ 74, pp. 479-80 (1966). 
The degree of change that will be allowed in the use of an easement differs with 
the manner in which the easement was conveyed, the language of conveyance, 
and the use of the servient estate before and after the conveyance. See 5 
Restatement of Property§ 483, p. 3010 (1944). 
In Boydstun Beach Ass'n v. Allen, 111 Idaho 370, 723 P.2d 914 (Ct.App.1986), the 
Idaho Court of Appeals applied the following rule to an easement: "The rule is 
that, absent language in the easement to the contrary, the uses made by the 
servient and dominant owners may be adjusted consistent with the normal 
development of their respective lands." 111 Idaho at 378, 723 P.2d at 922. 
Applying these principals there is no basis for this court's current ruling that Mr. 
Campbell's access is limited to a single family residence forever. While the Campbells have 
no current plan to split his lot, they may do so in the future. That would be consistent with 
historical development in the North End in Boise, Idaho. The servitude was created to 
benefit the Campbell property, which has gotten smaller over time, not larger. Again there 
is no current controversy that allows the court to adjudicate this claim, but the court should 
not diminish unlimited reasonable use of the property. That is all the court should decree. 
In this regard the court should reverse it's current ruling that Mr. Campbell cannot park his 
vehicle on the easement, or turn around. The Camp bells may need to park for a moment, 
or turn around. As long as this temporary use does not interfere with the owner's servient 
property rights, then there is controversy that can be adjudicated. This is not a matter that 
properly before the court. 
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CONCLUSION 
The court directed the parties to prepare a written description of the existing 
easement. A preliminary description has been prepared and is attached hereto as an 
exhibit. Subject to review and objection by opposing counsel, this should provide a 
complete basis for the court's final judgment. There is no legal or statutory authority to 
modifiy this express written easement, in place for over fifty years, to run over the 
Camp bells' property. The court should reverse the ruling that the easement is limited to a 
single family dwelling and eliminate any language with regard to temporary parking or 
turning around. 
DATED this __ day of February, 2010. 
BY~----'--~--~----'--
JOSEPH L. ELLSWORTH 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ___ day of February, 2010, I served a true and 
correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method indicated below and 
addressed to the following: 
Thomas E. Dvorak 
Givens Pursley LLP 
PO Box 2720 
Boise ID 83701 
/ {__, , 
JOSEPH L. ELLSvVORTH 
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL MEMORANDUM 
US Mail 
~ Hand 
Facsimile: 
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February 9, 2010 
An access located in the of the SE1/4 of Section 33, T.4N ., R.2E., B.M., Boise, 
Ada County, Idaho more particularly described as follows: 
Commencing at the NE corner of Lot 1, Block 10 of Elm Grove Addition as filed in 
Book 5 of Plats at Page 242 records of Ada County, Idaho; 
thence along the West right-of-way line of N. 21 st Street North 00°00'00" East, 
9.02 feet to a point on the South boundary of the Manning property as described in that 
Warranty deed recorded as Instrument No. 108114031, records of Ada County, Idaho; 
thence leaving said West right-of-way line and along said South boundary line 
South 89°46'52" East, 23.40 feet to REAL POINT OF BEGINNING of this access; 
thence leaving said South boundary line and along a non-tangent curve to the 
right 58.85 feet, said curve having a radius of 77.00 feet, a central angle of 43°47'38" 
and a long chord of 57.43 feet which bears North 24°01 '15" East to a point on the East 
boundary line of the said Manning property; 
thence along said East boundary line South 00°11'07" East, 18.94 feet to the 
beginning of a non-tangent curve to the left; 
thence leaving said East boundary line and along said curve 35.82 feet, said 
curve having a radius of 64.70 feet, a central angle of 31°43'17" and a long chord of 
35.36 feet which bears South 18°20'48" West to a point on the South boundary line of 
the said Manning property; 
thence along said South boundary line North 89°46'52" West, 12.31 feet to the 
REAL POINT OF BEGINNING. 
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Thomas E. Dvorak (lD State Bar lD# 5043) 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
Telephone: 208-3 8 8-1200 
Facsimile: 208-388-1300 
Attorneys for Tom and Julie Manning 
NO. t-L ___ _ 
A.M ____ Fl...t'LE··~-= 
FEB 'i 6 2010 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Cien, 
By J. RANDALL 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THOMAS CRELLIN MANNING and 
JULIE ANN MANNING, husband and 
wife, 
Case No. CV OC 0907350 
Plaintiffs, PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED EXHIBIT 
LIST 
V. 
WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL, an unmarried 
individual, and NAOMI LOUISE 
CAMPBELL, an unmarried individual, 
Defendants. 
COME NOW, Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys of record, Givens Pursley LLP, 
and hereby submits their Exhibit List as of February 91\ 2010. Plaintiffs reserve the right to 
withdraw, revise, or supplement any of these exhibits, and/or to submit further exhibits to 
conform to proof presented at the time of trial. 
Plaintiffs' Description Stipulated Date Admitted Exhibit Offered 
1. Boise Intranet Map overlaid on aerial photo 
(offered for demonstrative purposes) 
2. Boise Intranet Map overlaid on aerial photo 
(offered for demonstrative purposes) with 
handwritten numbering 
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PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED EXHIBIT LIST-1 
Plaintiffs' Description Stipulated Date Admitted Exhibit Offered 
3. Illustrative map depicting proposed 
driveway changes, view facing N.E. 
(offered for demonstrative purposes) 
4. Illustrative map depicting proposed 
driveway changes, view facing N. N. E. 
(offered for demonstrative purposes) 
5. Illustrative map depicting proposed 
driveway changes, view facing W. 
(offered for demonstrative purposes) 
6. Jllustrative map depicting proposed 
driveway changes, view facing N.W. 
(offered for demonstrative purposes) 
7. Original Parcel Configuration 1952 
Diagram, prepared by Gregory S. Carter 
8. Current Parcel Configuration, prepared by 
Gregory S. Carter 
9. Idaho Survey Group Description for Access 
(Option 1) Manning Property, dated April 
14,2009 
10. Idaho Survey Group Description for Access 
Manning Property, dated July 29, 2009 
11. Idaho Survey Group Description for Access 
Manning Property, dated February 9, 2010 
12. Photo graphs of Property 
(12.1-
12.65) 
13. Documents attached to Affidavit of Eric B. 
Nelson filed on October 14, 2009 
13.1 Reference map created by Eric B. Nelson 
depicting current configuration of property 
as of September 1, 2009 
13.2 Reference map created by Eric B. Nelson 
depicting configuration of property at the 
time of the 1952 Agreement 
13.3 Deed between Peter and Nina Jensen and 
Frank and Ida Mattison, dated April 19, 
1950 
13.4 Deed between Peter Jensen and Nina Jensen 
dated April 26, 1951 
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Plaintiffs' Description Stipulated Date Admitted Exhibit Offered 
13.5 Deed between Nina Jensen and Frank and 
Ida Mattison, dated June 18, 1952 
13.6 Decree Establishing Record Title to 
Community Property filed in the Estate of 
Ida Grace Mattison, recorded October 2, 
1965 
13.7 Warranty Deed between Nina Jensen and 
Jack and Barbara Mattison, dated March 7, 
1968 
13.8 Warranty Deed between Frank Mattison and 
Jack Mattison and Chester and Eulah 
Thomas, dated June 8, 1968 
13.9 Warranty Deed between Chester and Eulah 
Thomas and Denis and Karen Hoekler, dated 
June 12, 1974 
13.10 Warranty Deed between Barbara Mattison 
and Chester and Eulah Thomas dated June 
26, 1974 
13.11 Warranty Deed between Denis and Karen 
Hoel<ler and Nathan and Marjorie Talbot, 
dated September 23, 1975 
13.12 Warranty Deed between Nathan and 
Marjorie Talbot and Alphonse Roy III, dated 
November 26, 1976 
13.13 Warranty Deed between Nina Jensen & A. 
Kenison Roy III, dated June 28, 1979 
13.14 Certificate of Marshal's Sale filed in A. 
Kennison Roy III bankruptcy, dated October 
1982 
13.15 Warranty Deed between Nina Jensen & A. 
Kenison Roy III 
13.16 Trustee's Deed between First American 
Title Company and LOS Life Insurance 
Company, dated April 7, 1983 
13.17 Warranty Deed, Instrument No. 8337595 
13.18 Deed between Lawyers Title Insurance 
Company and Marcelynn Rothermal, dated 
May 2, 1983 
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Plaintiffs' Description Stipulated 
Date Admitted 
Exhlbit Offered 
13.19 Warranty Deed between Marcelynn 
Rothermal and Marcelynn Rothermal and 
Clarence Rothermal, dated August 22, 1983 
13.20 Warranty Deed between Marcelynn 
Rothermal and Anthony and Vikki 
McQueen, dated November 21, 1986 
13.21 Warranty Deed between Anthony and Vikki 
McQueen and William and Michelle 
Campbell, dated April 29, 1993 
13.22 Quitclaim Deed between Michelle Campbell 
and William Campbell and Naomi Campbell 
dated December 23, 1997 
13.23 Memorandum of Contract between Naomi 
Campbell and William Campbell dated May 
22, 1998 
13.24 Deed between Edward and Virginia Siebert 
and Paul and Mary Boyd, dated January 11, 
1950 
13.25 Agreement between Paul Boyd and Frank 
Mathison, dated July 29,1952 
13.26 Deed of Distribution by Personal 
Representative between William Boyd as 
Personal Representative of the Estates of 
Paul and Mary Boyd and Mary Paula Boyd 
Davis, dated January 29, 1987 
13.27 Deed of Distribution by Personal 
Representative between William Boyd as 
Personal Representative of the Estates of 
Paul and Mary Boyd and First Security 
Bank, dated January 29, 1987 
13.28 Quitclaim Deed between Mary Paula Boyd 
Davis and Mary Paula Davis, dated February 
23,2006 
13.29 Warranty Deed between Mary Paula Davis 
to Emily Stenger-Schwartz and Benjamin 
Schwartz dated May 26, 2006 
14. Warranty Deed between Benjamin Schwartz 
and Emily Stegner-Schartz and Thomas and 
Julie Manning recorded October 14, 2008 
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Plaintiffs' Description Stipulated Date Admitted Exhibit Offered 
15. List of talking points created by Thomas & 
Julie Manning and delivered to Bill 
Campbell on February 22, 2009 
16. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' 
Discovery Requests dated July 8, 2009 
( offered for impeachment purposes) 
17. Home Occupation Application submitted by 
Bill Campbell, dated October 6, 2009 
18. Letter to Joseph Ellsworth from Thomas 
Dvorak dated October 16, 2009 
19. Boise City Planning and Development 
Services letter of denial to Bill Campbell 
dated October 21, 2009 
20. Application for Appeal submitted by Bill 
Campbell, dated November 2, 2009 
21. Boise City Planning and Development 
Services letter of appeal denial to Bill 
Campbell dated December 8, 2009 
22. Isuzu Commercial Vehicle Specifications 
23. F. Scott Beecham's biography dated October 
14,2009 
24. List of land entitlement work completed by 
LandWorks LLC dated October 14, 2009 
25. Gregory G. Carter's biography dated 
October 14, 2009 
26. Photograph of sign left in Manning's yard 
27. Certified ACHD Driveway Approach 
Request completed by Tom and Julie 
Manning, dated September 1, 2009 and 
certified on February 11, 2010 
28. Certified ACHD Approval, dated November 
3, 2009 and certified on February 11, 2010 
29. Affidavit of Eric B. Nelson dated October 
14,2009 
30. Letter from City of Boise Planning & 
Development Services to Givens Pursley, 
dated February 5, 2010 
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Plaintiffs' Description Stipulated Date Admitted Exhibit Offered 
31. Chain of Title for Tracts I through 4 created 
by Erin B. Nelson 
DA TED this 16th day of February, 2010. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED EXHIBIT LIST- 6 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of February, 2010, I caused to be served a true and 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, TI\J AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THOMAS CRELLIN MANNING and JULIE 
ANN MANNING, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL, an unmarried 
individual, and NAOMI LOUISE 
CAMPBELL, an unmarried individual, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0907350 
PLAINTIFFS' INITIAL CLOSING 
ARGUMENT 
COME NOW, Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys of record, Givens Pursley LLP, 
and hereby submit their Initial Closing Argument. 
I. Factual Background. 
This case is about Dr. Thomas and Julie Mannings' (the "Mannings") property and how 
much of it must be dedicated to Defendant Bill Campbell's ("Campbell" or "Mr. Campbell") use 
to satisfy a 1952 driveway agreement (the "1952 Agreement'). In 1952, Judge Boyd, the owner 
of the property located at 2000N.21 st Street in Boise, granted to his neighbors, the Mattisons, 
the owners of the property located at 2002 N. 21 st Street, the right to use a driveway across his 
land to access their own property from 21 st Street. There is no evidence in the record showing 
where this driveway was located originally in 1952 or from 1952 to 1993. 
When Mr. Campbell, a successor in interest to the Mattisons, purchased his property in 
1993 he noticed he would use a driveway located on his neighbor's property to access his 000 4 9 4 
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property from 21 st Street. But Mr. Campbell did not know anything about the 1952 Agreement 
at that time or have any impression that the driveway ''had to" remain in the same location, as 
that "never came up." He had no assurance that William Boyd, the resident in 1993 of Judge 
Boyd's former home, would not move the driveway the day after Mr. Campbell purchased his 
property. As the years went by Mr. Campbell probably became increasingly accustomed to 
using Mr. Boyd's property for access. But at the same time, Mr. Campbell must have lived for 
years with an unsettling feeling that the owners of the property next door might some day decide 
to reconfigure their own driveway in a way that would affect Mr. Campbell. 
Then in the spring of 2006, Emily and Ben Schwartz purchased the Boyd property and 
began remodeling the house thereon. Part of their efforts included removing a large hedge 
between the two properties that would have precluded the driveway from turning into the 
Campbell property further south. They removed the carport on the east side of their property and 
built a new garage on the southwest side of their property. Around this time, Mr. Campbell 
heard from a neighbor that the neighbor had spoken with Mr. Schwartz, and that the Schwartzes 
were planning to reconfigure their driveway and that some sort of agreement governing the 
driveway might exist. So, Mr. Campbell visited a local title office to try to discern what rights, if 
any, he might have to prevent his neighbors from changing their O\VTI driveway. Although 
Defendant must have been glad to discover the existence of the 1952 Agreement, he surely must 
have been disappointed and concerned to find that the agreement did not give him the right to 
use any particular location on the neighbor's property to access his own property and certainly 
not to use the one he was enjoying. The 1952 Agreement merely gave him the right to use his 
neighbor's driveway just "far enough to allow [him] to enter upon [his] premises". 
The Schwartzes sold their home in 2008 to the Mannings. The Mannings desired to move 
the driveway for a number of reasons, including safety of their children, aesthetics, improving the 
ability of visitors and emergency vehicles to find their property, and simply not having to (l.}00 4 9 5 
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such a large portion of their yard to the easement. Mr. Campbell rejected the Mannings' efforts 
over a period of several months to attempt to reach an agreement in a neighborly fashion and move 
the driveway. Indeed, Mr. Campbell eventually started "fortifying" the area where the Mannings 
desire to move the driveway with a railroad tie planter, state of Idaho and American flags on a flag 
pole and an eight-foot tall fence. With no alternative left, the Mannings brought suit to quiet title 
and declare the respective rights of the property owners. The Court can resolve this case in either 
one of two ways: (1) by interpreting the 1952 Agreement that created the "ingress and egress" 
easement at issue or (2) by applying Idaho Code § 55-313 allowing the relocation of an access 
across private property. 
II. The Language in the 1952 Agreement Clearly Shows the Parties Intended to Grant 
Rights for the Purpose of Ingress and Egress and Not to Designate a Fixed Location 
for the Driveway, Which Had Already Been Built. 
It is established law that "[t]he legal effect of an unambiguous written document must be 
decided by the trial court as a question of law." Benninger v. Derifield, 142 Idaho 486 (2006 ). 
"'In interpreting and construing deeds of conveyance, the primary goal is to seek and give effect 
to the real intention of the parties. Id. (citing Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503 (2003)). "If the 
language of a deed is plain and unambiguous, the intention of the parties must be ascertained 
from the deed itself and extrinsic evidence is not admissible." Id. 
The language of the 1952 Agreement defines the rights of the dominant estate based on 
the purpose of allowing access to the dominant estate, not based upon the location of any certain 
driveway. The following are relevant portions of the 1952 Agreement ( emphasis added): 
WHEREAS, ... Paul S. Boyd and Mary M. Boyd built a certain macadam 
drive-way leading from 21 st Street into and over his land and Frank Mattison is 
desirous of obtaining the right-of-way to use the approach from 21 st Street ... into 
the drive-way for the purpose of ingress and egress .... 
wrn\JESSETH: That Paul S. Boyd and Mary M. Boyd in consideration of 
$112.50 ... do hereby grant unto Frank N. Mattison and Ida Grace Mattison, for 
all ordinary purposes a right to use the driveway jointly with Paul S. Boyd and 
Mary M. Boyd, ... the said drive-way running and leading from the end of North 
21 st Street ... in a northerly and southerly direction, far enough to allow the Q Q Q 4 g 6 
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[Mattisons} to enter upon their premises which adjoin the premises of the 
[Boyds] on the East side of said premises .... 
Should the land hereby subject to this right of way ever cease to be used as a 
driveway, then in such a case, the full right and title shall revert to the present 
owners or their successors in title. 
(Ex. 13.25, emphasis added). Clearly Judge Boyd had already built his "macadam" driveway 
before the agreement was executed, so it would have been very easy for him to designate, using a 
precise metes and bounds description, all or a portion of the driveway that he had already built as 
the easement under the 1952 Agreement. But Judge Boyd chose not to do so. Instead, Judge 
Boyd granted his neighbors a right to use his driveway for the "purpose of ingress and egress." 
Moreover, Judge Boyd limited this grant of rights to just "far enough to allow [them] to enter 
upon their premises." 
By not fixing the location of the easement, Judge Boyd built flexibility into the 1952 
Agreement that could accommodate changes in the use of the property over time and into the 
future. Indeed, we know Judge Boyd was thinking about the future when he signed the 1952 
Agreement as it prospectively provides that "should the land hereby subject to this right-of-way 
ever cease to be used as a driveway, then ... the full right and title shall revert to the present 
owners or their successors in title." What was "far enough to allow them to enter upon their 
premises" in 1952 foreseeably could be radically different than "far enough to allow them to 
enter upon their premises" at some future point in time. 
If Judge Boyd had intended the neighbors' right of way to be forever fixed in its location, 
presumably he would have delineated it precisely. See Green v. Blum, 13 A.D.3d 1037, 1038 
(N.Y. App. Ct. 2004). But he did not do so. 
III. The 1952 Agreement Does not Define A Location for the Easement, and The 
Location To Be Defined Should Impose No Greater Burden Than Necessary to the 
Mannings' Property, While Providing Defendant's Property With A Reasonable, 
Convenient and Accessible Means of Ingress and Egress. 
It is fundamental to the law of easements that the impact or burden of the easement on the 
000497 
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servient estate needs to be minimized as much as possible. 1 
1. The driveway that Defendant currently uses imposes numerous and 
substantial burdens on the Mannings. 
The first burden for the Mannings relates to safety, particularly because of their children 
Henry, Owen and Claire, ages 4, 7, and 10, respectively. Sharing a driveway means a greater 
potential for conflict between vehicles and people and is particularly dangerous for children. Dr. 
Manning testified without objection that once every three days a child is run over and killed in a 
driveway in the United States. 
A second burden upon the Mannings is the impact of the driveway on their ability to seek 
a reasonable degree of separation and privacy from their neighbor's property. Currently the 
Mannings' privacy is limited because of the way Defendant's house is sited with respect to their 
house and yard. Ordinarily, houses are sited side-by-side. But in this case, Defendant's house is 
sited so that it faces the Mannings' house and yard. See Pl. Ex. 12.57. If the Mannings were 
able to extend their fence towards the southeastern boundary of their property, they could 
achieve separation and privacy from the neighboring house. The Mannings' desire to extend a 
privacy fence and plant some landscaping along the eastern side of their property to create a 
more private and safe area for their three children to play in, but they are precluded from doing 
so because of the location of Defendant's current access. 
A third burden upon the Mannings is the length and area of the Mannings' property that 
is currently dedicated to Defendant's use is burdensome because his access intrudes deeply into 
the Mannings' property and consequently occupies a large area. Currently Defendant crosses 55 
feet of the Mannings' property in a northerly direction from 21 st Street before he turns into his 
own property. Defendant effectively dominates a swath of the Mannings' property that is 55 feet 
by 21 feet in size, or a total area of 1,155 square feet in the southwest comer of the Mannings' 
1 This point is extensively briefed in Plaintiffs Pretrial Memorandum filed February 9, 2010, and Supplemer9aP Q 4 g 8 
Pretrial Memorandum filed February 11, 2010 (collectively "Pretrial Memorandum"). 
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property (see Exhibits 9 and 11 ). This use of space has become very burdensome since the 
Schwartzes developed the servient estate that now belongs to the Mannings for two reasons. 
First, whereas prior to the remodel the Defendant's driveway merely passed in front of the 
servient estate's carport, since the remodel the Defendant's driveway passes within a few feet of 
the Mannings' front lawn. Second, whereas Defendant's driveway is on the east side of 
Mannings' property, the Mannings' garage is located on the west side of their property. 
Finally, the current driveway is very confusing and visitors often need substantial 
directions and assistance to find the Mannings' house. Delivery people frequently leave 
packages for the Mannings at other neighbors' houses because they cannot find the Mannings' 
house, and presumably emergency workers would be just as confused if they ever needed to find 
the Mannings' house. 
In addition to the burdens set forth above that are caused by the location, length and size 
of the existing driveway, Defendant imposes additional burdens on the Mannings based on his 
particular use of their property. It is well established in Idaho that the "use of an easement may 
not be enlarged to the injury of the servient estate." Conley v. Whittlesey, 985 P.2d 1127, 1133 
(Idaho 1999)). Currently, Defendant drives a large (between 14,000 and 16,000 pounds, see 
exhibit 21) commercial Isuzu plumbing truck and operates his plumbing business across the 
Mannings' property. There is absolutely nothing in the 1952 Agreement that supports the use of 
the easement for commercial purposes, and Defendant should be enjoined from utilizing the 
easement in operating any business and using any commercial vehicle across the easement.2 
Also, on March 1, 2010, he placed a no parking sign on the boundary fence to purportedly 
regulate parking on the Mannings' property. (See Attachment 1 hereto.) This is totally outside 
the scope of his rights, and he should be enjoined from doing so. 
2 Note, the City of Boise has cited Defendant for having a commercial vehicle at his l10use because it is in a 
residential zone, operating a business out of his home without a home occupation permit, and has denied his 
application for a home occupation permit. Defendant has exhausted his appeals. Nonetheless, Defendant is iAn9riµp 
the City's citations and decisions and continues to keep his plumbing truck at his house and have a contractoey#ij} 4 9 9 
related to his plumbing business there. See Pl. Ex. 19 and 21. 
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Along these same lines, the evidence adduced at trial showed that the dominant estate is 
actually smaller than all property owned by Mr. Campbell, and a declaration of the actual 
dominant estate is likewise appropriate. 
2. There is sufficient room to provide alternative driveway configurations. 
The Mannings have proposed to provide an alternative route for Defendant to access his 
property that would use a combination of the Mannings' property and a small portion of an Ada 
County Highway District ("ACHD") right-of-way that is located just south of and abutting the 
Mannings' property ("Best Driveway Alternative"). See Pl. Ex. 10. Alternatively, the same 
driveway that the Mannings proposed in Exs. 3, 4, 5, 6 and 10 could be pushed northward 
enough to be located entirely on the Mannings' property without using the ACHD right-of-way, 
i.e., a combination of Plaintiffs Ex. 9 and 10 ("Good Driveway Alternative"). There is 
sufficient space on the Mannings' property to the east of the existing driveway to provide a 
suitable driveway for Defendant for this Good Driveway Alternative. 
3. The current driveway imposes a greater burden than Necessary on the 
Mannings' property. 
The Mannings have shown that the current driveway configuration burdens the 
Mannings' property in numerous ways. The Mannings have proposed several alternative 
driveways that they and land planner Scott Beecham have shown to be convenient, reasonable 
and accessible for Defendant. They have also provided survey and perspective sketches showing 
that the alternative driveways would satisfy the dominant estate's interest in a driveway for 
ingress and egress and at the same time would be much less burdensome to the servient estate 
than the cunent driveway that Defendant uses. Therefore, the current driveway represents a 
"greater burden than necessary." Coulsen v. Aberdeen, 47 ldaho 619 (1929). 
IV. As Owners of the Servient Estate, the Mannings Have the Right to Choose a 
Location for the Undefined Easement on their Property. 
It is well settled law in Idaho that: 
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The present owner of a property shall have the right in the first instance to locate 
an easement thereon, and ifreasonably suitable for the purpose of the easement, 
then a selection of a place cannot be questioned. 
Bethel v. Van Stone, 120 Idaho 522,528 (Id. Ct. App. 1991) (citing Quinn v. Stone, 75 Idaho 243 
(1954)). 
The Bethel court explained the reason for allowing the owner of the servient estate to 
locate an undefined easement is: 
This procedure is in recognition of the right of the owner of the servient property 
to make such use of his property as he desires, so long as his use is consistent with 
the easement granted. The owner may choose the location to minimize the impact 
of the road and to prevent umeasonable interference with the rights of the owner 
so long as the chosen easement is a convenient and suitable way. Id. (Emphasis 
added.)3 
The Mannings' right of a servient estate owner to relocate an existing easement is also 
well established in many states.4 
3 See also the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 8.3(1) at 559 (2000) provides: 
Unless expressly denied by the terms of an easement ... the owner of the servient estate is entitled 
to make reasonable changes in the location or dimensions of an easement, at the servient owner's 
expense, to pennit nonnal use or development of the servient estate, but only if the changes do not 
( a) significantly lessen the utility of the easement, (b) increase the burdens on the owners of the 
easement in its use and enjoyment, or (c) frustrate the purpose for which the easement was created. 
This rule is designed to pennit development of the servient estate to the extent it can be accomplished without 
unduly interfering with the legitimate interests of the easement holder. ... The reasons for this rule are ... it will 
encourage the use of easements and lower their price by decreasing the risk the easements will unduly restrict future 
development for the servient estate." Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes§ 4.8(1) comment f. at 563 
(2008). 
4 See, e.g., Roaring Fork Club, L.P. v. St. Jude's Co., 36 P.3d 1229 (Colo. 2001) (court adopted the Restatement 
(Third) Property: Servitudes § 4.8(3) (2000) as the correct statement of controlling legal principle for purposes of 
analyzing a case involving an easement relocation); Carlin v. Cohen, 895 N.E.2d 793 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008) (court 
affirmed relocation of easement in connection with construction of a new house on the servient estate after trial 
court considered six proposed alternatives and chose one as a suitable replacement for the old path even though it 
had a different entry point on the dominant estate); R&S Investments v. Auto Auctions, Ltcl, 725 N. W.2d 871 (Neb. 
App. Ct. 2006) (affirmed trial court's decision to allow plaintiffs to relocate easement on their property); Parker v. 
Maynard, 2006 WL 1291300 (Neb. App. Ct. 2006) ("law is quite plain that the owner of a servient estate may alter 
the path of an easement not specifically located by deed so long as to do so does not materially impair the rights of 
the owner of the dominant estate"); Chekijian v. Mans, 34 A.D.3d I 029 (N.Y. App. Ct. 2006) ("'landowner burdened 
by express easement of ingress and egress may [change it]"); Green v. Blum, 13 A.D.3d 1037 (N.Y. App. Ct. 2004) 
(holding that easement provided right of ingress and egress, not right to a particular path and that plaintiffs ~rJ\ Q 5 Q 1. permitted to move right of way so long as they comply with the conditions protecting the easement holder). U U 
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Accordingly, when locating an undefined easement or relocating an existing easement, 
the legal analysis boils down to whether a proposed location negatively affects the access 
easement and the ability to enjoy its use, not whether such changes affect the dominant estate. 
1. The proposed driveway reserves the right of ingress and egress, which is all 
Campbell is entitled to under the 1952 Agreement. 
"If the purchaser of an easement wishes to retain control over any change in location, the 
instrwnent should be drafted to accomplish that result." Restatement (Third) of Property: 
Servitudes§ 8.3(1) comment f. at 563. The 1952 Agreement creates an easement for purposes of 
ingress and egress, and it does not prohibit the owner of the servient estate from making changes 
in the location or dimensions of the easement. "As a rule, where the intention in granting an 
casement is to afford only a right of ingress and egress, it is the right of passage, and not any 
right in a physical passageway itself, that is granted to the easement holder." Green v. Blum, 13 
A.D.3d 1037 (N.Y. App. Ct. 2004) (quotations and citations omitted); see also Parker v. 
lvfaynard, 2006 WL 1291300 (Ky. App. Ct. 2006) (there is "well established case law holding 
that in situations where the deed establishes no particular path for the easement, the owner of the 
servient estate may change its location so long as the rights of the dominant estate are not 
materially impaired."). Here, the Mannings should be allowed to change the location of the 
passageway or driveway on their property so long as they maintain Defendant's right of passage. 
The Mannings have proposed a new driveway for Defendant to use on their property in a 
slightly different location from, and partially overlapping, the driveway that he enjoys now. See 
Pl. Ex. 10. This proposed driveway will satisfy the purpose of the 1952 Agreement by providing 
an excellent means of ingress and egress for Defendant. At trial Scott Beecham, a land planning 
expert who develops residential areas in the Treasure Valley, testified that the alternative 
driveway proposed by the Mannings and labeled as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 10 would be superior to 
the driveway that currently exists. Mr. Beecham testified that if he were developing that 
property he would most prefer to have a driveway in the location proposed by the ManniQgQ. Q 5 Q 2 
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Defendant has not disputed the Mannings' arguments nor provided any evidence to show 
that the Mannings' proposed driveway alternatives are umeasonable or unsuitable for his ingress 
and egress purposes. Defendant has not proposed any alternative to the current driveway 
configuration. When Defendant's attorney asked him at trial why he did not want the driveway to 
change, his response was, "I am happy with it the way it is." While it is understandable that 
Defendant likes the status quo, Defendant has provided no evidence that the proposed driveway 
would be unsuitable for the rights of ingress and egress that he derives from the 1952 Agreement. 
2. The proposed driveway is a convenient and suitable way. 
The proposed driveway would not affect the servient estate's ingress and egress. The 
proposed driveway would not affect, much less reduce, the utility and usefulness of Defendant's 
easement. At trial, Mr. Beecham testified that the proposed driveway would offer a much clearer 
and less confusing approach to Defendant's property that would assist visitors, delivery people 
and emergency workers in finding his house; that is, the proposed driveway would be more 
useful than the current driveway. There is no evidence that the proposed driveway would lessen 
the utility of the easement, frustrate its purpose or increase the burden on the dominant estate 
owner· s ability to use and enjoy it. 
For all the reasons set forth in this section, the Mannings should be entitled to make the 
reasonable changes proposed in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 10 to the location of the easement at their 
expense. Based on the evidence in the record that the location the Mannings have proposed for a 
new driveway is reasonably suitable to provide "ingress and egress" to fulfill the purposes of the 
1952 Agreement, this location "can not be questioned." Quinn v. Stone, 75 Idaho at 246. If the 
Court allows the Mannings to reconfigure the driveway pursuant to its interpretation of the 1952 
Agreement, the Court need not consider whether Idaho Code § 55-313 applies to this case. 
000503 
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3. Section 55-313 provides the owners of private property with the right to 
relocate any access for motor vehicle travel constructed across their private 
property, so long as they can accomplish such relocation without obstructing 
motor vehicle travel or injuring persons interested in the access, which is 
exactly what the Mannings seek to do in this case. 
At the conclusion of trial and during the pretrial conference, the Court questioned the 
applicability of Idaho Code§ 55-313 5 to the present case, more specifically, whether injury 
exists simply because moving the proposed new driveway location requires Mr. Campbell to 
reconfigure his property. Plaintiffs Pretrial Memorandum extensively addresses the issue of 
injury contemplated under 55-313. Plaintiffs will not repeat those arguments here, other than to 
simply point out to the Court that the Court had not reviewed those Pretrial Memorandum briefs 
at the time the Court had the pre-trial discussion regarding injury. 
There is not an abundance ofldaho case law interpreting 55-313. In Benninger v. 
Derifiefd, 142 Idaho 486 (2006), in dicta, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that the district court 
had approved the relocation of a historical residential driveway in accordance with 55-313. 
I lowever, this statute fairly replicates the case law cited previously that is well established in 
numerous states allowing the owners of easements to change or relocate them so long as they can 
do so without frustrating the purpose of the easement. Further, rather than causing "injury" to 
Campbell, the proposed relocation of the driveway would still afford him the ingress and egress 
he is entitled to under the 1952 Driveway Agreement and a distinctive entrance would enhance 
the aesthetic and monetary value of the dominant estate. 
4. While the proposed relocation of the access would affect Defendant, it would 
not cause a legally cognizable "injury" that would nullify the Mannings' 
rights to relocate his access under Idaho Code§ 55-313. 
Any person seeking to maintain the status quo can invent or complain of a variety of so-
called injuries that would be caused by instituting changes to the status quo. Defendant's 
5 That statute provides: '"l W[here, for motor vehicle travel, any access which is less than a public dedication has 
heretofore been or may hereafter be, constructed across private lands, the person or persons owning or controlling 
tlte private lands slw// ltave the right at their own expense to change such access to any other part of the private 
lands [emphasis added], but such change must be made in such a manner as not to obstruct motor vehicle tratJ,@rQ 5 Q 4 
to otherwise injure any person or persons using or interested in such access." (Emphasis added.) 
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stubborn resistance to change- "I am happy with it the way it is" as Mr. Campbell said in 
court-is not the "injury" that the Idaho legislature has created in Idaho Code § 55-313. 
Yes, Defendant will be affected if the Mannings' change the configuration of the 
driveway on their property, but how Defendant adjusts to this change and how, if at all, he 
develops his own property in response to changes and developments on the servient estate, is 
completely within his determination and control. 
A close look at the alleged injuries that Defendant would suffer if the Mannings relocated 
his access reveals that they are without merit. First, Defendant has concerns over the sycamore 
tree in his front yard. In fact, the sycamore tree would not be affected at all, much less injured, 
by the Mannings' proposed relocation of access. As shown at trial, the driveway that Defendant 
currently maintains on his property runs directly past his sycamore tree and just a few feet away 
from it. Even if Defendant were to decide to pave a portion of his property to connect to the 
proposed new driveway on the Mannings' property, such paving would be further away from his 
sycamore tree than the existing driveway on his property. 
Second, Defendant has alleged that the relocated access would affect his newly built 
railroad tie planter box, his newly planted lawn and the even newer fence that he built around 
November, 2009. The unclean hands doctrine "stands for the proposition that a litigant may be 
denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and 
dishonest, or fraudulent and deceitful as to the controversy in issue." Kirkman v. Stoker, 6 P. 3d 
397 (2000). When Defendant unfairly built his planter box after the Mannings communicated 
with him about their desire to relocate his access in that area, and when he installed the lawn and 
the fence after the Mannings filed a complaint against him seeking to relocate his driveway in 
the same location, he took a risk. Now, the unclean hands doctrine applies here and prevents 
Defendant from complaining that any effect on this planter box, lawn or fence would injure him. 
000505 
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Tbird, Defendant has alleged that relocating his driveway would somehow interfere with 
the isolation and privacy that he currently enjoys on his property. The Mannings do not dispute 
that isolation and privacy are values. However, the 1952 Agreement did not grant an easement 
for the purposes of isolation and privacy, it granted the easement for the purposes of ingress and 
egress only. See Green v. Blum, 13 A.D.3d 1037, 1038 (N.Y. App. Ct. 2004) (rejecting 
Defendants' argument that a driveway easement should not be moved because it would injure 
their scenic view where the easement was for ingress and egress purposes, not for purposes of 
affording a view). In any case, however, relocating Defendant's access as proposed would not 
affect the privacy or isolation of the dominant estate: it would still be surrounded on four sides 
by other houses and properties, and Defendant's house would remain invisible from the street 
just as it is now. 
For all the reasons set forth above, Defendant has failed to articulate any injury that 
would be legally cognizable under Idaho Code§ 55-313 and has failed to present evidence that 
sustains his burden of proof on the injury issue. 
S. The relocated access would actually increase the safety and value of 
defendant's property and better effectuate the purposes of his easement. 
The Mannings provided substantial evidence at trial that their proposed relocation of 
Defendant's access would actually increase the value and safety of his property. With regards to 
safety, providing a separate driveway for Defendant would reduce conflicts that arise in the 
shared driveway and eliminate the confusion that currently prevents people from finding 
Defendant's property. This would be especially important if emergency workers ever needed to 
find his house. With regards to value, Scott Beecham, the land planner, testified at trial that 
providing Defendant with his own separate driveway would increase the value of his property 
and make it more desirable because it would: (a) create a more clear and intuitive approach to his 
house, (b) distinguish his house from the Mannings' house, and (c) eliminate its appearance as an 
accessory to the Mannings' house. Finally, providing Defendant with his own access wouLl O O 5 0 6 
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eliminate the existing problem where visitors inadvertently park on the Mannings' property and 
block Defendant's ingress and egress. Thus, the purposes of his easement would actually be 
better served by the proposed relocation. 
For all the reasons set forth above, this Court should apply Idaho Code § 55-313 and 
allow the Mannings to exercise their right to relocate the access that Defendant currently uses 
across their private property to the locations provided in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 10, the Best 
Driveway Alternative, or the similar location defined above as the Good Driveway Alternative. 
V. The Issue of Whether a Common Driveway Must Be 20 Feet Wide Under Boise City 
Code Is a Red Herring That Is Not Relevant to this Case. 
At trial, Defendant's attorney asked Mr. Beecham on cross examination: "Are you aware 
that the Boise Municipal Code requires a minimum street or common driveway width of at least 
20 feet?" His answer was "That is correct." The question and answer were general in nature and 
did not address the driveway in question. 
A review of the applicable provisions of the Boise City Code reveals that the driveway in 
this case is not a legally-defined ·'Common Driveway." Boise City requires Common Driveways 
to be specifically approved by its Planning Director (as part of a zoning certificate or subdivision 
process), but only if the proposed driveway meets all nine of the requirements listed Boise City 
Code§ 11-04-04.01.I. There is no evidence in the record that the driveway in question is a 
legally recognized Common Driveway, or even that the driveway in question meets all nine of 
the requirements to make it eligible for legally recognized Common Driveway status. 
Even if the existing driveway would not be sufficient to provide legal access under the 
Boise City's current legal requirements for new developments, it still provides legal access to the 
Camp bells' property because this area was developed prior to Boise City's adoption of its 
original zoning ordinance on August 15, 1966. The owner of a nonconforming use has the right 
to continue the use despite subsequent enactment of conflicting zoning requirements. See 
Glengary-Gamblin Protective Ass 'n v. Bird, 106 Idaho 84, 89 (Ct. App. 1983 ). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The Mannings respectfully request that the Court allow the Mannings to define and 
designate the location of the easement on their property, at their election, either (a) as proposed 
in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 10, the Mannings' Best Driveway Alternative, or (b) as proposed in 
Plaintiffs" Exhibit 10, except moved a sufficient distance in a northern direction so that it is 
entirely located on the Mannings· property without using the ACHD right-of-way). so that the 
Mannings can implement this Good Driveway Alternative in the unlikely event that ACHD does 
not give final approval for the Mannings to use a small portion of the existing ACHD right-of-
way just south of their property. 6 
?Y 
DATED this f day of February, 2010. 
Thomas E. Dvorak 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this f 1ay of February, 2010, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to the persons listed below the method indicated: 
Joseph L. Ellsworth 
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defranco P.L.L.C. 
1031 E. Park Boulevard 
Boise, ID 83712 
Facsimile: 345-8945 
Attorney/or Defendants William J Campbell 
and Naomi Louise Campbell 
~ Hand Delivery 
"><'f'acsimile 
~ Overnight Courier 
U.S. Mail 
6 ACHD has approved the Mannings application to use the portion of the right-of-way set depicted in Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 10. ln the event this Court issues a judgment pem1itting the Mannings' to reconfigure their drivewayrtsn "'· r: n 8 proposed, then the ACHD plans to offer the public a chance to comment on the Mannings' plans before gran\mg,, U J 'J 
final approval for a construction permit. 
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Thomas E. Dvorak (ID State Bar ID# 5043) 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
Telephone: 208-388-1200 
RECEIVED 
MAR o 5 2mo 
Facsimile: 208-388-1300 ADA COUMTY 
807017_1 (10493-1) 
Attorneys for Tom and Julie Manning 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL D STRICT FOR THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THOMAS CRELLIN MANNING and JULIE 
ANN MANNING, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL, an unmarried 
individual, and NAOMI LOUISE 
CAMPBELL, an unmarried individual, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0907350 
[PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED] 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER FOR JUDGMENT 
Having held a court trial in this matter from February 17 through 19, 2010,1 and heard the 
testimony of the witnesses, and thereafter allowed for the submission of closing arguments and 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in writing by all parties, the Court hereby enters 
its findings of fact and conclusions of law and order for judgment in this matter. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The dispute in this case centers on the location and scope of right of use of a driveway 
easement created by a certain 1952 agreement. Paul S. Boyd2 and Mary Boyd and Frank 
Mattison and Ida Grace Mattison owned the adjoining properties at that time. The Boyds built a 
1 The Court notes that Defendant Naomi Louise Campbell did not personally participate in the trial, but that she was 
represented at trial by attorney Joseph Ellsworth. 
2 lncidentally, Paul S. Boyd was an Idaho attorney of some note and previously served as a judge of this court.a Q Q 511 
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driveway on their property and the Mattisons wished to use the driveway to access their property. 
On July 29, 1952, the two couples entered into an agreement under which the Mattisons paid 
$112.50 for "a right to use the driveway jointly with the Boyds." The relevant portion of that 
agreement provides as follows: 
That Paul S. Boyd and Mary M. Boyd in consideration of $112.50, 
lawful money of the United States, to them in hand paid by Frank 
N. Mattison and Ida Grace Mattison, do here-by grant unto Frank 
N. Mattison and Ida Grace Mattison, for all ordinary purposes a 
right to use the driveway jointly with Paul S. Boyd and Mary M. 
Boyd, the same including all rights of ingress and egress over the 
same, the said driveway running and leading from the end of North 
21 st Street of the City of Boise, Idaho, in a northerly and southerly 
direction, far enough to allow the said second parties herein to 
enter upon their premises, which adjoin the premises of the first 
parties on the East side of said premises. 
The parties shall be entitled to use the driveway in common and 
the expense of constructing and maintenance of said driveway 
shall always be equally borne by both parties hereto. Should the 
land subject to [t]his right of way ever cease to be used as a 
driveway, then in such a case, the full right and title shall revert to 
the present owners or their successors in title. 
In a Memorandum Decision and Order entered in this matter on January 19, 2010, after a 
hearing on a motion to dismiss by the Defendants and a summary judgment motion by the 
Plaintiffs, the Court ruled as follows: 
1. That "the 1952 Agreement created an express easement for the limited purpose of 
allowing the residents of the adjacent premises the ordinary use of a driveway for 
ingress and egress far enough to allow the residents to enter on to their property." 
2. That "Plaintiffs second cause of action for declaratory judgment is not disposed 
of by a finding of an express easement as the requested declarations seek 
clarification of the scope of the easement." 
3. That "the precise location and legal description of the easement remain issues for 
trial." 
4. That "the parties intended the right to be limited to a single-family residence 
adjoining the servient property on the east side." 
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5. That "the easement does not include a right to park upon or turn a vehicle around 
on the Plaintiffs' property or right to place any signage or a mailbox on the 
Plaintiffs' property .... " 
6. That "because the grant was not specified as to size or location, ... in order to 
minimize the burden to Plaintiffs' estate, Plaintiffs would be entitled to move the 
location of access in such a way that is convenient, reasonable, accessible, within 
the limits of the grant, and not injurious to Defendants' property." 
At trial of this matter, the Plaintiffs Dr. Tom and Julie Manning, who are the successors 
in interest to the servient estate of Judge and Mrs. Boyd, presented evidence (a) aimed at 
establishing the location of the easement in question, (b) that a movement of the easement to the 
desired location of the Mannings would minimize the burden to the servient estate while 
allegedly not be injurious to right of ingress and egress of the Defendant; ( c) that the Defendant's 
actual use of a certain Isuzu commercial truck was outside the allowable scope of the easement; 
and (d) that the Defendants' property, while overlapping in some respects with the original 
dominant estate, nevertheless contains additional property to the north that was not within the 
original dominant estate. The Defendant Bill Campbell refuted the first three of these items, but 
did not offer testimony to refute (d), the current makeup of the dominant estate. 
The Court·will proceed by making its factual findings and conclusions of law under the 
applicable legal standard to each of the issues relative to location and scope of the easement 
raised at trial. 
DESCRIPTION OF THE DOMINANT ESTATE 
As the Court noted in its prior Memorandum decision and Order, under Idaho law use of 
an easement appurtenant to an identified dominant estate to serve a parcel other than that 
dominant estate is impermissible as a matter of law. Christensen v. City of Pocatello, 142 Idaho 
132, 136, 1124 P.3d 1008, 1012 (2005). At trial in this matter, the undisputed evidence was 
adduced through the testimony of the surveyor, Greg Carter, that the parcel currently owned by 
Defendants Campbell is different and contains significantly additional property to the north than 
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the parcel that was originally owned by the Mattisons at the time of the 1952 Agreement. Mr. 
Carter testified as to the boundaries from the deeds that represented what property Defendants 
Campbell have that remains from the original property owned by the Mattisons at the time of the 
1952 Agreement, and exhibits were introduced into evidence which document those differences 
(see exs 7, 8, 31.1, 13.2). Accordingly, the Court finds that the dominant estate is limited to that 
dominant estate described by Mr. Carter in his testimony and in the drawings. The Plaintiffs 
may submit a legal description created by Mr. Carter consistent with his testimony as part of a 
proposed judgment to the Court for purposes of describing the dominant estate in the judgment 
of this Court. 
USE OF THE COMMERCIAL VEHICLE AND ACCESS FOR BUSINESS PURPOSES 
As this Court held in its Memorandum Decision and Order: 
An easement does not include the right to enlarge the use to the 
injury of the servient land. Merrill v. Penrod, 109 Idaho 46, 704 
P.2d 950 (Ct. App. 1985). The degree of change that will be 
allowed in the use of an easement differs with the manner in which 
the easement was conveyed, the language of the conveyance, and 
the use of the servient estate before and after the grant of the 
conveyance. Abbott v. Nampa school District No. 131, 119 Idaho 
at 548,808 P.2d at 1293. Absent language in the easement to the 
contrary, the uses made by the servient and dominant owners, as a 
rule, may be adjusted consistent with the normal development of 
their respective lands. Id. (citing Boydstun Beach Ass 'n v. Allen, 
111 Idaho 370, 378, 723 P.2d 914, 922 (Ct. App. 1986)). Use of 
an easement appurtenant to an identified dominant estate to serve a 
parcel other than that dominant estate is impermissible as a matter 
oflaw. Christensen v. City of Pocatello, 142 Idaho 132, 136, 124 
P.3d 1008, 1012 (2005). 
Memorandum Decision and Order at p. 16. 
The Mannings object to the use of a certain Isuzu diesel commercial truck that is used by 
Mr. Campbell in his plumbing business. Mr. Campbell begin using this truck in 2003, having 
used a Ford pickup truck and trailer, a motorcycle and a Subaru passenger car over the driveway 
prior to that time. Mr. Campbell testified as to the dimensions of the truck during his testimony 
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as follows: 20 feet from bumper to bumper and 8 feet wide and IO feet off the ground at the 
tallest part (Ex. 506). There was also testimony that Mr. Campbell maintains in the northern part 
of his property, which is not part of the dominant estate, pipes related to his plumbing business. 
There was also testimony that he has no other location and owns no other property from which to 
run a plumbing business. On this basis, the Court finds that he is indeed running a plumbing 
business from his house. There was also testimony and evidence that the Defendant William 
Campbell had applied to the City of Boise for a home occupancy permit to allow him to continue 
the plumbing business from his home, but had been denied (Ex .. 17, 19, 20, 21). The evidence 
from the planning and zoning commission references code enforcement violations dating back to 
2004 for outdoor storage of plumbing supplies, including toilets, sinks, pipes and other 
miscellaneous equipment (Ex. 19). 
The Court noted and found in its prior Memorandum Decision and Order that the 
language discussing this as a "driveway" and "as far as necessary" means that this easement was 
contemplated for access to a single-family residence. In light of the facts (a) that the character of 
the area appears to be residential, (b) the language of the original agreement, and ( c) the size and 
commercial nature of the vehicle in question, the Court holds that the use of this particular 
vehicle is inconsistent with the scope of the easement. Simply put, driving a vehicle of this size 
and weight over a residential driveway is beyond the scope of an easement for ingress and egress 
to a single-family residence. 
RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF THE DRIVEWAY 
The Court also notes that the clear purpose of the driveway is for ingress and egress 
access to a single-family residence. The scope of the easement does not include an ability on the 
part of the dominant estate holder to park upon the easement premises, whether that involves 
parking the entire vehicle or any portion thereof on the easement premises. Further, there was 
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testimony at trial that a certain sign has been placed by Campbell that attempts to regulate 
"trespassing" upon the easement and that that particular sign causes confusion to the invitees of 
the servient estate and is not desirable from the perspective of the current servient estate owner. 
Mr. Campbell responded affirmatively to a question to the effect that "the only claim you have to 
put that sign there would be because you claim you have a driveway easement on the Mannings' 
Property." The dominant estate has no right to place such a sign that would cause confusion as 
to the servient estate owner's desire for his property. There was also testimony that the dominant 
estate holder parks a vehicle while he unchains and chains a chain across the entrance to the 
dominant estate premises. There is no right for the dominant estate holder to park upon the 
easement premises for any purpose. 
LOCATION OF THE DRIVEWAY AND RIGHT TO MOVE THE DRIVEWAY 
In Bethel v. Van Stone, 120 Idaho 522, 528 (Id. Ct. App. 1991), the Court noted that 
"[t]he present owner of a property shall have the right in the first instance to locate an easement 
thereon, and if reasonably suitable for the purpose of the easement, then a selection of a place 
cannot be questioned." Id. (citing Quinn v. Stone, 75 Idaho 243 (1954)). The Court finds that 
the option proposed by the Mannings using ACHD right of way is suitable and convenient to 
afford Campbell the ingress and egress to which he is entitled under the 1952 Agreement. To 
the extent that ACHD approval is required, there was testimony by the ACHD representative, 
Gary Inselman, that ACHD approval was a two-step process, and that the first step in that 
process, approval of the driveway approach request had occurred. The ACHD representative did 
testify that the second step, approval of a permit for construction, involved approval of the 
details of the work to be done and standards to follow. The ACHD representative testified that 
would, in this case, not simply be a staff level decision, but would go to the Highway 
Commissioners as part of a public process in which the public could come in and provide 
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testimony and comment before the Commissioners made a decision. Mr. Inselman also testified 
that the right of way in question was just as much in front of the Kimball Anderson property as it 
was in front of the Campbell or Manning Property. 
There was testimony from Scott Beecham, a landscape architect and a land planning 
professional familiar with entitlement of residential property in Boise, Idaho that moving the 
access was essentially neutral from an entitlement perspective and would not impact the ability 
to use the dominant estate for a single family residence, the current allowed use. Mr. Beecham 
testified that the current configuration of the driveway was not intuitive and that aesthetically it 
would differentiate the Campbell property from the Manning Property if the Campbell property 
had separate access. Mr. Beecham also testified without objection that secluded properties such 
as this have a lower property value. 
Mr. Campbell can undertake whatever activity he wants on his property in response to the 
approach that the Mannings construct to his property. The demonstrative exhibits admitted at 
trial (Ex. 3, 4, 5, 6) only show one potential route over his property and are merely suggestions. 
Ultimately, it remains his choice as to how and whether to develop his property to take 
advantage of the right of ingress and egress, and the Court makes no order in this regard. 
ORDER FOR JUDGMENT 
This case requires a carefully crafted judgment. Under the present facts and 
circumstances existing today, the Court believes, based on the findings and conclusions set forth 
above, a judgment should be entered as follows in favor of Plaintiffs and hereby instructs 
Plaintiffs' counsel to submit a proposed judgment along the following lines: 
Conclusions of Memorandum Decision and Order: The rulings of the Court's prior 
memorandum decision on Summary Judgment should be reduced to judgment form; 
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Designation of Dominant Estate: A legal description should be created by Mr. Carter 
consistent with his testimony as part of a proposed judgment to the Court for purposes of 
describing the dominant estate in the judgment of this Court; 
Use of Commercial Vehicle: The use of the lsu;ru plumbing truck is inconsistent with 
the scope of the easement. Further, the use of this access for purposes of running a plumbing 
business is inconsistent with the purposes of the easement. 
Restrictions on Use of the Driveway: The dominant estate holder has no right to use 
the easement other than for purposes of ingress and egress to a single family residence. The 
dominant estate holder may not use the easement for parking, turning, archery, etc. Further, the 
dominant estate owner may not place, and must remove, any signs that create a perception of 
regulating conduct on the Manning Property, including the "no trespassing" sign in front of the 
Manning property and including the recently placed "no parking" sign on the border between the 
properties. The dominant estate holder has no right to call a tow truck to tow any vehicle off the 
Manning Property. 
Location of Driveway and Right to Move the Driveway: Location of the easement as 
near as possible (a) to the southern border between the respective properties, and (b) to the 
junction with 21 st Street, and yet (c) utilizing the minimum amount necessary of the servient 
estate so as to tum in as soon as possible, is appropriate and in keeping with the letter and spirit 
of the original agreement as well as applicable law (the "Location Criteria"). The Court desires 
that the conflict over the use of this easement be minimized. To that end, a separate driveway 
using only so much of the servient estate as is necessary to afford Defendants ingress and egress 
to their property is consistent with the original language of the Agreement, and yet takes into 
account existing circumstances on the ground today as well as the interest of both parties and 
minimizes the burden and injury to the servient estate. 
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Accordingly, the Court finds that the route proposed by the Plaintiffs using the ACHD 
right of way effects the purpose of the Location Critera (the "Best Driveway Alternative" 
referred to in the Manning's opening brief). However, this route depends in part upon the 
consent of the Ada County Highway District and potentially upon the consent of other zoning 
authorities. Obviously, those parties are not before this Court and other than making a finding 
that historically there has been an easement in this location, the Court cannot force or order or 
compel those non-parties to take any action. What the Court can do, and hereby does, is order 
the Defendants to cooperate reasonably and in good faith in the process to determine if those 
third parties will give their approval.3 That is the Court's first order. If it appears that ACHD 
and zoning approval cannot be obtained, then the Court's decree is that the easement be situated 
in accordance with the Good Driveway Alternative (referred to in the Mannings' opening brief), 
in accordance with the Location Criteria. 
DATED this ___ day of _______ , 2010. 
The Honorable Ronald J. Wilper 
District Judge 
3 It is not this Court's intent to waive, relinquish, extinguish or otherwise impact in any way pre-existing property 
rights (often times referred to as "grandfathered" rights) that may relate to this easement or any relocation of this 
easement by mentioning third parties in this Order. Q Q Q 519 
JPLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED] FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND PROPOSED ORDER FOR ,JlJDGMENT 9 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this __ day of ______ , 2010, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document to the persons listed below the method 
indicated: 
Thomas E. Dvorak 
Givens Pursley LLP 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701 
Attorney for Plaintiffs Tom and Julie Afanning 
Joseph L. Ellsworth 
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defranco P.L.L.C. 
1031 E. Park Boulevard 
Boise, ID 83712 
Facsimile: 345-8945 
Attorney for Defendants William J Campbell 
and Naomi Louise Campbell 
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Hand Delivery 
Facsimile 
Overnight Courier 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile 
_ Overnight Courier 
U.S. Mail 
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JOSEPH L. ELLSWORTH, ISB #3702 
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS, TALBOY & DEFRANCO, P.L.L.C. 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
,L i)_il\f{~) 
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Boise, ID 83712 
Phone: (208) 336-1843 
Fax: (208) 345-8945 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS 
Pjl A "'""l"'\Ul:'J:• 
DEPU'f't' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THOMAS CRELLIN MANNING and ) 
JULIE ANN MANNING, husband and ) 
wife, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL, an unmarried ) 
Individual, and NAOMI LOUISE ) 
CAMPBELL, an unmarried individual, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
__________ ) 
Case No.: CV OC 2009 0007350 
MOTION TO ENLARGE TIME 
COMES NOW William and Naomi Campbell, Defendants, by and through 
counsel of record, and hereby moves the Court, pursuant to Rule 6(b) of the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure, to enlarge the time by one week for filing of Defendant's Closing 
Argument and Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. This motion is 
brought on the basis and for the reason that defense counsel requests additional time to 
reply to the brief submitted by Plaintiff. 
DATED this __fj__ day of March, 2010. 
MOTION TO ENLARGE TIME 
("",_,--·--~,\ 
·,_____ ),,..; _/ 
Joseph L. Ellsworth 
Attorney for Defendant 000521 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this /( day of March, 2010, I served a true and 
correct copy of the within and foregoi~g document by the method indicated below and 
addressed to the following: 
Thomas E. Dvorak 
Givens Pursley LLP 
PO Box 2720 
Boise ID 83701 
MOTION TO ENLARGE TIME 
US Mail 
Hand Delivery 
~Facsimile: 388-1300 
000522 
2 
i 
! "\ 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
7" _., 
24 
25 
26 
II NO·------------+ Q' · · Flt.ED 
A.M .{...: t/0 PM----+ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICI 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNT · 
THOMAS CRELLIN MANNING and 
JULlE ANN MANNING, husband and 
wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WILLlAM J. CAMPBELL, an unmarried 
individual, and NAOMI LOUISE 
CAMPBELL, an unmarried individual, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CVOC0907350 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
ENLARGE TlME 
On March 11, 2010, the Defendants filed a motion for enlargement of time to file the 
Defendants' closing argument and proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The 
Motion is hereby granted. 
It is further ordered that the deadline for filing the Plaintiffs' rebuttal closing argument is 
extending accordingly. 
1T IS SO ORDERED. 
" 1·1':--
Dated this / (I ._,.day of March 2010. 
Ronald J. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, J. David Navarro, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have mailed, by 
United States Mail, on this / 5 day of March 2010, one copy of the foregoing as notice pursuant 
to Rule 77(d) l.C.R. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes addressed as 
follows: 
Joseph L Ellsworth 
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS, 
TALBOY & DEFRANCO, PLLC 
l 03 l E Park Blvd 
Boise. ID 83712 
ax: (208) 345-8945 
Thomas E. Dvorak 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 W Bannock St 
PO Box 2720 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
Ada County, 
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ORDER-2 
JOSEPH L. ELLS\tVORTH, ISB #3702 
ELLS\tVORTH, KALLAS, TALBOY & DEFRANCO P.L.L.C 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
MAR 1 g 2010 
Boise, ID 83712 
Phone: (208) 336-1843 
Fax: (208) 345-8945 
Attorney for Defendants 
J, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THON1AS CRELLIN 1\-1ANNING and 
JULIE ANN MANNI~G, husband and 
wife, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
WILLIAMJ. CAMPBELL, an unmarried) 
individual, and NA0:1VII LOUISE ) 
CAMPBELL, an unmarried individual, ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
Case No.: CV OC 2009 0007350 
DEFENDANTS' POST TRIAL 
MEMORANDUM AND CLOSING 
COMES NOW William J. Campbell and Naomi Louise Campbell ("Campbells"), 
Defendants in the above-entitled action, through counsel, Joseph L. Ellsworth, and hereby 
submits this post trial memorandum and dosing to the court. 
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL 
This case involves a written easement for a common driveway in existence and use 
in the exact formation since July 29, 1952. The neighbors constructed the driveway prior to 
signing the agreement. The agreement states that Paul Boyd had built a "macadam drive-
way" and that his neighbor Frank .h,1attison was desirous of obtaining "the right of way" 
for the purposes of "ingress and egress" to his property. 1\,ioney changed hands behveen 
the neighbors and a driveway right was granted to the 1\,iattisons. 
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DEFENDANT'S TRIAL MEMORANDUM 
That Paul S. Boyd and Mary M. Boyd in consideration of $112.50, lawful money 
of the United States, to them in hand by Frank N. Mattison and Ida Grace 
Mattison, do hereby grant unto Frank N. Mattison and Idaho Grace Mattison, 
for all ordinary purposes a right to use the driveway jointly with Paul S. Boyd 
and Mary M. Boyd, the same including all rights of ingress and egress over the 
same, the said drive-way running and leading from the end of North 21st street 
of the City of Boise, Idaho, in a northerly and southerly direction, far enough to 
allow the said second parties herein to enter upon their premises which adjoin 
the premises of the first parties on the east side of the premises. 
The parties shall be entitled to use the driveway in common, and the expense of 
constructing and maintenance of said driveway shall always be equally borne 
by the parties hereto. Should the land hereby subject to this right of way ever 
cease to be used as a driveway, then in such a case, the full right and title shall 
revert to the present owners or their successors in title. 
Under Idaho Law a "grant" means an actual conveyance of a right in an estate, a 
possessory right. Idaho Code 55-612. In this case it means that the Mattisons bought the 
right to use this driveway, and no other, subject only to the right of reversion in the event 
of non-usage. 
Bill Campbell has personally used this express easement for more than seventeen 
years (longer than any prescriptive period under Idaho Law) and without anyone's 
permission. These facts are undisputed. 
The Plaintiffs ("Mannings") are the next-door neighbors to Bill Campbell and Naomi 
Campbell. Bill Campbell has occupied the property for seventeen years and has been using 
the driveway the entire time. 
Julie Manning testified at trial that she and her husband looked at the property 
several times prior to purchasing the property in October, 2008. She testified that she is a 
lawyer and familiar with the common driveway prior to closing. Prior to purchase she 
personally spoke to the seller about the common driveway and called Boise City Planning 
and Zoning to see if she could have her prospective neighbor cited for the condition of his 
property. The Mannings purchased the property from Benjamin and Emily Schwarz on 
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October 13, 2008. The Mannings had actual and recorded knowledge of the easement 
agreement. 
Just after the Christmas Holiday, Julie Manning and Mr. Manning brought in a fence 
company and began constructing a fence across the Campbells' driveway. Julie Manning, 
an attorney at law, testified at trial that she thought there was an oral agreement between 
her husband and Mr. Campbell to relocate the 1952 easement through the Campbells' front 
yard and that it was ok to construct a wooden fence across Mr. Manning's driveway. Her 
testimony was contradicted by the fact that: 
1) no new easement was negotiated, written or recorded; 
2) no new access was developed for Mr. Campbell's vehicle prior to constructing 
the fence across his only access; 
3) Julie Manning admitted to running around the yard with a copy of LC. 55-313 
claiming she had a "right'' to relocate the driveway; 
4) ~fr. Campbell completely denied any agreement to close or modify his single 
access point driveway. 
tv1r. Campbell testified at trial that Julie Manning told him that access to his property 
was his problem and instructed her fence crew to continue drilling holes in his driveway 
anyway. When Mr. Campbell took reasonable steps to defend his property, Julie Manning 
called the authorities and accused Mr. Campbell of "trespass" in an effort to have him 
arrested. 
Following the unsuccessful attempt to fence Mr. Campbell from his property, the 
Mannings sued the Camp bells under the theory that they should have a right to move the 
easement somewhere else on the Campbells' property. The Mannings then made a 
concerted effort to shut down Mr. Campbell's business and have him cited for zoning 
violations, conducting his plumbing business as a home business, and for the use of his 
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plumbing truck. The Mannings then successfully opposed Mr. Campbell's application for 
a permit to run his plumbing business from his home. Finally, the Mannings applied with 
Ada County Highway District for the construction of a driveway in front of the Anderson 
and Campbell homes. The County did not approve this application despite repeated 
assertions by the Mannings to the contrary. 
In April 2009, the Mannings filed this legal action for quiet title and declaratory 
judgment terminating the easement, or relocating the easement to their desired location, 
through the Campbells' front yard. 
The Campbells filed a responsive pleading and 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. This 
is the equivalent of a motion for summary judgment. Miles v. Idaho Power, 116 Idaho 635, 
778 P.2d 757 (1989). This motion was filed August 24, 2009, with supporting memorandum 
of law. The matter came before the court on November 30, 2009. The court ruled on the 
motion to dismiss on January 19, 2010. The matter was set for trial on February 16, 2010. 
In its _Memorandum Decision the court granted Defendant Cambells' Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings, in part, ruling that there is an "express limited easement which 
is not unilaterally revocable." Memorandum Decision at p. 14. 
The court left open for trial the issue of whether the easement can be relocated under 
a statute, LC 55-313. The Mannings contend this statute allows the easement to be moved 
off of their property and onto the property of the dominant estate, thus reversing or 
eliminating the easement in their favor. The Mannings cite general legal authority stating 
that an easement may be moved or relocated if the location is not fixed and there is no 
damage to the owner of the easement. Neither of those factors is present in this case. 
At the pretrial conference, the Mannings raised the new issue of whether the court 
could restrict Mr. Campbell from accessing his property in a Mitsubishi Truck. There was 
no evidence presented at trial that the truck is wider than the existing easement or causes 
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any damage to the driveway. The issue would appear to be framed around whether the 
court can issue an injunctive order defining what type of verucle can be driven under a 
written "ingress or egress" easement. 
Finally, the Mannings urge the court to terminate the easement or restrict the 
easement based upon a slight change to the boundary of the dominant estate in 1987 (the 
addition of one foot on the northern boundary of parcel 1, but a substantial diminishment 
in overall size). It is uncontested that the driveway has served the same residence at the 
same location for more than fifty-seven (57) years. 
REMAINING ISSUES 
1) Does Idaho Code 55-313 or any authority cited by Plaintiff support judicial 
modification of an express easement in place for more than fifty seven years? 
In the court's decision the court correctly stated "The Plaintiffs cite no Idaho Law 
providing for judicial modification of an express easement in contravention of the plain 
language of the easement." Memorandum Decision at p. 15. 
Plaintiffs assert two theories to support moving the easement from its fixed location. 
The first legal theory is based upon Bethel v. Van Stone, 120 Idaho 522 (Ct. App. 1991). In 
this case the appellate court upheld the existence of a 60-foot road easement over the 
"existing road" (through a meadow) but remanded the case because there was no evidence 
offered at trial to fix the location of the road. 
We believe the present case falls squarely within the rule set forth in Quinn and in 
Northwest Pipeline. Here, the trial judge made no findings fixing the location of the sixty-
foot easement through the meadow. He simply announced at the conclusion of the 
evidence that the Bethels were entitled to such an easement. He found only that the 
southerly end of the easement started at the existing gate leading into the meadow from 
Highway 200. We do not mean to fault the judge for this deficiency, because no survey 
evidence was introduced upon wruch a legal description of any part of the sixty-foot 
easement could be made. 
Idaho law requires that a judgment wruch affects an interest in real property must describe 
000529 
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL MEMORANDUM 5 
the interests with such certainty that rights and liabilities be clearly fixed. Palmer v. 
Fitzpatrick, 97 Idaho 925,557 P.2d 203 (1976); Seccombe v. Weeks, 115 Idaho 433, 767 P.2d 
276 (Ct.App.1989). See also Christensen v. Ruffing, 117 Idaho 1047, 793 P.2d 720 
(Ct.App.1990). This case must be remanded for that purpose. The entire length of the 
easement across Government Lots 1, 2 and 3 should be surveyed so that the judgment can 
contain a precise description of the course and location of the easement. Additional 
evidence may be taken to determine the precise location of the easement on the respective 
properties involved in this action. Sinnett v. Werelus, 83 Idaho 514, 365 P.2d 952 (1961). 
In accordance with the rule stated in Quim1 v. Stone, supra, the present owner of 
Chester's property shall have the right in the first instance to locate the road within the 
meadow, and, "if reasonably suitable for the purpose, a selection of a place cannot be 
questioned." Quim1, 75 Idaho at 246, 270 P.2d at 827. This procedure is in recognition of the 
right of the owner of the servient property to make such use of his property as he desires, 
so long as his use is consistent with the easement granted. The owner may choose the 
location to minimize the impact of the road and to prevent unreasonable interference with 
the rights of the owner so long as the chosen easement is a convenient and suitable way. Id. 
"If the grantor omits to exercise this right, the grantee may make the selection and his 
selection will be upheld unless he has abused the right." Id. Consistent with these rights, 
the district court should encourage the parties to agree to the exact location of the entire 
sixty-foot easement, but to the extent that they are unable or unwilling to do this, the court 
shall determine a reasonable location that is convenient and suitable. After the survey is 
completed and approved by the court, the court should enter an amended judgment with a 
legal description of the easement. Bethel v. Van Stone, 120 Idaho at p. 529. 
While the Bethel decision stands for the general proposition that an easement not 
otherwise fixed or described needs to be defined by a court, such a case has no application 
to a case where the parties themselves fixed the location of the easement over 57 years ago. 
This is not a case of an undefined road running through the middle of meadow. This is a 
case where the parties agreed to the joint use of an already constructed driveway. 
The more appropriate line of legal authority in this case is set forth in Turner v. Cold 
Springs Canyon Ltd. Partnership, 143 Idaho 227, 141 P.3d 1096 (Idaho 2006). The Idaho 
Supreme Court held that the right to relocate an easement should be set forth in the 
agreement or it is waived. 
Plaintiffs do not dispute that this macadam driveway was already built by the Boyds 
prior to the recordation of the easement. 
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If the court needs additional legal authority to uphold the existence and exact 
location of a well defined driveway easement, the court should consider the analysis under 
prescriptive easement cases such as Benninger v. Derefield, 179 P.3d 336 (ID 2008). The 
Idaho Supreme Court noted in a footnote that: 
The district court noted that Derefield's improvements to the driveway have 
relocated the driveway from its historical position. Nonetheless, the district court 
held the relocation can stand and that the scope of the easement will apply to the 
driveway as currently positioned. The scope of the easement is based on the district 
court's determination of the width of the driveway during the prescriptive period. 
FNl Benninger, Supra. 
Although prescriptive easement cases are not directly on point, the authority created 
limits the court's ability to move easements that are fixed by agreement or in place for more 
than the prescriptive period. The evidence in this case is undisputed that the original 
parties agreed to the existing location in this case, and that Bill Campbell himself used the 
existing driveway for more than fifteen years before ever meeting the Mannings. 
Additionally, the court should consider the complete lack of any statutory authority 
to move an easement on to the lands of another private party, especially the dominant 
estate. There is no legal support for Plaintiffs' case. 
LC. 55-313 offers no additional guidance. This statute states: "The person or 
persons owning or controlling the private lands shall have the right at their own expense to 
change such access to any other part of the private lands, but such change must be made in 
such a manner as not to obstruct motor vehicle travel, or to otherwise injure any person or 
persons using or interested in such access." There is no case law or authority that offers 
guidance in this case. 
An express easement can be one created or modified by use, agreement, or under 
limited circumstances by statute, but there is no legal authority for the proposition 
promoted by the Mannings in this trial. There is no case, statute, or even a comment by our 
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courts that would support the wholesale move of an easement onto the land of the 
dominant estate. The court can only reasonably conclude that such a move would damage 
or injure the dominant estate. 
The court should order the legal description set forth in Plaintiff's Exhibit 502 be 
recorded as final judgment. 
2. Should the court enter an order of injunctive relief prohibiting Mr. Campbell from 
driving his truck onto the property or from stopping or turning around? 
The Plaintiffs now urge the court to enter restrictive injunctive orders on Campbell's 
use of the 1952 agreement by declaring that Campbell may not drive his Mitsubishi truck 
over the easement to his home. Plaintiffs urge that he should be "enjoined" and be forced 
to take down a no parking sign on the boundary fence. 
Defendants respond that there is no complaint or action on file against him for 
injunctive relief under any theory of law. This issue was first raised at the pretrial 
conference and there was no consent to trial on the issue of whether the court can enter 
such an order. To the extent that the court must consider the use of the Mitsubishi truck 
under the terms of the 1952 easement agreement, the analysis of the court should be limited 
solely to whether the use of this vehicle itself is per se unreasonable under the doctrine of 
"unlimited reasonable use." It is completely irrelevant for the court to consider whether 
the use of the vehicle is permissible under a license from the city for a home occupancy 
permit to run a business. 
Counsel is unaware of any legal authority relevant to the analysis of whether a private 
individual can drive a truck from a street onto private property. It is a common every day 
occurrence and there are no CCR's or covenants and restrictions which limit Bill 
Campbell's right to drive such a vehicle. Plaintiffs argue that there is no support in the 
1952 agreement for the use of the commercial vehicle, but the agreement is silent on what 
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use is reasonable. This is an easement for ingress or egress. The evidence at trial did not 
demonstrate that the vehicle exceeded the width of the driveway easement or caused any 
damage. There was no evidence that there is a fleet of commercial vehicles coming and 
going from the home. It is a one man, one truck story. The evidence at trial showed only 
that Bill Campbell ran a small one person home business from his residence and that he 
drove his commercial truck from his home to the location of the plumbing problem and did 
his work there. How this violates an easement for "ingress and egress" is unknown. 
Plaintiffs' concerns for safety are imaginary. There is no proof before the court that a 
commercial vehicle is more dangerous, or causes more damage, than any other vehicle. If 
there is a legitimate concern for commercial use of a vehicle on a private property, it is the 
proper subject for a business application permit before the City. This court cannot address 
this issue without limiting the personal right of Bill Campbell to use his vehicle of choice 
for a noncommercial purpose. There is no analysis that the court should engage in here 
except for a finding that Defendant's use of the driveway did not, and does not exceed the 
reasonable use rights under the existing driveway easement. 
This court correctly recognized in its Memorandum Decision that an easement must 
be construed to allow the "grantee convenient, reasonable and accessible right of way 
within the limits of the grant." Bethel v. Stone 120 Idaho 222 (Ct. App. 1999). In Abbott v. 
Nampa School Dist. No. 131, 119 Idaho 544, 548, 808 P.2d 1289, 1293 (1991), the Idaho 
Supreme Court stated that a general grant of easement was defined as an "easement 
granted or reserved in general terms, without any limitations as to its use." See also 
McFadden v. Sein, 139 Idaho 21, 88 P.3d 740 (2004). In Abbot, the Idaho Supreme Court 
summarized the basic principals of a grant of easement under Idaho Law: In other words, 
an easement granted or reserved in general terms, without any limitations as to its use, is 
one of unlimited reasonable use. 
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In Boydstun Beach Ass'n v. Allen, 111 Idaho 370, 723 P.2d 914 (Ct.App.1986), the 
Idaho Court of Appeals applied the following rule to an easement: "The rule is that, absent 
language in the easement to the contrary, the uses made by the servient and dominant 
owners may be adjusted consistent with the normal development of their respective lands." 
111 Idaho at 378, 723 P.2d at 922. 
Applying these principals, there is no basis for this court to rule that Bill Campbell 
cannot access his property with a particular vehicle. While it may be that the City is not 
currently allowing Campbell to run a home business, there is no need for any court ordered 
imprimatur. Similarly, the court should not order that Campbells are forever restricted to a 
single-family residence. That is inconsistent with the doctrine of reasonable use, and 
adjudicates a matter not before the court. Finally, the court should clarify the current ruling 
that Mr. Campbell cannot temporarily park his vehicle on the easement, or turn around. 
The Camp bells may need to park for a moment, or turn around, consistent with the 
reasonable use of the easement. If the court does consider such an order, the order should 
be binding on both parties to the agreement so that the joint driveway is free from 
blockades or parking by either party at any time. 
3. Is there a material change in the size of the dominant estate that is relevant to the 
court's analysis? 
The Plaintiffs have raised an additional issue asking the court to "declare" the 
dominant estate as something other than Bill Campbell's residence as it now exists. 
Apparently the theory is based upon the proposition that Campbells' property 
configuration is slightly different than in 1952. This theory is without merit. The dominant 
estate is substantially smaller than it was in 1952, and there has been no increase in the 
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burden over the years. The property served by the easement is substantially the same as it 
was in 1952. This is not a case of an increase or change in the dominant estate. 
CONCLUSION 
The Campbells are the lawful owners of a written right to use an existing driveway 
that was built in 1952. The proposition that this driveway can be moved now to another 
location without damage to the Campbell residence is without serious merit. The 
Mannings well knew of the driveway easement when they bought their property in 2008. 
The driveway was visible. The easement agreement was recorded. Julie Manning is a 
lawyer. There was actual and recorded notice of the common "joint" driveway. The parties 
agreed to the fixed location of the easement in the exact current location. 
Bill Campbell himself has been using the same easement for his home and small 
plumbing business since 1993. That is longer than the prescriptive easement under Idaho 
Law and the court should consider this as a factor in deciding whether to relocate an 
existing written easement. 
Plaintiffs have exploited every possible angle to remove or relocate Bill Campbell 
from his property. Julie Manning testified that she had already contacted Boise City to 
inquire into zoning enforcement or criminal prosecution prior to buying her new home. 
She and her husband built a fence across the Camp bells' driveway without permission. 
Julie Manning called police and accused Bill Campbell of trespassing and then claimed she 
had a right to move the easement under her own version of law. She testified that she has 
repeatedly reported Bill Campbell to the City for zoning violations, code enforcement, the 
condition of his property or for running his small business. Bill Campbell has been put out 
of business by his neighbor. The Mannings contested his application for a home occupancy 
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permit before the City. The Mannings next applied with Ada County for a driveway permit 
for a driveway not belonging to them. And now the Mannings come before this court 
asking the court to recognize the burden of sharing a driveway with their neighbor that 
was that there fifteen years earlier. It makes no sense. 
There is no reasonable driveway alternative to the existing driveway that does not 
damage property belonging to the Campbells or their neighbors. There is no need for the 
court to further define the easement or the use other than for the court to find that the 
Campbells' use has not violated the reasonable use doctrine. The court should adopt the 
surveyed metes and bounds description set forth in Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 502, and enter 
judgment accordingly. 
// 
Dated this /f d:y of March, 2010. 
//,---) 
/ 
BY /tvt 
JOSEPH L. ELLSWORTH 
000536 
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL MEMORANDUM 12 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this Ii f t...day of March, 2010, I served a true and correct 
copy of the within and foregoing document by the method indicated below and addressed 
to the following: 
Thomas E. Dvorak 
Givens Pursley LLP 
PO Box 2720 
Boise ID 83701 
US Mail 
Hand 
/.L //~~ 
JOSEPH ffu~RTH t:__ _ 
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL MEMORANDUM 
000537 
13 
JOSEPH L. ELLSWORTH, ISB #3702 MAR 1 9 20ffl 
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS, TALBOY & DEFRANCO, P.L.L.C. 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
NAvARRO, Cl@rk. 
1.,AMSS 
Boise, ID 83712 
Phone: (208) 336-1843 
Fax: (208) 345-8945 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THOMAS CRELLIN MANNING and ) 
JULIE ANN MANNING, husband and ) 
wife, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
VS. ) 
) 
WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL, an unmarried ) 
individual, and NAOMI LOUISE ) 
CAMPBELL, an unmarried individual, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
________________ ) 
Case No.: CV OC 2009 0007350 
[DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED] 
FINDINGS OFF ACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER FOR JUDGMENT 
The above-entitled matter having come before the Court at a court trial held from 
February 17 - 19, 2010, and the Court having heard the testimony of witnesses and 
considered evidence presented, and thereafter allowed for the submission of closing 
arguments and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in \vriting by all parties, 
the Court hereby enters its findings of fact and conclusions oflaw and order for judgment 
in this matter. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This is a case involving a written easement for a common driveway in existence 
and use in the same location since July 29, 1952. Bill Campbell has personally used this 
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express easement for more than seventeen years (longer than any prescriptive period 
under Idaho Law) and without anyone's permission. These facts are undisputed. 
The Plaintiffs ("Mannings") are the next-door neighbors to Bill Campbell and 
Naomi Campbell. Bill Campbell has occupied the property since April of 1993 and has 
been using the driveway the entire time. 
The drive\vay is a joint or common use driveway that has been governed by a 
written agreement between the neighbors since July 29, 1952. The agreement drafted by 
Paul S. Boyd created a perpetual right to use the common driveway by his then 
neighbors, Frank and Ida Mattison. The agreement states in pertinent part: 
That Paul S. Boyd and Mary M. Boyd in consideration of $112.50, lawful 
money of the United States, to them in hand by Frank N. Mattison and Ida 
Grace Mattison, do hereby grant unto Frank N. Mattison and Ida Grace 
Mattison, for all ordinary purposes a right to use the driveway jointly with 
Paul S. Boyd and Mary M. Boyd, the same including all rights of ingress and 
egress over the same, the said drive-way running and leading from the end of 
North 21 st street of the City of Boise, Idaho, in a northerly and southerly 
direction, far enough to allow the said second parties herein to enter upon 
their premises which adjoin the premises of the first parties on the east side 
of the premises. 
The parties shall be entitled to use the driveway in common, and the expense 
of constructing and maintenance of said driveway shall always be equally 
borne by the parties hereto. Should the land hereby subject to this right of 
way ever cease to be used as a driveway, then in such a case, the full right 
and title shall revert to the present owners or their successors in title. 
The Mannings purchased the property from Benjamin and Emily Schwarz, 
successors in interest to the Boyds, on October 13, 2008. In April, 2009, the Mannings 
filed this legal action for quiet title and declaratory judgment terminating the easement, or 
relocating the easement to their desired location, through the Campbells' front yard. 
The Campbells filed a responsive pleading and 12(6)(6) motion to dismiss. This 
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is the equivalent of a motion for summary judgment. Miles v. Idaho Power, 116 Idaho 
635, 778 P.2d 757 (1989). The court ruled that the written agreement constituted an 
easement and was controlling between the parties in its Memorandum Decision of 
January 19, 2010. The matter proceeded to trial on February 17 - 19,2010. 
At trial, evidence was presented from both sides. 
The court, having heard the testimony and considered the evidence submitted at 
trial, hereby enters judgment as follows: 
1. The 1952 driveway agreement constitutes an express easement for ingress and 
egress in accordance with Idaho Law, with all rights incidental or necessary to 
the reasonable and proper use of the easement. 
2. The easement is not revocable by the Plaintiffs, and is subject only to the right 
of reversion set forth in the agreement. 
3. The easement creates an express right to use the driveway jointly. 
4. The driveway was constructed prior to the 1952 agreement. 
5. The location of the driveway has remained in the same general configuration 
and position on the ground since I 952. It may not be moved without injury to 
the Defendants. 
6. There has been no material change in the size or location of the dominant 
estate. 
7. The parties fixed the location of the easement in 1952. 
8. Plaintiffs Exhibit 502 provides a complete and accurate legal description of 
the existing easement. Plaintiffs Exhibit 502 is attached hereto and 
incorporated herein by reference. 
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9. There was no evidence presented at trial that Campbells' use of the easement 
exceeded the reasonable incidental use of the easement. No orders restricting 
use are appropriate or necessary in this case. 
, . /1'.ttA UA 1 En this __z_ day of March, 2010. 
'~~~ 
Joseph L. ~orth 
Attorney for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this //:i day of March, 2010, I served a true and 
correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method indicated below and 
addressed to the following: 
Thomas E. Dvorak 
Givens Pursley LLP 
PO Box 2720 
Boise ID 83701 
US Mail 
__ Hand Delivery 
f/ Facsimile: '.»8-1300 
Molly ~ed~leg~l Assistaf t 
/ 
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February 9. 2010 
An access located in lhe of the SE 1/4 of Section 33, TAN., R.2E .. B.M .. Boise. 
Ada County, Idaho more particularly described as follows: 
Commencing at the NE corner of Lot 1, Block 10 of Eim Grove Addition as filed In 
Book 5 of Plats at Page 242 records of Ada County, Idaho; 
thence along the West nght-of-way line of N. 21" Street North 00'00'00• East, 
9.02 feet to a point on the South boundary of the Manning property as described in that 
Warranty deed recorded as Instrument No. 108114031, records of Ada County, Idaho; 
thence leaving said West right-of-way line and along said South boundary line 
South 89"46'52" East, 23.40 feet to REAL POINT OF BEGINNING of this access; 
thence leaving said South boundary line and along a non-tangent curve to the 
right 58.85 feet, said curve having a radius of 77.00 feet, a central angle of 43' 47'38" 
and a long chord of 57.43 feet which bears North 24•01·15• East to a point on the East 
boundary line of the said Manning property; 
thence along said East boundary line South 00'1 1 '07" East, 18.94 feet to the 
beginning of a non-tangent curve to the left; 
thence leaving said East boundary hne and along said curve 35.82 feet. said 
curve having a radius of 64.70 feet, a central angle of 31"43'17" and a long chord of 
35.36 feet which bears South 18"20'48• West to a point on U1e South boundary line of 
the said Manning property; 
thence along said South boundary line North 89' 46'52. West, 12.31 feet to the 
REAL POINT OF BEGINNING. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THOMAS CRELLIN MANNING and JULIE 
ANN MANNING, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL, an unmarried 
individual, and NAOMI LOUISE 
CAMPBELL, an unmarried individual, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0907350 
PLAINTIFFS' POST-TRIAL REPLY 
CLOSING ARGUMENT 
The core issue before the Court is the legal location of, and scope of allowable use of, a 
previously unlocated easement created by the 1952 Driveway Agreement. Defendants continue to 
confuse the physical location of the current driveway on the ground with the to-be-determined legal 
location of the easement-but these two things are not the same. 1 We know where the driveway is 
located now. However, there is absolutely no evidence in the record as to where the driveway was 
located from the time of the 1952 Driveway Agreement until 41 years later in 1993, when Defendant 
purchased the dominant estate. The only evidence of the location in 1993 is Defendant's testimony 
at trial. The legal location was not defined in the 1952 Driveway Agreement that created it, and 
there is no evidence that the parties or their predecessors ever memorialized a legal location for the 
easement. As this Court noted in its Memorandum Decision and Order, "the precise location and 
legal description of the easement [ are the] issues for trial." 
1 Defendants also misstate the evidence at trial throughout their closing brief. These misstatements are too nuQeQQt~ 4 5 
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I. In Idaho and Throughout the United States, the Law is Well Settled that the Owner of a 
Servient Estate May Choose the Location of an Undefined Express Easement or Relocate 
an Easement So Long as the Location Chosen is Suitable for the Purposes of the Easement. 
In Idaho, the law is well settled regarding the location of an indefinite easement: the "grantor 
has the right in the first instance to designate and locate the roadway, and, if reasonably suitable for 
the purpose, a selection of a place cannot be questioned .... [T]he easement must be a convenient and 
suitable way and must not unreasonably interfere with the rights of the owner of the servient estate." 
Quinn v. Stone, 75 Idaho 243,246 (Idaho 1954) (citations omitted); see also Bethel v. Stone, 120 
Idaho 522, 528 (App. Ct. 1991) ("the present owner of [the] property shall have the right in the first 
instance to locate the road"). 
There is also substantial legal precedent throughout the United States that the owners of a 
servient estate have the right to relocate a defined easement so long as the new location remains 
suitable for the purposes of the easement.2 In Carlin v. Cohen, supra (copy attached), a case that is 
directly on point, a Court allowed Cohen, the owner of the servient estate, to relocate an easement 
across his property consistent with the development of his property. Cohen's neighbor, Carlin had 
an express easement across Cohen's property to access a private beach. Cohen demolished the 
cottage on his property and began constructing a new house that blocked part of the path of Carlin's 
easement. In a lawsuit to determine whether Cohen could relocate the easement on his property, 
Cohen proposed several options as to where the easement could be relocated and labeled each option 
detail in this brief, but this brief will rectify some of the material misstatements. 
2 See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) (2000) § 4.8(3) ("the owner of the servient estate is entitled to 
make reasonable changes in the location or dimensions of an easement, at the servient owner's expense, to permit normal 
use or development of the servient estate .... "); Carlin v. Cohen, 895 N.E.2d 793 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008) (court affirmed 
relocation of easement in connection with construction of a new house on the servient estate after trial court considered 
six alternatives proposed by the owner of the servient estate and chose one as a suitable replacement for the old 
easement); R&S Investments v. Auto Auctions, Ltd., 725 N.W.2d 871 (Neb. App. Ct. 2006) (affirmed trial court's 
decision to allow plaintiffs to relocate easement on their property); Parker v. Maynard, 2006 WL 1291300 (Ky. App. Ct. 
2006) ("law is quite plain that the owner of a servient estate may alter the path of an easement not specifically located by 
deed so long as to do so does not materially impair the rights of the owner of the dominant estate"); Chekijian v. Mans, 
34 A.D.3d I 029 (N.Y. App. Ct. 2006) ("landowner burdened by express easement of ingress and egress may [ change 
it]"); Green v. Blum, 13 A.D.3d I 037 (N.Y. App. Ct. 2004) (holding that easement provided right of ingress anp, eRRs5 not right to a particular path and owners of servient estate could move right of way so long as they complied wW1WitJ 4 6 
conditions protecting the easement holder). 
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by color. During an eight day trial, the Judge evaluated the practicability of Cohen's proposed 
alternative easements. The Judge determined the location of the original easement, which was not 
well defined in the express agreement, based on the language of the deed and evidence of a path on 
the ground (the "Westerly Path"). The Judge then held that the easement could be relocated 
consistent with the "Blue Path" alternative offered by Cohen because it was a suitable replacement 
for the original easement. Significantly, this required "an adverse change in travel over the 
dominant estate to reach the relocated easement." Id. at 798. 
A. Just like in Carlin v. Cohen, the Mannings now propose a reasonably suitable 
location for the easement on their property that is consistent with the development 
of their property. 
According to the Idaho Supreme Court holding in Quinn, the only factors to consider now 
are: (1) the location chosen by the Mannings for the easement and (2) the reasonable suitability of 
that location for the purpose of Defendants' easement. See also Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Forrest 
Weaver Farm, Inc., 103 Idaho 180 (Idaho 1982); Bethel v. Stone, 120 Idaho 522 (App. Ct. 1991). 
The Schwartzs, the Mannings' predecessors in interest, developed what is now the 
Mannings' property between 2006 and 2008. This development included making these changes to 
the servient estate: eliminating a carport that formerly existed on the east side of the property and 
constructing a bedroom in its place, constructing a garage on the west side of the property, installing 
a la\\TI on the southern portion of the property, and removing a large hedge that formerly grew in the 
southeast corner of the property. Now, the Mannings propose to define the location of defendants' 
easement as the location set forth in Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibits 6 and 10. This location would be 
suitable for the easement's purpose of providing ingress and egress to the dominant estate. In fact, 
according to Scott Beecham, the land use expert who testified at trial, this proposed location would 
be better than the location of the current driveway. Mr. Beecham testified at trial that reconfiguring 
the driveway as set forth in Exhibits 6 and 10 would increase the utility and value of defendants' 
000547 
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property, and that if Mr. Beecham were developing the dominant estate he would reconfigure the 
driveway in exactly this manner. 
8. The Mannings seek now to define the easement on their own property and move the 
existing driveway to this location; the Mannings do not advocate or seek any change 
in Defendants' dominant estate. 
In this case, Defendants assert that the Mannings are trying to move the easement onto the 
Campbell Property. This is not true. The Mannings propose to locate the easement on their property 
in accordance with the metes and bounds description set forth in Plaintiffs' Trial Ex.10 and the 
landscape architect's drawing set forth in Plaintiffs' Trial Ex. 6. The Mannings believe that, as 
shown in these Exhibits 6 and 10, it would be sensible for Defendants to install some additional 
pavement or gravel on their property that would connect the new access driveway on the Mannings' 
property with the existing driveway on their own property. But ultimately, what Defendants do on 
their property is up to them. Bill Campbell can do, and always has done, exactly what he wants on 
his property, without regard to applicable zoning laws or the affect his actions have on other 
neighbors. He may, for example, choose to re-dig his 20 foot deep open pit on his property that he 
only recently filled in or to facilitate a driveway. That is up to him. 
C. Under applicable law, damage to the dominant estate is not a factor for the Court to 
consider, only damage to the purposes of the easement. 
Defendants contend that any change in the existing driveway would damage their property. 
However, under the law '·if the three requirements of the Restatement (Third) of Property section are 
met, all of which speak to matters relating to the easement- its utility, its use and enjoyment, and its 
purpose-- and not to the dominant estate as a whole, other effects, unrelated to the purpose of the 
easement, which may reduce the value of the dominant estate are not to be taken into account." 
Carlin v. Cohen, 895 N .E.2d at 797. Therefore, the alleged damage to the Defendants' dominant 
estate is not relevant under applicable law. 
In Carlin v. Cohen, Carlin, the easement holder, tried to prevent relocating the easement by 
arguing that there would be an adverse change in travel over the dominant estate and it woJili(i,£) 5 4 8 
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more difficult to reach the relocated easement. The Court noted that the ··Blue Path" that was 
designated as the new easement was shorter than the original easement and that it had a different 
entry point from Carlin's original easement. But the court found that "the entry point to the Blue 
Path was equally accessible from Carlin's home, as compared to the entry point of the original 
easement." Id. at 798. Ultimately, the Court ordered the easement to be relocated because the new 
"Blue Path" would satisfy the purposes for which the easement was created, namely, the right to 
travel from Carlin's property to the private beach. Id. 
In this case, the purpose of Defendants' easement under the 1952 Driveway Agreement is 
ingress and egress to their property. The language of the 1952 Driveway Agreement did not provide 
Defendants with any right to: (1) eliminate a driveway on their property, or (2) limit the amount of 
pavement on their property. These rights were not expressly granted or even implied in the 1952 
Driveway Agreement, and so Defendants may not assert them now. Even if relocating the driveway 
would result in an increased amount of pavement on Defendants' property, it would not be relevant 
because the 1952 Driveway Agreement does not contain any language even suggesting that the 
purpose of the easement was to minimize the amount of pavement on the dominant estate .. 
As in the case of Carlin v. Cohen, here the Mannings propose to define the easement in a 
location that would shorten the driveway Defendants currently use on their property and provide a 
slightly different entry point onto Defendants' property. However, the new entry point the Mannings 
propose is equally accessible from Defendants' property and, most importantly, it satisfies the 
purposes for which the easement was created, namely, affording ingress and egress to Defendants' 
property and access to the public street. 
D. Defendants1 legal arguments are wrong because (1) they are based on misstating the 
legal rules in cases and (2) they attempt to raise new issues now for the first time 
regarding prescriptive rights that they never raised before in their pleadings, in the 
summary judgment motion or at trial. 
Defendants contend that the "more appropriate line of legal authority in this case is set forth 
000549 
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in Turner v. Cold Springs Canyon Ltd Partnership, 143 Idaho 227 (Idaho 2006)." Def Post Trial 
Brief at p. 6. Then Defendants erroneously represent what that line oflegal authority is by stating 
that the ''Idaho Supreme Court held that the right to relocate an easement should be set forth in the 
agreement or it is waived." Post Trial Brief at. p. 6. Actually, the Turner court did not even 
consider whether to relocate an easement because it found that: 
"Cold Springs neither pied nor addressed whether it was entitled to relocate the 
easement. Cold Springs waited until filing motions to clarify and amend the 
judgment to address the issue. As a result, the district court correctly declined to rule 
on whether the easement was open to relocation." 
Turner, 2006 Ida. LEXIS 110 at *5, 143 Idaho 227 (emphasis added). 
Likewise Defendants miscite the case of Benninger v. Derifield, 179 P.3d 336 (Idaho 2008), 
for the proposition that a court's ability to move easements fixed by agreement or in place for more 
than the prescriptive period is limited. That is not what this case represents. Rather, the Benninger, 
Court acknowledged that a prescriptive easement existed and recognized that the owner of the 
servient estate had relocated the historical driveway. Both the trial court and the Idaho Supreme 
Court let the relocation stand. Benninger, 179 P.3d 336, fn L This case directly supports the 
Mannings' right to relocate a historical driveway. 
Finally, for the first time in this case Defendants reference prescriptive rights in their Post 
Trial Closing Brief, See, e.g., Def Post Trial Brief at p. 7, 11. It is not clear what Defendants are 
trying to argue in this regard. But in any case, Defendants' sole claim to use has always been 
permissive use under the 1952 Agreeement. 3 It is too late now to raise a new theory of easement not 
framed up by the pleadings or discovery, and any such arguments have been waived. 
II. The Court Should Define the Scope and Appropriate Use of the Easement Granted Under 
the 1952 Driveway Agreement. 
As this Court noted in its Memorandum Decision and Order, "Idaho law requires that a 
3 In Defendants' Answer at paras. 6 and 10 filed on or about May 11, 2009, Defendants allege that the have "a written 
grant, or easement, for the access to [the] property" and also that "Campbell denies that his use of the driveway under the 
written easement agreement is 'adverse' to Plaintiffs' use .... " 0 Q Q 5 5 () 
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judgment which detennines an easement in real property must describe the interest with such 
certainty that the rights and liabilities are clearly fixed." (Citations omitted). In their Post Trial 
Brief, Defendants argue that their current use of the driveway does not exceed reasonable use rights 
under the 1952 Driveway Agreement. Def. Post Trial Brief at p. 10. 
A. Defendants' use of the dominant estate for a plumbing business with a seven-ton 
commercial truck does not in any way represent a normal development or use of 
their lands. 
Defendants assert that "[t]he rule is that, absent language in the easement to the contrary, the 
uses made by the servient and dominant owners may be adjusted consistent with the normal 
development of their respective lands." Boydstun Beach Ass 'n. v. Allen, 111 Idaho 3 70, 3 78 (Ct. 
App. 1986). Defendants claim that this rule justifies them running a plumbing business from their 
property and using a seven ton commercial vehicle to access their property. In light of this Court's 
previous ruling on summary judgment, namely that this easement was for the purpose of access to a 
single family residence, Defendants' use of their property and of the servient estate for a plumbing 
business is not a normal development of their lands. Defendants' property is located in a quiet, well 
maintained, strictly residential zone in the North End of Boise. Defendants' plumbing business and 
commercial vehicle are totally out of character with their neighborhood. 
Defendants' use of the easement is also not a normal development of their property because 
it violates applicable Boise Municipal zoning ordinances. Going back at least to 2004, the City of 
Boise cited defendant Bill Campbell for zoning code violations for "outdoor storage of plumbing 
supplies including toilets, sinks, pipes and other miscellaneous equipment." Pl. Trial Ex. 19, at p. 1. 
Around September 2009, the City of Boise cited defendant Bill Campbell for operating a plumbing 
business and for using a commercial vehicle in a residential zone.4 On October 21, 2009 the City 
4 The Boise Municipal Code prohibits the use or storage of a commercial vehicle in a residential zone. "No commercial 
vehicle ... shall be parked, stored or otherwise left unattended at any place in a residential district ... for over two (2) 
hours except while actually engaged in pickup or delivery activities or during the course of actual construction .... "§ 11-
10-04.02. The Code defines a "commercial vehicle" as "a vehicle with a gross vehicle weight of over 8,000 poll/l~,ilf!\f 5 51 designed for commercial use .... " § 11-01-03.01 U U U . 
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denied Campbell's application for a permit to operate his plumbing business at his residence. Pl. 
Trial Ex. 19. On December 7, 2009, the Boise City Planning and Zoning Commission denied 
Campbell's appeal of the City's decision, for numerous reasons, including: 
The operation of the business goes beyond what is envisioned by the Zoning Ordinance as a 
home occupation ... the impact of a commercial vehicle going to and from the property on 
this very narrow, substandard street is abnormal [emphasis added] ... [and] [t]he truck 
weighs between 14,000 and 16,000 pounds, greatly exceeding the one ton limitation.5 
Pl. Trial Ex. 21, at p. 2.6 
It is abundantly clear that Defendants' use of their property to operate a plumbing business 
and maintain a seven ton commercial vehicle is totally inconsistent with (a) the normal development 
of their lands and (b) the purpose of the 1952 Driveway Agreement to provide ingress and egress to 
a single residence. Consequently, this Court should hold that the easement on the Mannings' 
property may not be used to operate a business and may not be used by a commercial vehicle for 
ingress and egress to the dominant estate. Cf Becksted v. Price, 46 Idaho 57, 65, 190 P.3d 876, 884 
(2008) (prescriptive easement limited to use of vehicles "that would be reasonably used" for 
purposes for which easement established). Defendants' assertion that the Mannings are spitefully 
trying to run Bill Campbell out of business is absolutely false. What is true is that the Mannings do 
not desire for anyone to operate a business on and across their front yard. 
B. It is too late for Defendants to challenge this Court's holdings in the 
Memorandum Decision and Order dated January 19, 2010. 
Defendants also contend that they should not be limited to using the easement to access a 
single residence and that they should be able to park and turn around on the Mannings' property. 
These arguments ignore this Court's holdings in its Memorandum Decision and Order dated January 
19, 2010. In that decision, this Court carefully considered these issues and decided them. This 
5 The Boise Municipal Code prohibits the operation of an occupation within a home without a permit and sets forth 
specific requirements for obtaining a pem1it. Section 11-05-02-N. I of the Boise Municipal Zoning Code provides that 
"any vehicle [used in conjunction with the home occupation] exceeding one ton in weight shall be regarded as not fitting 
the allowed parameters" of a home occupation. Q Q Q r; 5 ? 
6 The Defendant, Bill Campbell failed to appeal this ruling by the applicable December 17, 2009 deadline. u -
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Court found that the parties to the 1952 Driveway Agreement "did not simply grant an easement of 
general use, but instead placed limitations on its use" and that "the 1952 Agreement created an 
express easement for the limited purpose of allowing the residents of the adjacent premises the 
ordinary use of a driveway for ingress and egress far enough to allow the residents to enter their 
property." Mem. Dec. at p. 13 (emphasis added). 
In the Memorandum Decision and Order this Court held that: (1) "Plaintiffs' motion for 
summary judgment that the dominant estate is limited to a single residence is GRANTED" and (2) 
"Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment that the easement does not include a right to park upon or 
turn a vehicle around on the Plaintiffs' property or a right to place any signage or a mailbox on the 
Plaintiffs' property is GRANTED." Mem. Dec. at p. 17. The Summary Judgment decision stands as 
the law of the case. 
C. All the evidence in the record contradicts Defendants' claim that the property 
owned by Defendants today is substantially the same as the dominant estate that 
benefitted from the 1952 Driveway Agreement. 
The title documents and the trial testimony of surveyor Greg Carter prove that the dominant 
estate that benefitted from the 1952 Driveway Agreement is a very different piece of property from 
what Defendants own today. The dominant estate in 1952 was an L-shaped property with the apex 
of the "L" centered on the Southwest comer of the current Campbell Property and the legs of the L 
extending in east and north directions. While the property is still an L-shape, the leg to the east is 
considerably shorter, while the leg to the north has been greatly enlarged with additional property. 
Compare Pl. Trial Exs. 8 and 13.1 (property today), with 7 and 13.2 (property in 1952). The 1952 
dominant estate had substantially different boundaries than the property that Defendants own today. 
As the Court noted previously, "[u ]se of an easement appurtenant to an identified dominant 
estate to serve a parcel other than that dominant estate is impermissilble as a matter of law." Mem. 
Dec. at p. 16 (citing Christensen v. City of Pocatello, 142 Idaho 132, 136, 124 P.3d 1008, 1012 
(2005)). Here, Defendants may not enlarge the use of the easement on the Mannings' propxrt~ to 
uu0553 
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serve additional property that Defendant now owns, which was not part of the dominant estate that 
existed when the easement was created. Bill Campbell's testimony at trial was that he was using this 
additional property to the north of the original dominant estate as a contractor's yard for his 
plumbing business. Clearly, Defendant's use (a) exceeds the scope of the express terms of the 
easement, even in light of foreseeable development of the property, and (b) uses the servient estate to 
benefit property outside the original dominant estate. 
III. Conclusion 
Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court hold that the Mannings are entitled to define the 
easement in the proposed location set forth in Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit 10 and to grant the Mannings 
the other relief specifically set forth in Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Order for Judgment7. In this case, the adage in the Robert Frost Poem "Mending Wall" that 
"good fences make good neighbors" seems applicable, and any ruling that fails to create a separate 
entrance for Campbell likely dooms the parties to continuing conflict. 
DATED this2O!y of March, 2010. 
GIVENSPUR~ 
~tl 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
7 Although the Mannings believe that applicable law would only require them to pay for changes on the servient estate, 
in the interest of resolving the issues at hand and preserving the possibility of future peacefu I relations with their 
neighbor, Bill Campbell, the Mannings would not object if this Court ordered them to pay a reasonable amount for 
pavement on Defendants' property consistent with Pl. Trial Ex. 10 to connect the new driveway with his existint) 0 Q f:' 5 4 driveway should Campbell desire this. ~ 
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Background: Q.9~J1ement owner .!:>.r~l!Z1lt 
p£!ion to enjoin servient tenement owner's construc-
tio;-of a new house that i~terfered wlth'eas'einent 
granted to domlnanttenement OM1Cf for access to 
b..~]ch. Servient tenement owner counterclaimed for 
~elocation of easement. After a bifurcated trial, the 
Land Court Department, Charles W. Trombly, Jr., J., 
found that new house interfered with easement, de-
termined a new site for relocation of the easement, 
and entered judgment declaring the rights of the par-
ties. Parties appealed and cross-appealed. 
Holdings: The Appeals Court, Dreben, J., held that: 
ill evidence of .cli!l!inYtiQHJ!U'_aJIJ..ul~.tQJ,e.dui;e.i;l 
Yk.'?!'..~.wasJlQLrekv.ant.in.determiningr.elo.c.a.tion; 
Q) ne\V hous~ ~~~a f\Ormal. development.of prop-. 
~~:!):; 
· ill trial court was required to consider whether the 
proposed relocation site would be more burdensome 
for dominant tenement owner to maintain; and 
(1) finding that site of relocated easement was not 
more difficult to reach was not clearly erroneous. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
ill Easements ~47 
141 k47Most Cited Cases 
In determining the location of an easement, subse-
quent use at most is only one relevant factor and the 
presence or absence of evidence of such later use is 
not decisive; what is important is the language of the 
grant construed in the light of attending circum-
stances. Restatement or Property § .:!.£;).. 
ill Easements ~61(9) 
141k6](9)Mosl Cited C;ises 
Pagel 
Access to a view was not the purpose of easement 
granted to dominant tenement owner for accessing 
beach, and thus evidence of diminution in value due 
to reduced views resulting from relocation of the 
easement was not relevant in determining whether 
and where to relocate easement after servient tene-
ment owner constructed new home interfering with 
easement. 
ill Easements C;=48(6) 
14 I k48(6)Most Cited Cases 
New house built by servient tenement owner was a 
normal development of property, for which relocation 
of easement was necessary, even though a smaller 
house had previously existed on property, given high 
value of the real estate and the size of the surround-
ing houses. 
W Easements €;:;;;148(6) 
141 k4?.(6)Most Cited Cases 
Trial court, in detennining whether and where to re-
locate easement, was required to consider whether 
the proposed relocation site would be more burden-
some for dominant tenement owner to maintain. 
ill Easements ~61(9.5) 
141 k6 I (9 .S)Mgst Cited Cases 
Trial court's finding, that site of relocated casement 
was not more difficult for dominant tenement owner 
to reach than site of original easement, was not 
clearly erroneous; although there was evidence that in 
order __ to. a~.~~lgcated e~~ement dominant 
i.iiieme;Ji Q.)VJ1erlwL10....wa.lk..o.Ye.r __ ~i:-ih~re was 
no evidence that the path of 1he original easement 
was more level, and finding was based on three views 
trial court had taken of property. 
J.§l Equity ~65(2) 
I 50k65(1)Most Cited Cases 
Servient tenement owner's construction of new house 
without dominant tenement owner's permission did 
not constitute unclean hands, and thus casement that 
new house interfered with could be relocated; servi-
ent tenement owner ceased construction after domi-
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 000556 
895 N.E.2d 793 
73 Mass.App.Ct. I 06, 895 N.E.2d 793 
(Cite as: 73 Mass.App.Ct. I 06, 895 N.E.2d 793) 
nant tenement owner obtained a preliminary injunc-
tion and did not resume construction until the injunc-
tion was dissolved. 
""794 Justin Perrotta for the plaintiff. 
Russell Beck, Boston (David L Delaney, Plymouth 
& Andrew K. Goldstein, Boston, with him) for the 
defendants. 
Present GRAHAM, DREBEN, & WOLOHOJIAN, 
JJ. 
DREBEN, J. 
*107 This case, a dispute between two neighbors on 
Martha's Vineyard, concerns the JocJtli?n of a deeded 
. easeme!}Lb~ld l?x, Carl~n €jj,r lot 12Jow ~wn~ by 
Cohen, to a private beach known as the "Beach Re-
. serve!' It also involves the question whether the 
easement may be relocated according to the princi-
ples of M.P.M. Builders. llC v. Dwl!.er. 442 Mass. 
87,809 N.E.2d 1053 {2004}(M.P.M.). 
The following facts are undisputed. When Cohen 
bought Jot 12, there was a modest, unheated summer 
cottage on the prope11y. Although his lot contains 
approximately 3.1 acres, it has a fairly small "build-
ing envelope" as a result of zoning and wet-
land limitations. Cohen demolished the cottage and 
began construction of a larger house. Soon thereafter 
Carlin, and other plaintiffs not party to this appeal, 
brought this action against Cohen to enjoin constru~-
tion and also claiming that he trespassed on their 
land, i.e., their easement.lfNJ'I lf__the orig~-
JnMLis.J~jfill..o.Jl...lhe_'.'..Wesrerly Path'.:...as....carlill 
c;l!l-ims, Cohen's h.QUSe....b~pal:h....of..her 
easement. Cohen co~terclaims:~~clara:... 
tion that he 1riay relocate Carlin's...e.asmie.nLif...htl:. 
easement is held to be on the ~ester.!YR..ath and not 
on the "Southern Path," as he _claimed.jFN4) 
The building envelope refers to the 
buildable area on a lot. 
Construction on Cohen's house 
stopped on November l, 2001 pursuant to a 
preliminary injunction issued by a judge of 
the Land Court who was not the trial judge. 
It resumed on February I 0, 2003 after the 
injunction was lifted by the judge who is-
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sued it and after Cohen acknowledged that 
any further construction would be at his risk. 
He undertook to obey any order requiring 
demolition of a portion of his house, The 
trial judge explicitly stated that he "did not 
take into consideration any hardship that 
may be caused to Cohen if he were ordered 
to tear down his house (or a portion thereof). 
The court's ... decision is based entirely on 
whether any of the proposed alternate ease-
ments satisfy the criteria." 
FN4. The other plaintiffs not parties to this 
appeal claimed prescriptive easements. The 
judge noted that they agreed to accept the 
Southern Path in a settlement with Cohen. 
The action was bifurcated for trial by a judge of the 
Land *108 Court, and after two lengthy trials, the 
judge issued two careful and comprehensive deci-
sions. Phase I of the trial addressed the question of 
the location of the original easement. ~-~e 
found that Carlin had an easement along the West_er]y 
Path as she ·had claimed, and not along the Southern 
~as Cohen had urged. In Phase II of the trial, the 
judge considered whether the **795 easement could 
be relocated and, if so, where it should be placed. The 
11.ulge.. determined that ~!lllable coa~s in the loca-
tion of the easement could be made, and that ~o-
posed location, shown on a plan as the Blue Path, !lne 
·of several options offered by Cohen, met the re-
guirements of M. P.M. Judgment entered declaring the 
· rights of the parties accordingly. The parties filed 
cross appeals. Cohen challenges the judge's location 
of the original easement in Phase I of the trial, and 
Carlin challenges multiple aspects of the judge's find-
ings in Phase II. ~~l~!'..J,udgmenl, exc~~ 
possible modification as to mamtenance set forth m 
part 3.c of this opinion. 
I. Location of easement. The location of the original 
easement is not clearly defined. fl is_~-<!_~~-
~arlin's deed as "[t]he right to travel on foot only. 
from~~ over iiJeiTTT.!lllifu!.~. to 
the Beach R~ve shown on the attached Plan." No 
pla~as attached~zing tfiatlliere was 
considerable evidence of use of the Southern Path ten 
years after Carlin acquired title, the judge, based on 
the language of the deed, on documents contempora-
neous with the deed (a 1979 plan and covenant), and 
evidence of a path on the ground, concluded that the 
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grant was of the Westerly Path ... 
Ill In challenging that finding, Cohen claims that the 
judge erred in not giving enough credence to the sub-
sequent use of the Southern Path by Carlin and her 
tenants, in admitting certain testimony under the dead 
man's statute, G.L c. ?33, § 6~, and in construing 
Carlin's deed. The arguments are without merit. 
"Subsequent use ... at most is only one relevant factor 
and the presence or absence of evidence of such later 
use (where admissible) is not decisive. See 
Rcslatement of Property § 483, & Comment j 
[1944]." f'ion 1•. Dwieht, 11 Mass.App.Ci. 406. 412. 
417 N .E.2d 20 ( 198 I ). What is important is "the lan-
guage of the grant construed in the lighl of attending 
circumstances." Marden v. ,\,fa/lard Decov Cluh. Inc,, 
J6I Mass. 105. 107. 2781']_,E.2d 7<13 (1972). 
*l09 As to the hearsay statement of Doris Parker, 
Carlin's deceased grantor, we see no reason to ex-
clude her statement. _ _LFN~j See I!arriso11v. l,m,al 
!'rol<!ctivtJ U(e Ins. Co., 379 Mass. ?12, 219. 39(~ 
N.E.2d 987 ( 1979) (legislative decision to create ex-
ception to hearsay rule for declarations of deceased 
persons is applicable in all civil cases). Assuming, 
without decidirw., that the aflidavit of Parker's de-
ceased attorney- was erroneously admitted by the 
judge,.J!J'-l§J such evidence was merely corrobora-
tive. I FN7J The deed itself is the most important evi-
dence of intent, and its language fully supports the 
judge's decision. The Westerly Path leads directly to 
the Beach Reserve via the parking area; the Southern 
Path does not and reaches a different beach. f FN8l 
As the judge pointed out, "it is significant that this 
specific location [the Beach Reserve] is referred to in 
the Carlin deed, and that the easement does not sim-
ply provide for passage to 'the beach.' " The judge's 
findin" as to the location of the easement is **796 
not cl~arly erroneous. Indeed, the language of the 
deed may require it as matter of law.JFN_?J 
FN5, Carlin testified that Parker told her that 
Carlin "had permission 10 go over the High 
Tide property [now Cohen's property] and to 
the Beach Reserve parking lot to the beach, 
and that was going to be in my deed." 
1:NG, We make no suggestion to that effect. 
FN7. The affidavit stated, inter alia, that 
Montgomery "drafted this language [grant-
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ing the easement] at the express direction of 
Mrs. Parker, who stated [lo him] her intent 
to provide direct and convenient foot access 
from the Carlin property to the Beach Re-
serve and I believe the parking area." 
fN8. One can walk from that beach to the 
Beach Reserve. 
f-N9. Construction began on Cohen's house 
in September, 200 I, and Carlin sought an in-
junction immediately thereafter. We therefor 
consider Cohen's claim of laches to be with-
out merit. 
2. Relocation of Carlin's easement. In /1-/.fj,,L the 
Supreme Judicial Court adopted § 4.8(3) of the Re-
statement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) (2000), set 
forth in the margin._LJ::N I OJ The court concluded that 
pemiitting relocation of an easement subject to the 
stated limitations "strikes an appropriate balance be-
tween the interests of the respective estate owners by 
pcnnitting the "110 servicnt owner to develop his 
land without unreasonably interfering with the case-
ment holder's rights." M.P.Al,_442_Mass. at 9L 809 
N.E.2d 1053. If, however, the owners of the domi-
nant and servient estates do not agree concerning the 
relocation of an easement, "the servient estate owner 
should seek a declaration from the court that the pro-
posed changes meet the criteria in § 4.8(3)." Id. at, 93. 
809 N.E.2d 1053. 
FNI 0. "Unless expressly denied by the 
terms of an easement, as defined in § 1.2, 
the owner of the servient estate is entitled to 
make reasonable changes in the location or 
dimensions of an easement, at the servient 
owner's expense, to permit nomrnl use or 
development of the scrvient estate, but only 
if the changes do not (a) significantly lessen 
the utility of lhc easement, (b) increase the 
burdens on the owner of the easement in its 
use and enjoyment, or (c) frustrate the pur-
pose for which the easement was created.'' 
After an eight-day trial on the question of relocation 
(Phase II), during which the judge took views of the 
properties ''to evaluate the practicability of several 
proposed alternate easements," and after considering 
other paths proposed by Cohen--Carl in proposed 
none--ihc judge found the "Blue Path" [FN l lJ to be a 
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suitable replacement meeting the requirements of 
i\4.l'.\-1., sueru a1 91. 809_.\J._r:,2iJ _ID5J, "First, ... the 
Blue Path is shorter than Carlin's original easement 
.... [and] will actually be less of a burden to mai11-
1a111." The Blue Patl1 protects the panies' privacy, is 
not subject to greater erosion than the original ease-
mem, and "is relatively flut and much of the ground is 
on a grassy, Jevel surface." In sum, the judge found 
that lhe Blue Path does not lessen the utility of the 
easement, increase the burdens on Carlin in its use 
and enjoyment, or frustrate the purpose for which the 
easement was created, namely, the right co travel, on 
foot only, from Carlin's property over a ten-foot way 
to the Beach Reserve. 
FN I I. Six of the paths proposed by Cohen 
were shown on an exhibit attached to the 
trinl judge's Phase JI decision, and each pro-
posed path was designated with a different 
color. Cohen also offered Carlin an ease-
ment "anywhere else across his property so 
long as it [did] not prevent construction of 
his residence." 
LlJ 3. Carlin's claims of error. a. Diminlifiun in prop-
erzv value. The judge would not allow Carlin's ap-
praiser to testify to the loss of value to her property 
becaL1se her view was interfered with by the presence 
of Cohen's house. As the judge considered this factor 
irrelcvant,_Lt.::t'clJ2.J he permitted testimony only as to 
the impact of relocating the easemenl on the value of 
the original casement on the assumption that Cohen's 
house remained in place. He also rejected uny con-
sideration of a claim that Carlin's view from the I3lue 
Path was not equal to the view from the "*797 origi-
nal easement, as Carlin did not have a view easement. 
[FN131 
lJ.ilL In his general discussion, not directed 
to the question of value, the judge srated, 
"From Carlin's house, one can see the roof 
of Cohen's new residence. Both homes have 
spectacular views of the beach and the 
ocean." 
FN 13. The judge pointed out, however, "that 
for the majority of the walk to the beach, 
Carlin will enjoy as spectacular a view of 
the ocean using the Blue Path as she now 
does." 
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*111 In arguing that the judge erred in declining to 
consider the diminution in value resulting from the 
relocation of the easement, Carlin focuses on the Su-
preme Judicial Court's statement in M. I'. M. rhat "[ § 
]4.8(3) maximizes the over-all property utility by 
increasing the value of the servient estate without 
diminishing the vaiue of the dominant estatt." '142 
Mass. al 90-91 809 N.E.'.;sLL053. This language, 
however, must be read in context of the discussion of 
easements in M.P.M. The court explained that 
11
[ a]n easement is created to serve a particular ob-
jective, not to grant the easement holder the power 
to veto other uses of the servient estate that de, not 
interfere with that purpose. 
"The limitations embodied in § 4 .8(3) ensure a re-
located easement will continue to serve the pLirpose 
for which it was created. So loug as the casement 
continues to serve its intended purpose, reasonably 
altering the location of the easement docs not de-
stroy the va luc of it." 
fl{ .-OL~2:2J. 809 N.E.2d l 051 
We consider the judge correct in determining that if 
the three re(]Llircments of the section arc met, all of 
which speak 10 matters rclarmg to the t;l!SClJlS'D!-- its 
utility, its use and enjoyment, and its purpose, see 
note I 0, .rnpra--and not to the dominant estate as a 
whole, other effects, unrelated to the purpose of the 
easement, which may reduce the value of the dorni-
naut estate are not to be taken into account. We also 
agree with the judge that the reduced views, if any, 
on the path of the relocated easement compared with 
the views on the original casement arc not relevant. 
Access lo a view was not a purpose for which the 
easement was granted. Sec Green v. 11/um. J3 A,D.J~j 
_1037, 1038. 786 N.Y.S.2d 832 (N.Y.2004). [rN 141 
L~l 4. At trial, Carlin argued that the value 
of the easement was its capacity to prevent 
Cohen from utilizing his property. She 
wisely does not pursue this argument on ap-
peal, as the purpose of JL!' :\4 is to allow 
development of the scrvicnt estate wi1hout 
grat11ing veto power to the easement holder. 
4,12 l\.·las,.at_l)2. 809 N.E.2d 1053. 
L,J b. Relorntion not necessary ji;r normal use or 
development of Cohen's property. Curlin comi:ncb 
that since the rt was already • 112 a house on the 
Cohen property, there was development, and Cohen 
should be limited to adding on to the old modest 
D 20 IO Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Ciov. Works. 000559 
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structure or to building a sma!Jer house. ln view of 
the evidence of the high value of the real estate and 
che size of the surrounding houses, including Carlin's, 
the judge was warranted in implicitly finding that 
Cohen's house was a nomrnl development of his 
property. See Le1vis V. 1'01mg, n N.Y.2d 443 446-
4-17. 6!Q N.Y.S.2d 657,705 N.E.2d 649 (1998}. 
111 c. Blue Path more burdensome. Carlin claims the 
condition of the Blue Path is such that maintenance 
of ii will be more burdensome. In answer to Carlin's 
contcmion that she has not had to perform any main-
tenance on the easterly portion of her original ease-
ment, the judge stated in an early portion of his Phase 
II decision: 
"Whether or not Carlin did, in fact, maintain the 
original easement is immaterial. What is relevant is 
the fact that the burdell was on Carlin to maintain 
the original easement. If this court approves the re-
location of Carlin's easement, Carlin would con-
tinue to bear the same burden to maintain **798 
the replacement path. Any difference in the fre-
quency of Carlin making repairs or routine mainte-
nance on the new path, compared to the original 
path, has no bearing on Carlin's burden to do so. In 
other words, Carlin assumed a burden to maintain 
the path when she purchased the land in 1980, and 
h,,s carried that burden until the present. She would 
continue to bear that same burden if her easement 
were relocated." 
We think this is an incorrect statement of the Af.f'. !vi. 
principle that the relocation may not "increase the 
burdens on the owner of the easement in its use and 
e11joyment." Jf.P.ij:/., sllpra at 90. 809 N.E.2d IQ53_, 
quoting from Restatement (Third) of Property (Servi-
tudes) § 4.8(3). Although the judge concluded, in 
discussing the merits of the Blue Path at the e11d of 
his Phase 11 dcci&ion, that the Blue Path will be less 
of a burden to maintain, this conclusion may have 
been intluenced in the same way as was the judge's 
earlier incorrec1 discussion or the law on this issu.::. 
See Coleman Cu. 1·. _Southwej/ I- ield !trlgation Co, 
-~~.:L V1iL~_?3_, -~~ .. UJ1Y1b_ 197:s J. Cf. 8~,Pt:i!l.1'. .. Lf.£~ 
Gu/J~t.J!_, ___ ,L __ ;ir._ ,/JJ(/e'.,_ Cu, 36 P.3d 12~_1_2J8 
rr:olo.200 l} ( adverse change iii maintenance right of 
dominant estate owner docs not comport with § 
4.8[3] ). 
* 113 Cohen claims that subsequent to the judge's 
finding that the easemcm may be relocated to the 
illue Patil, and in consequence of 1 hat decision, he 
l'agt: :i 
has changed the landscaping of the Uluc Path, and 
that now increased maintenance is not required. If 
Cohen's claim is correct, and Carlin is in accord, it 
may not be necessary for the judge to consider the 
matter further. Otherwise, if within thirty days of the 
rescript, either pany wishes to file a motion in the 
Land Court to have tl1e judge delem1ine the question, 
the judge shall hold such hearings, if any, as the 
judge deems necessary, and if appropriate, he shal I 
modify the judgment in such manner as to impose on 
Cohen the increased costs, if any, of maintenance or 
impose on him the duty of landscaping the Blue Path 
so that the costs of maintaining: the Blue Path are not 
greater than the costs of maintaining the original 
easement (by Carlin or by others). Without limiting 
the authority of the judge, he may determine that no 
modification is necessary because the increased costs 
are de minimis. 
12.l d. Adve,-se change in trnvel ov<.!r the dominant 
estate 10 reach the relocated ecise111ent. The difficulty 
with Carlin's argument that it is more difficult to 
reach the relocated casement is that at trial, she pre-
vented Cohen's surveyor from testifying about the 
slope on hi.!r land on the basis that the conditions on 
her property are irrelevant. Moreover, although them 
was evidence that in order to access the Blue Path she 
must walk over a knoll, Carlin has not pointed to any 
evidence that the path of the original easement was 
more level. The judge noted that "[n]either duriug the 
trial, nor in her post-trial brief did Carlin mention her 
preference for using the Purple Path [another option 
proposed by Cohen] to access the Blue Path should 
the cou11 relocate the easement." L[Nl2J He also 
found "that the entry point f to the Blue Path] is 
equally accessible from Carlin's home, as compared 
to the entry point of the original easement." The 
judge's findings with respect to the condition of th<! 
entry point to the Blue Path, premised on his views 
(he took three) of the properties of both Carlin and 
Cohen, as well as evidence adduced at the trial, ··must 
smJtti unless clearly erroneous." **199/'ia,minl! Bd 
r..•L ">'an_,j~r_irh v. /Joa rd o( tlJ!/2<lS.tiLJ,f_S.g11lfyyich . .15. 
Mas~./\11.12.Ct 971.972._446 N.E.2d_ 1071ll.2.ill 
FN I~ Use of the Purple Path would permit 
Carlin to enter Cohen's property at roughly 
the same area that she entered when she 
used her original casement. 
L!"2J-'114 c. Unclean ht.mds. Carlin claims that since 
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Cohen improperly built his house over the easement 
without permission, he cannot rely on the equitable 
p1inciples of M.P.M. The judge found this argument 
unpersuasive, and we agree. Cohen ceased construc-
tion after Carlin obtained a preliminary injunction 
and did not resume construction until the injunction 
was dissolved, see note 3, supra, and Carlin's attempt 
to reinstate the preliminary injunction was unsuccess-
ful. 
f. Denial of Carlin's motion to amend. Carlin sought 
to amend her pleadings to add a claim that relocation 
of the easement constituted a taking without compen-
sation. She filed her motion to amend four days into 
Phase II of the trial. Not only was this a tardy attempt 
to amend, but the amendment would have been futile. 
There was here no State action. Carlin's reliance on 
Shelle11 v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I. 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 
L. Ed. I 16 I ( 1948), to urge State action is without 
merit. Cf. Commonwealth v. HorJ£f. 389 Mass. 581. 
588-589, 452 N.E.2d 188 ( I 983)(Shel/ev v. Kraemer. 
supra, does not apply to judicial enforcement of a 
trespass statute at the behest of a private party). 
g. Joinder of Ryan Melcher. In a related case in this 
court, Melcher v. Melcher, 12 Mass.App.Ct. I 119, 
893 N.E.?d 1286 (2008), issued pursuant to our rule 
I :28, we held that Ryan Melcher does not have an 
interest in Carlin's prope11y. That decision disposes of 
Carlin's argument to join Ry~cher~arty in 
this case. ------ ------------/"'_.- -, ·,.,,_" 
4. C,9n8~sion. We affirm the judgment of the Land '",~-
Cpuit except with the possible modification set forth 
(
{n part 3.c of this opinion. If either party seeks further 
action in accordance with that part of this opinion, _/ 
the judge shall take such action, if any, he deems . 
ropriate to implement pa,t 3.c of this opinion. ____ __,/' 
_,.// 
.,,---
~. ______ .,-----
73 Mass.App.Ct. f0o~895N-:-If.M;93 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDIC . D TRICT OF 
! 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNT OF ADA 
THOMAS CRELLIN MANNING and, 
JULIE ANN MANNING, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
J 
Case No. CV OC 0907350 
vs. 
WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL, an unmarried 
Individual, and NAOMI LOUISE 
CAMPBELL, an unmarried individual, 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
JUDGMENT 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court at a court trial held from February 17 through 19, 2010. 
Thomas Dvorak appeared for the Plaintiffs and Joseph Ellsworth appeared for the Defendants. 
Having heard the testimony of the witnesses, having considered the evidence presented by the 
parties, and having thereafter allowed for the submission of closing arguments and proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law in writing by all parties, the Court hereby enters its findings 
of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment in this matter. 
BACKGROUND 
Paul and Mary Boyd and Frank and Ida Mattison owned adjoining residential properties in 
Boise's North End. The Boyds built a driveway on their property and the Mattisons wished to use 
the driveway to access their property. On July 29, 1952, the two couples entered into an agreement 
under which the Mattisons paid $112.50 for "a right to use the driveway jointly" with the Boyds. 
The 1952 Agreement states: 
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That Paul S. Boyd and Mary M. Boyd in consideration of $112.50, lawful 
money of the United States, to them in hand paid by Frank N. Mattison and Ida Grace 
Mattison, do hereby-by grant unto Frank N. Mattison and Ida Grace Mattison, for all 
ordinary purposes a right to use the driveway jointly with Paul S. Boyd and Mary M. 
Boyd, the same including all rights of ingress and egress over the same, the said 
driveway running and leading from the end of North 21st street of the city of Boise, 
Idaho, in a northerly and southerly direction, far enough to allow the said second 
parties herein to enter upon their premises, which adjoin the premises of the first 
parties on the East side of said premises. 
The parties shall be entitled to use the driveway in common, and the expense 
of constructing and maintenance of said driveway shall always be equally borne by 
both the parties hereto. Should the land subject to this right of way ever cease to be 
used as a driveway, then in such a case, the full right and title shall revert to the 
present owners or their successors in title. 
In 1993, Defendant William Campbell and his then wife, Michelle Campbell, purchased 
some portion of the Mattisons' property. On December 23, 1997, the Campbells executed a 
quitclaim deed which transferred their interests in this property to Defendant Naomi Campbell, 
William Campbell's mother. William Campbell and Naomi Campbell both possess an ownership 
interest in the property pursuant to a May 1998 recorded Memorandum of Contract. 
In May 2006, Benjamin and Emily Schwartz purchased the Boyd property, remodeled the 
residence, eliminated a carport, built a garage on the other side of the residence, and repaved the 
disputed driveway. On October 13, 2008, Plaintiffs Thomas and Julie Manning purchased the Boyd 
property from the Schwartzes. 
In a January 19, 2010 Memorandum Decision and Order following Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss and Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court held: 
1. The 1952 Agreement created an express easement for the limited purpose of 
allowing the residents of the adjacent premises the ordinary use of a driveway for ingress and egress 
far enough to allow the residents to enter onto their property. 
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4. The parties did not provide for expanded use of the driveway for additional families 
and therefore the dominant estate is limited to a single residence. 
5. The easement does not include a right to park upon or tum a vehicle around on the 
Plaintiffs' property or a right to place any signage or a mailbox on the Plaintiffs' property. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Having previously determined that the 1952 Agreement created an express easement with a 
limited purpose, the Court heard testimony on the precise location, legal description, and scope of 
the easement. Idaho law requires that a judgment which determines an easement in real property 
must describe the interest with such certainty that the rights and liabilities are clearly fixed. Bethel v. 
Van Stone, 120 Idaho 522, 528, 817 P.2d 188, 194 (Ct. App. 1991)(remanding for additional 
evidence to determine the precise location of the easement). More than once an Idaho appellate 
Court has remanded a case to the trial court to determine and describe the location and extent of the 
easement. See Bedke v. Pickett Ranch & Sheep Co., 143 Idaho 36, 137 P.3d 423 (2006); Sinnett v. 
Were/us, 83 Idaho 514,365 P.2d 952 (1961); Kosanke v. Kopp, 74 Idaho 302,261 P.2d 815 (1953). 
Citing Idaho Code § 55-313, Plaintiffs presented evidence to the Court intended to establish 
that the easement created by the 1952 Agreement did not have a fixed location, that the current 
location of the driveway imposes on Plaintiffs a greater burden than necessary, and that "the 
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proposed alternate driveway configurations are suitable, convenient, would not obstruct motor 
vehicle traffic, and do not injure any persons interested in the access." Idaho Code§ 55-313 states: 
Where, for motor vehicle travel, any access which is less than a public dedication, has 
heretofore been or may hereafter be, constructed across private lands, the person or 
persons owning or controlling the private lands shall have the right at their own 
expense to change such access to any other part of the private lands, hut such change 
must be made in such a manner as not to obstruct motor vehicle travel, or to otherwise 
injure any person or persons using or interested in such access. 
In its January 19, 2010 Memorandum Decision and Order, the Court held that because the grant was 
not specified as to size and location, in order to minimize the burden to Plaintiffs' estate, Plaintiffs 
would be entitled to move the location of the access in such a way that it is convenient, reasonable, 
accessible, within the limits of the grant, and not injurious to Defendants' property. The Court is 
mindful of the fact that the express easement created by the 1952 Agreement across the servient 
estate was bought and paid for. 
Plaintiffs presented evidence to the effect that, in the opinion of others, Defendants' property 
would be benefitted by the proposed alternate driveways. Defendant Campbell testified as to his 
enjoyment of the privacy provided by his property and as to his fear that the proposed alternatives 
would affect the accessibility of his property. It is undisputed that in order to connect the proposed 
alternatives to the existing driveway on Defendants' property, Defendants would need to increase 
the pavement on the property and sacrifice trees and lawn. The Court finds that the alternatives 
proposed by Plaintiffs would injure Defendants and Defendants' property. 
Because the 1952 Agreement did not provide a legal description of the easement and neither 
party had presented evidence from which the Court could make a determination as to the size and 
location of the easement, the Court previously held that the precise location and legal description of 
the easement were issues for trial. There is no evidence in the record establishing the size or 
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location of the driveway until 1993. However, there is also no evidence in the record to suggest that 
the size or location of the driveway was anything other than what they are today. The Court finds 
that the size and location of the driveway have remained as they are now since at least 1993. 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 502 provides a complete and accurate legal description of the existing easement. 
The Court finds that Plaintiffs' Exhibit 502 is the legal description of the express easement created 
by the 1952 Agreement. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 502 is attached hereto and incorporated herein by 
reference. 
Having determined the precise location of the driveway easement, the Court next turns to the 
scope of the easement in order to describe the interest with such certainty that the rights and 
liabilities are clearly fixed. The disputes regarding the scope of the easement include 1) whether 
either party may park on the shared portion of the driveway; 2) whether Defendants may use the 
shared driveway in connection with a commercial truck; 3) whether Defendants may increase the 
use of the easement by subdividing their property; 4) whether a right incident and necessary to the 
easement allows Defendant Campbell to place signs and a mailbox upon the property of Plaintiffs; 
and 4) whether a right incident and necessary to the easement allows Defendant Campbell to park or 
tum around on any portion of the Plaintiffs' driveway not included in the express easement as 
established by Plaintiffs' Exhibit 502. 
There is evidence in the record that establishes that Defendant Campbell on some occasions 
parks on the shared portion of the driveway and stops his vehicle on the shared driveway for periods 
long enough to check his mail or unfasten a chain. There is also evidence in the record that on 
occasions guests of Plaintiffs have parked on the shared driveway. The Court finds that the purpose 
of the easement was to provide for joint use of the driveway for the ordinary purposes of ingress and 
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egress to the properties. Parking on the shared portion of the driveway by either party frustrates that 
purpose. For Defendants to park on the easement exceeds the purpose of the easement to allow 
access to Defendants' property. If Plaintiffs or their guests are parked on the easement, Defendants 
are prevented from entering or exiting their property. Therefore neither party, or their guests, may 
park on the easement without the express consent of the other party. 
The Court declines to go so far as to rule that Defendant Campbell may never so much as 
stop his vehicle on the easement property in order to check his mail or unfasten the chain to his 
property. Instead the Court reminds the parties that merely being part of society requires that 
individuals come into contact with one another and endeavor to respect the reasonable needs of 
others. 
As previously noted by the Court, in Idaho the use of an easement "includes those uses 
which are incidental or necessary to the reasonable and proper enjoyment of the easement, but is 
limited to those that burden the servient estate as little as possible." McFadden v. Sein, 139 Idaho 
921, 924, 88 P.3d 740, 743 (2004). However, easements "are not restricted to use merely for such 
purposes of the dominant estate as are reasonably required at the time of the grant or reservation, 
but the right may be exercised by the dominant owner for those purposes to which that estate may 
be subsequently devoted." Id. Further, there may be an increase in the volume and kind of use of 
such easement during the course of its enjoyment consistent with the normal development of the 
land. Id. Thus, use of a general easement may be enlarged beyond the purposes originally required 
at the time the easement was created, so long as that use is reasonable and necessary and is 
consistent with the normal development of the land. 
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The Court previously held that the parties intended the right to be limited to a single family 
residence adjoining the servient property on the east side. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 19 establishes that the 
use of the dominant estate for a plumbing business is not at this time consistent with the normal 
development of this property. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12.21 establishes that Defendants' commercial 
truck has caused damage to the horizontal bricks laid in the driveway in 2006. Finally, there was 
testimony that Defendant Campbell previously drove personal vehicles over the easement and 
Defendant Campbell has not established that driving the commercial truck is necessary. The Court 
finds that at this time, Defendants' use of a commercial plumbing truck is not a reasonable or 
necessary use of the easement and is not consistent with the normal development of the land. The 
Court finds that Defendants' use of the commercial truck exceeds the scope of the easement and is 
not permitted. 
In its January 19, 2010 Memorandum Decision and Order, the Court granted Plaintiffs 
motion for summary judgment that the dominant estate is limited to a single residence. Defendants 
in their closing argument and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law request that the 
Court reconsider this decision. The unrefuted evidence presented at the trial establishes that 
Defendants' total property exceeds the size of the property owned by the Mattisons at the time of 
the 1952 Agreement. Use of an easement appurtenant to an identified dominant estate to serve a 
parcel other than that dominant estate is impermissible as a matter of law. Christensen v. City of 
Pocatello, 142 Idaho 132, 136, 124 P.3d 1008, 1012 (2005). Defendants' motion to reconsider is 
DENIED. The Court finds that the dominant estate is limited to a single residence. 
Previously, Plaintiffs sought summary judgment declaring that Defendants are not permitted 
under the 1952 Agreement to park or tum upon the Plaintiffs' property or to post signage and a 
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mailbox upon the Plaintiffs' property. The Court granted Plaintiffs' motion in its January 19, 2010 
Memorandum Decision and Order. Evidence was admitted at trial tending to show that Defendants 
Campbell has made turns on Plaintiffs' property and that Defendants' mailbox is not on Plaintiffs' 
property, but rather on property belonging to the Ada County Highway Department. Further, the 
parties argued in their closing arguments for and against such restrictions in the final judgment. The 
Court finds that no portion of the Agreement provides for a right to use Plaintiffs' property for 
executing three point turns, to park on Plaintiffs' property, to place signs onto Plaintiffs' property, 
or to place a mailbox on Plaintiffs' property. The Court finds that such actions exceed the scope of 
the easement. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
~ 
Dated this./V day of April 2010. 
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DESCRIPTION FOR 
EXISTING CAMPBELL ACCESS 
MANNING PROPERTY 
l~SO bit W:1tcrmwc, S, 
Suite I SO 
Mer,d,,)n. ldlho 83642 
Phone ( 208) 8~6-85 70 
F= (208) 884-S 199 
February 9, 2010 
An access located in the of the SE1/4 of Section 33, T.4N., R.2E., B.M., Boise, 
Ada County, Idaho more particularly described as follows: 
Commencing at the NE corner of Lot 1, Block 10 of Elm Grove Addition as filed in 
Book 5 of Plats at Page 242 records of Ada County, Idaho: 
thence along the West right-of-way line of N. 21st Street North 00°00'00" East, 
9.02 feet to a point on the South boundary of the Manning property as described in that 
Warranty deed recorded as Instrument No. 108114031, records of Ada County, Idaho; 
thence leaving said West right-of-way line and along said South boundary line 
South 89°46'52" East, 23.40 feet to REAL POINT OF BEGINNING of this access; 
thence leaving said South boundary line and along a non-tangent curve to the 
right 58.85 feet, said curve having a radius of 77.00 feet, a central angle of 43°47'38" 
and a long chord of 57.43 feet which bears North 24°01 '1 S" East to a point on the East 
boundary line of the said Manning property; 
thence along said East boundary line South 00°11 ·or East, 18.94 feet to the 
beginning of a non-tangent curve to the left: 
thence leaving said East boundary line and along said curve 35.82 feet, said 
curve having a radius of 64.70 feet, a central angle of 31"43'17" and a long chord of 
35.36 feet which bears South 18°20'48" West to a point on the South boundary line of 
the said Manning property: 
thence along said South boundary line North 89°46'52" West, 12.31 feet to the 
REAL POINT OF BEGINNING. 
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Facsimile: 208-388-1300 
863743_1 
Attorneys for Tom and Julie Manning 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THOMAS CRELLIN MANNING and JULIE 
ANN MANNING, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL, an unmarried 
individual, and NAOMI LOUISE 
CAMPBELL, an unmarried individual, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0907350 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: DEFENDANT WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL, AN UNMARRIED 
INDIVIDUAL AND DEFENDANT NAOMI LOUISE CAMPBELL, AN 
UNMARRIED INDIVIDUAL AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, AND 
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 1 7, the above named Plaintiffs Thomas Crellin 
Manning and Julie Ann Manning, husband and wife ("the Mannings"), appeal to the Idaho 
Supreme Court from the final Judgment entered in the above-entitled action on the 21 st day of 
April 2010 by the Honorable Ronald J. Wilper, presiding. This Notice of Appeal, pursuant to 
Idaho Appellate Rule l 7(e)(l), shall be deemed to include and present on appeal all interlocutory 
judgments, orders and decrees entered prior to the foregoing named Judgment (including without 
limitation that certain Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Judgment entered on April 21, 
2010); all judgments, orders and decrees entered prior to the judgment, order or decree appeoo 5 7 2 
NOTICE OF APPEAL· 1 
from for which the time for appeal has not expired and all interlocutory or final judgments, 
orders and decrees entered after the foregoing named Judgment. 
2. The Manning's have the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
judgments and orders described or incorporated herein pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 
l l(a)(l). 
3. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL: 
The following includes a non-exhaustive list of preliminarily identified issues on appeal, 
and the Mannings reserve the right to present additional issues or modify these issues on appeal: 
Whether the trial court erred as a matter oflaw in determining the location of the 
undefined easement created by the Driveway Agreement (a) Without considering or 
interpreting the language of the Driveway Agreement; (b) Without applying any 
principles of contract interpretation; (c) Without applying any law concerning easements, 
including established case law providing (i) how to determine the location of an 
undefined easement and (ii) that an easement should impose no greater burden than 
necessary on the servient estate while providing a suitable means of access for the 
dominant estate; 
Whether the trial court erred in not determining that because this express easement under 
the Driveway Agreement did not specify a location, that the servient estate's designation 
of a proposed description for the easement should control the location; 
Whether the trial court erred when it found that the undefined easement created by the 
Driveway Agreement was in a location that contradicts the language of the Driveway 
Agreement; 
Whether the trial court erred in determining the location of the undefined easement (a) by 
basing its finding on the lack of evidence in the record, specifically, the court found "no 
evidence in the record establishing the size or location of the driveway until 1993" and 
"no evidence in the record to suggest that the size or location of the driveway was 
anything other than what they are today"; and (b) by not holding that the location of the 
driveway today or since 1993 is not determinative or material in this case where 
defendant's rights to use an express easement are solely based on the Driveway 
Agreement, and this is not a case of implied or prescriptive easement. 
Whether the trial court erred in measuring potential injury to the benefitted estate by 
focusing on the benefitted estate and not, in accordance with well established case law, 
by focusing on the lack of injury to access over the servient estate, which is the only right 
afforded to defendants under the Driveway Agreement; 
Whether the trial court erred in holding that defendants would be injured by increasin~ 
the pavement on defendants' property and the '·sacrifice [ of] lawn" because ( a) 0 U O 5 7 3 
Defendants are legally estopped or otherwise may not claiming damage based on a lawn 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
that Defendant planted many months after this lawsuit was initiated; and (b) it is 
unreasonable to conclude that putting pavement in place of a portion of the junkyard and 
open pit that existed on defendants' property at the time this lawsuit was filed, both of 
which are unpermitted uses under Boise City Code, would constitute injury; 
Whether the trial court erred in holding that defendants would be injured because the 
Mannings' proposed driveway would "sacrifice trees" because: (a) only one tree would 
be affected by the proposed new driveway, such tree is co-located on the Mannings' and 
defendants' properties, such tree is nearly dead, and defendant did not produce any 
evidence much less object to removing this tree and (b) Defendant expressed some 
concern about the sycamore tree located on his property but relocating the driveway 
would in no way affect this tree, and defendant failed to produce any evidence that this 
tree would be affected. 
Whether the trial court, after determining the location of the easement, erred by failing to 
consider whether this easement could be relocated based on either ( a) established legal 
precedent governing easements or (b) Idaho Code § 55-313; 
Whether the trial court committed a procedural error by raising the issue sua sponte of 
whether the Mannings could park on the shared portion of the driveway on their own 
property because this issue was never pled by either of the parties; and 
This case, if not decided based on existing case law concerning easements, presents an 
issue of first impression as to: (A) when an access may be relocated under Idaho Code § 
55-313 and (B) the applicable standard for measuring what would constitute an injury 
sufficiently substantial to prevent owners of private property from exercising their rights 
under this statute. Plaintiffs contend that the injury must be: (i) to the access at issue, not 
to defendant's property or the dominant estate and (ii) sufficiently substantial so as to 
give effect to the statute's existence. 
4. REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT. The Manning's request transcripts of the 
entirety of the following proceedings: 
A. Transcript of hearing on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment and other 
pending matters in case held on 11/30/09; 
B. Transcript of hearing on Motion to Strike Affidavits and Motion to Amend 
Scheduling Order and other pending matters in case held on 11/30/09; 
C. Transcript of hearing on Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and other 
pending matters in case held on 11/30/09 ; 
D. Transcript of pre-trial conference held on 2/9/1 O; 
E. Transcript of trial proceedings held on 2/17/10; 000574 
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F. Transcript of trial proceedings held on 2/18/10; 
G. Transcript of trial proceedings held on 2/19/10; and 
H. Transcripts of all other hearings not specifically listed above held by the 
District Court in this matter. 
5. CLERK'S RECORD: The Manning's request that in addition to all documents 
automatically included in the record pursuant to Rule 28, I.A.R., that the Court include the 
following additional documents in the record (identified below as they are in the Court's): 
Document 
1 4/17/09 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Quiet Title; Summonses 
2 5/11/09 Answer and 12(B)(6) Motion to Dismiss 
3 5/18/09 Motion for Order Allowing Out of State Service 
4 5/18/09 Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion for Order Allowing Out of State Service 
5 05/09/09 Order Allowing Out of State Service 
6 06/08/09 Answer 
7 06/15/09 Notice of Status Conference 
8 07/23/09 Amended Notice of Status Conference 
9 08/20/09 Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or for Summary Judgment 
10 08/20/09 Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Judgment on the Pleadings 
11 08/21/09 Affidavit of Bill Campbell in Support of Judgment on the Pleadings 
12 08/25/09 Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning 
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13 09/08/09 
14 09/21/09 
15 10/09/09 
16 10/09/09 
17 10/09/09 
18 10/14/09 
19 10/14/09 
20 10/14/09 
21 10/14/09 
22 10/14/09 
23 10/14/09 
24 10/14/09 
25 10/15/09 
26 10/15/09 
27 10/28/09 
28 10/28/09 
29 11/16/09 
30 11/16/09 
Order Setting Proceedings and Trial 
Motion to Modify Order Setting Proceedings 
Amended Notice of Hearing 
Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of Julie Ann Manning 
Affidavit of F. Scott Beecham 
Affidavit of Eric 8. Nelson 
Affidavit of Thomas E. Dvorak 
Affidavit of Gregory C. Carter 
Notice of Hearing re Motion to Amend 
Joint Notice of Continued Hearing 
Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavits of Attorneys and Given's Pursley 
Employees 
Notice of Hearing 
Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavits of 
Attorneys and Givens Pursley Employees 
Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of Bill Campbell in Support of Judgment 
on the Pleadings 
31 11/16/09 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike 000576 
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32 11/16/09 Response Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 
33 11/17/09 Notice of Hearing Motion to Strike 
34 12/03/09 Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Quiet Title 
35 12/28/09 Answer to Amended Complaint 
36 01/19/10 Memorandum Decision and Order 
3 7 02/09/ IO Plaintiffs' Pretrial Memorandum 
38 02/09/10 Plaintiffs' Exhibit List 
39 02/09/10 Plaintiffs' Witness List 
40 02/09/10 Defendant's List of Potential Trial Witnesses 
41 02/09/10 Defendant's List of Potential Trial Exhibits 
42 02/09/10 Defendants' Trial Memorandum 
43 02/10/10 Plaintiffs' Supplemental Pretrial Memorandum 
44 02/16/10 Plaintiffs' Amended Exhibit List 
45 03/05/10 Plaintiffs' Initial Closing Argument 
46 03/05/ l O Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
47 03/11/10 Motion to Enlarge Time 
48 03/15/10 Order to Enlarge Time 
49 03/19/10 Defendants Post Trial Memorandum and closing 
50 03/ l 9/l O Defendants Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
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51 03/26/10 Post Trial Reply Closing Argument 
52 04/21/10 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
Civil Disposition entered for: Campbell, Naomi Louise, Defendant: Campbell, 
53 04/21/ 10 William l Defendant; Manning, Julie Ann, Plaintiff; Manning Thomas Creline, 
Plaintiff 
All exhibits admitted into evidence, including demonstrative or illustrative 
54 NI A exhibits shown at trial and all exhibits offered at trial by any party but not 
admitted 
6. I CERTIFY: 
(a). That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter, Diane 
Cromwell in c/o Ada County Courthouse, 200 W. Front St., Boise, Idaho 83702. 
(b). That the court reporter, Diane Cromwell has been paid $1,900.00, the 
estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
(c). That the estimated fee of$100.00, for preparation of the clerk's record has 
been paid. 
( d). That the appellate filing fee of $101.00 has been paid. 
(e). That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20. 
DA TED this 25th day of May, 2010. 
GlVENSPU~ 
Tho~rak 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 25th day of May, 2010, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to the persons listed below the method indicated: 
Joseph L. Ellsworth 
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defranco P .L.L.C. 
103 l E. Park Boulevard 
Boise, ID 83712 
Facsimile: 345-8945 
Attorney for Defendants William J. Campbell 
and Naomi Louise Campbell 
Diane Cromwell 
c/o Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, ID 83702 
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_ Hand Deli very 
Facsimile 
_ Overnight Courier 
XU.S. Mail 
_ Hand Deli very 
Facsimile 
Overnight Courier 
)(U.S.Mail 
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Thomas E. Dvorak (fD State Bar ID# 5043) 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2 720 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
Telephone: 208-388-1200 
Facsimile: 208-388-1300 
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Attorneys for Tom and Julie Manning 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THOMAS CRELLIN MANNING and JULIE 
ANN MANNING, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL, an unmarried 
individual, and NAOMI LOUISE 
CAMPBELL, an unmarried individual, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0907350 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: DEFENDANT WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL, AN UNMARRIED 
INDIVIDUAL AND DEFENDANT NAOMI LOUISE CAMPBELL, AN 
UNMARRIED INDIVIDUAL AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, AND 
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 17, the above named Plaintiffs Thomas Crellin 
Manning and Julie Ann Manning, husband and wife ('"the Manning's"), appeal to the Idaho 
Supreme Court from the final Judgment entered in the above-entitled action on the 21 st day of 
April 2010 by the Honorable Ronald J. Wilper, presiding. This Notice of Appeal, pursuant to 
Idaho Appellate Rule l 7(e)(l), shall be deemed to include and present on appeal all interlocutory 
judgments, orders and decrees entered prior to the foregoing named Judgment (including without 
limitation that certain Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Judgment entered on April 21, 
201 O); all judgments, orders and decrees entered prior to the judgment, order or decree appealed 
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from for which the time for appeal has not expired and all interlocutory or final judgments, 
orders and decrees entered after the foregoing named Judgment. 
2. The Manning's have the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
judgments and orders described or incorporated herein pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 
1 l(a)(l). 
3. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL: 
The following includes a non-exhaustive list of preliminarily identified issues on appeal, 
and the Manning's reserve the right to present additional issues on appeal: 
A. Whether the trial court erred in determining the location of the undefined 
easement created by that certain agreement among Paul S. Boyd, Mary M. Boyd, Frank 
N. Mattison and Ida Grace Mattison dated July 24, 1952 (the "Driveway Agreement'') 
when the court made its determination: 
(i) Without interpreting the language of the Driveway Agreement; and 
(ii) Without applying established rules concerning easements; 
B. Whether the trial court erred by failing to conclude that because the express 
easement under the Driveway Agreement did not specify a location, the servient estate's 
designation of a proposed description for the easement should control the location; 
C. Whether the trial court erred in measuring potential injury to the defendants by 
focusing on the dominant estate instead of focusing on the easement itself and the rights 
provided thereby; 
D. Even if it were deemed valid to measure injury with respect to the dominant 
estate, did the trial court err in finding that defendants would be injured by relocating 
their easement because the court's decision was wrongly based on: 
(i) improvements that defendant made to the dominant estate many months after 
this lawsuit was initiated; 
(ii) an umeasonable conclusion that replacing a portion of the junkyard and open 
pit that defendants maintained on the dominant estate at the time this lawsuit was filed 
with pavement would constitute injury; and 
(iii) insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that any trees would be injured. 
E. Whether the trial court, after defining the location of the undefined easement, 
erred by failing to consider whether defendants' easement could be relocated based on 
either (i) established legal precedent governing easements or (ii) Idaho Code § 55-313; 
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F. Whether the trial court committed a procedural error by raising the issue sua 
sponte of whether the Manning's could park on the shared portion of the driveway on 
their own property because this issue was never pled or argued by either of the parties. 
4. REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT. The Manning's request transcripts of the 
entirety of the following proceedings: 
A. Transcript of hearing on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment and other 
pending matters in case held on 11/30/09; 
B. Transcript of hearing on Motion to Strike Affidavits and Motion to Amend 
Scheduling Order and other pending matters in case held on 11/30/09; 
C. Transcript of hearing on Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and other 
pending matters in case held on 11/30/09; 
D. Transcript of pre-trial conference held on 2/9/1 O; 
E. Transcript of trial proceedings held on 2/17/1 O; 
F. Transcript of trial proceedings held on 2/18/10; 
G. Transcript of trial proceedings held on 2/19/1 O; and 
H. Transcripts of all other hearings not specifically listed above held by the 
District Court in this matter. 
5. CLERK'S RECORD: The Manning's request that in addition to all documents 
automatically included in the record pursuant to Rule 28, LA.R., that the Court include the 
following additional documents in the record (identified below as they are in the Court's): 
Date Document 
4/17/09 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Quiet Title; Summonses 
2 5/11/09 Answer and 12(B)(6) Motion to Dismiss 
3 5/18/09 Motion for Order Allowing Out of State Service 000582 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
4 5/18/09 Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion for Order Allowing Out of State Service 
5 05109109 Order Allowing Out of State Service 
6 06/08/09 Answer 
7 06115109 Notice of Status Conference 
8 07/23/09 Amended Notice of Status Conference 
9 08/20/09 Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or for Summary Judgment 
10 08/20/09 Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Judgment on the Pleadings 
11 08/21/09 Affidavit of Bill Campbell in Support of Judgment on the Pleadings 
12 08/25/09 Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning 
13 09/08/09 Order Setting Proceedings and Trial 
14 09/21/09 Motion to Modify Order Setting Proceedings 
15 10/09/09 Amended Notice of liearing 
16 10/09/09 Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint 
17 10/09/09 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint 
18 10/14/09 Motion for Summary Judgment 
19 10/14/09 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
20 10/14/09 Affidavit of Julie Ann Manning 
21 10/14/09 Affidavit of F. Scott Beecham 
22 10/14/09 Affidavit of Eric B. Nelson 000583 
A'.\IEN'DED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
23 10/14/09 Affidavit of Thomas E. Dvorak 
24 10/14/09 Affidavit of Gregory C. Carter 
25 10/15/09 Notice of Hearing- re Motion to Amend 
26 10/15/09 Joint Notice of Continued Hearing 
27 10/28/09 Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavits of Attorneys and Given's Pursley Employees 
28 10/28/09 Notice of Hearing 
29 11/16/09 Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavits of Attorneys and Givens Pursley Employees 
30 11/16/09 Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of Bill Campbell in Support of Judgment 
on the Pleadings 
31 11/16/09 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike 
32 11/16/09 Response Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 
33 11 /17 /09 Notice of Hearing - Motion to Strike 
34 12/03/09 Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Quiet Title 
35 12/28/09 Answer to Amended Complaint 
36 01/19/10 Memorandum Decision and Order 
37 02/09/10 Plaintiffs' Pretrial Memorandum 
38 02/09/10 Plaintiffs' Exhibit List 
39 02/09/10 Plaintiffs' Witness List 
40 02/09/10 Defendant's List of Potential Trial Witnesses 
41 02/09/10 Defendant's List of Potential Trial Exhibits 000584 
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42 02/09/10 Defendants' Trial Memorandum 
43 02/10/10 Plaintiffs' Supplemental Pretrial Memorandum 
44 02/16/10 Plaintiffs' Amended Exhibit List 
45 03/05/10 Plaintiffs' Initial Closing Argument 
46 03/05/10 Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
47 03/11/10 Motion to Enlarge Time 
48 03/15/10 Order to Enlarge Time 
49 03/19/10 Defendants Post Trial Memorandum and closing 
50 03/19/10 Defendants Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
51 03/26/ 10 Post Trial Reply Closing Argument 
52 04/21/10 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
Civil Disposition entered for: Campbell, Naomi Louise, Defendant: Campbell, 
53 04/21/10 William J. Defendant; Manning, Julie Ann, Plaintiff; Manning Thomas Crellin, 
Plaintiff 
All exhibits admitted into evidence, including demonstrative or illustrative 
54 NIA exhibits shown at trial and all exhibits offered at trial by any party but not 
admitted 
6. I CERTIFY: 
(a). That a copy of this amended notice of appeal has been served on the 
reporter, Diane Cromwell in c/o Ada County Courthouse, 200 W. Front St., Boise, 
Idaho 83 702. 
(b). That the court reporter, Diane Cromwell has been paid $1,900.00, the 
estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
000585 
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(c). That the estimated fee of$100.00, for preparation of the clerk's record has 
been paid. 
( d). That the appellate filing fee of $101.00 has been paid. 
(e). That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20. 
DATED this d.~1 ~ day of May, 2010. 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this of May, 2010, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to the persons listed below the method indicated: 
Joseph L. Ellsworth 
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defranco P.L.L.C. 
l 031 E. Park Boulevard 
Boise, ID 83712 
Facsimile: 345-8945 
Attorney for Defendants William J. Campbell 
and Naomi Louise Campbell 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 8 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile 
~ight Courier 
~ U.S. Mail 
000587 
\~_ 
Thomas E. Dvorak (ID State Bar ID# 5043) 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
Telephone: 208-388-1200 
Facsimile: 208-388-1300 
Attorneys for Tom and Julie Manning 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THOMAS CRELLIN MANNING and 
JULIE ANN MANNING, husband and 
wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL, an unmarried 
individual, and NAOMI LOUISE 
CAMPBELL, an unmarried individual, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0907350 
STIPULATION TO AUGMENT THE 
RECORD 
COME NOW, Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys of record, Givens Pursley LLP, 
and Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defranco 
P.L.L.C., and hereby stipulate to augment the clerk's record in this case, to include Plaintiffs' 
Supplemental Pretrial Memorandum (attached hereto as Exhibit "A"). The attached 
Memorandum contains a certificate of service indicating it was served on counsel for Defendants 
via facsimile on February 10, 2010, and the confirmation fax sheet indicates it was received by 
the Court (attached). However, no file-stamped copy is in the official court docket. 
DATED this 30th day of August, 2010. 
STJPlLATIO.\ TO Al!G\IENTTHE RECORD-] 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
~µ 
Thomas E. Dvorak 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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STIPlJLATION TO AUGMENT TUB RECOllD 2 
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS, TALDOY & 
~OP~., 
Joseph L. Ellsworth 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 30th day of August, 2010, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to the persons listed below the method indicated: 
Joseph L. Ellsworth 
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defranco P.L.L.C. 
1031 E. Park Boulevard 
Boise, ID 83712 
Facsimile: 345-8945 
Attorney.for Defendants William J. Campbell 
and Naomi Louise Campbell 
STIPl L\TIO"i TO Al'G\JE"iT TIIE RECORD - 3 
~ Hand Delivery 
X Facsimile 
~ Overnight Courier 
U.S. Mail 
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Thomas E. Dvorak (ID State Bar ID# 5043) 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
Telephone: 208-388-1200 
Facsimile: 208-388-1300 
789351_1 (10493-1) 
Attorneys for Tom and Julie Manning 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THOMAS CRELLIN MANNING and 
. JULIE ANN MANNING, husband and 
wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
WILLI.Alv1 J. CAMPBELL, an unmarried 
individual, and NAOMI LOUISE 
CAMPBELL, an unmarried individual, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0907350 
PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL 
PRETRIAL MEMORA.i"'l'DUM 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs, Dr. Tom and Julie Manning, by and through their counsel of 
record, and hereby file this Supplemental Pretrial Memorandum 
INTRODUCTION 
This Supplemental Pretrial Memorandum is intended to supplement Plaintiffs' Pretrial 
Memorandum to further illuminate the issues before this Court. 
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A The 1952 Agreement Does Not Define the Location of the Easement, and the 
Driveway that Defendant Has Been Using Imposes A Substantial Burden on the 
Plaintiffs that is Totally Unnecessary Given the Configuration of the Properties; 
Locating the Easement in the Place that Plaintiffs Propose is Eminently Reasonable, 
Convenient and Accessible for Both Parties and it Comports with the 1952 
Agreement. 
The 1952 Agreement at issue in this case does not provide for a precise location. In 
defining the easement location, the Court should take into consideration ''the condition and use 
of the servient premises and the purposes the easement was intended lo serve," while 
understanding the grantee is entitled to a reasonable way. State ex rel. Hillhouse v. Hunter 
Raffety Elevator, Inc., 636 S.W.2d 400, 402 (Mo. Ct. App. (1982). Thus, the location of the 
easement shall meet the reasonable convenience of both parties, and both parties' rights shall be 
considered. O'Brien v. Richter, 455 S.W.2d 473 (1970); Gardner v. Webster, 64 N.H. 520, 15 
A 144, 145 (1888). This is in accord with the Idaho law cited by this Court in the Memorandum 
Decision: 
A grant indefinite as to width and location must impose no greater 
burden than is necessary. Coulsen v. Aberdeen-Springfield Canal 
Co., 47 Idaho 619,628,277 P. 542,545 (1929). "Where a 
conveyance of a right of way does not definitely fix its location, 
the grantee is entitled to a convenient, reasonable and accessible 
way within the limits of the grant." Bethel v. Van Stone, 120 Idaho 
522, 527-28, 817 P.2d 188, 193-94 (Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Quinn 
v. Stone, 75 Idaho 243, 246-47, 270 P.2d 825,826 (1954). 
Memorandum Decision at p. 18. 
In the present case, the driveway as currently configured does not comport with reason or 
with the 1952 Agreement. Under the current configuration, the Defendants' access creates a 
substantial and unreasonable burden on the Mannings' property because Defendant drives 
approximately 60 feet onto the Mannings' property before turning into his own property. This 
substantial burden on the servicnt estate is totally unnecessary in this case because Defendants' 
property borders approximately 15 feet of the same Ada County right of way that the Mannings' 
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property borders. The current configuration is completely overbroad with respect to Defendants' 
rights to egress and ingress under the 1952 Agreement. That agreement allows Defendants to go 
"far enough to allow" them to enter their property. No reasonable :interpretation of this language 
should allow that 60 feet onto the Mannings' property is just "far enough to enter'' the 
Defendants' property. In addition, it is unsafe and unnecessarily burdensome for the Manning 
family to have Defendant traversing a needlessly large portion of their property in his seven ton 
truck. As a result, the Mannings try to keep their children from playing in their own front yard. 
The Court can and should consider safety of the members of the household of the servient estate, 
which at this time includes smal] children, in locating this easement on the ground as close to the 
dominant estate as is practicable. 
Moreover, the current configuration of the driveway is inconvenient for both parties. It is 
inconvenient for the Mannings for the reasons stated above. The Mannings cannot use a large 
portion of their front yard-they never know when the truck may be coming or going. But it is 
also inconvenient for Defendant bt.-cause the Manning family's guests and visitors frequently but 
unwittingly block Defendant's access when parking at the Mannings' house. This problem 
would be eliminated if the access were moved to the location proposed in the Amended 
Complaint. The proposed access driveway would be convenient and reasonable. Moreover, it 
would provide Defendants with a direct connection to the street that they do not currently enjoy 
and make their property more accessible. 
In addition to meeting the standards set forth by this Court for fixing the Jocation of an 
indeterminate easement, the proposed driveway would comport with the language of the grant in 
the 1952 Agreement. The 1952 rights were granted by a certain Paul S. Boyd, owner of the 
servient estate, to the dominant estate using the careful language that the dominant estate would 
run "in a northerly and southerly direction, far enough to allow [the owner of dominant estate] to 
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enter upon [his] premises." It has recently come to light that Mr. Boyd was a prominent Boise 
judge and attorney, and thus it is particularly important in interpreting the 1952 Agreement to 
pay attention to the words that he agreed to in granting use of his property as well as to the fact 
that be chose not to fix the precise location of the access driveway. 
The language of the 1952 Agreement, that is, "far enough to-allow', actually provides 
some fluidity that is ab]e to accommodate changing conditions on the property. Indeed we know 
Mr. Boyd was considering the future of the properties when he signed the agreement because it 
also provides that if in the future the driveway would cease to be used jointly then all rights 
would revert back to the servient estate. \Vhile it may have been reasonable and convenient in 
years past for neighbors to share a driveway, that is no longer the case for at least two reasons. 
First, the servient estate has changed: there is no longer a carport on the east side of the property 
adjacent to the Defendants' property. There is now a garage on the opposite, west side of the 
property that formerly belonged to Boyd, and it is serviced by a very differently configured 
driveway in a different location. Second, the uses of the dominant estate have changed from 
residential to commercial: Defendant drives a seven-ton commercial vehicle on the driveway, 
not a passenger vehicle, and he runs a plumbing business on his property and, therefore, he runs 
a plumbing business across the Mannings' property. There is absolutely nothing in the 1952 
Agreement that supports the use of the easement for commercial purposes. 
The proposed driveway would still use the Mannings' property, but a smaller portion than 
y;hat is currently used, and it would also use a small portion of Ada County right of way. The 
Ada County Highway District, which has jurisdiction over unopened right of way abutting both 
properties on their southern border, has indicated that it is willing to allow use of enough of its 
right of way so that not as much of the Manning property is necessary. In determining an 
appropriate width for the proposed driveway, the Court should look to Boise city regulation 
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regarding the minimum width of a driveway in the City of Boise, which is placed at 9 feet. See 
Boise City Code Section 11-10-04.02.G and 11-10-04.03.J.2. The proposed driveway would be 
9 feet. 
Based on the forgoing, the Mannings would respectively submit that the location of the 
easement conferred by the 1952 Driveway Agreement should be determined by the Court to lie 
in one of the folloVving locations, with first priority being given to the first stated location, 
second priority to the next, etc: 
1. At the alternative location sought by the Mannings' Amended Complaint using 
the ACHD right of way and described in said Complaint ("ACHD Location"); 
2. At the alternative location sought by the Mannings' Amended Complaint 
without using the ACHD right of way and described in said Complaint 
("Alternate Non-ACHD Location"); 
3. At a variation of the forgoing two locations that talces into account any facts 
raised at trial that affect location, but still honors the intent of the original 
agreement, with Surveyor Greg Carter to be instructed by the Court on any 
variations from the Alternate ACHD Location ("To Be Detennined Alternate 
Location"); 
The Court now has the opportunity to determine the location of the easement, and it 
should do so in light of the applicable legal standards. These standards include the language of 
the 1952 Agreement, and pursuant to Idaho precedent, what is reasonable, convenient and 
accessible, and not substantially and unnecessarily burdensome to the servient estate. It is 
submitted that the Court is not rigidly locked into declaring the existing driveway location as the 
current location of this easement. The law allows this Court flexibility to site the easement in a 
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location that fits with the current use and regulation of the properties and avenues that arc 
currently available for access. 
B. In the Event the Court Determines the Easement is Not Located in the Reasonable, 
Convenient and Accessible Location Proposed in the Amended Complaint, Then 
The "Injury" Set Forth Under Idaho Code Section 55-313 Must be Sufficiently 
Significant So As to Give Meaning to the Idaho Statute 
In the event the Court determines that the Easement should be sited at a location other 
than the location sought by the Mannings in the Amended Complaint, then Idaho Code Section 
55-313 gives the Mannings the right to relocate the easement at issue. Specifically, the Idaho 
Code allows the person controlling "any access ... constructed across private lands," the right ''to 
change such access to any other part of the private land," as long as the change does not "injure 
any person ... using ... such access." LC. § 55-313. In interpreting that code section, this Court 
found "that in order to minimize the burden to Plaintiffs' estate, Plaintiffs would be entitled to 
move the location of the access in such a way that is convenient, reasonable, accessible, within 
the limits of the grant, and not injurious to Defendants' property." 
Section 55-313 does not provide guidance as to what injury is necessary to negate the 
right to relocate. Common sense would dictate that the level of injury must be measured with 
respect to what rights the Defendant has in the first place. In this case, Defendant's rights are to 
use the Mannings' property just "far enough to al.low'' him to enter his premises. The proposed 
changes to his access rights do not in any way injure this specific right. 
In determining what level of injury would bar a property owner from exercising their 
Section 55-313 rights to relocate an access, existing Idaho precedent concerning easements 
dictates that the injury must be significant. Even where a servient estate owner is not trying to 
move an easement, the law affords the servient estate owner great flexibility in what use the 
servient owner can make of the easement premises, drawing the line at "material" interference. 
PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEl\fENTAL PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM- 6 
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Conley v. Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 265, 272, 985 P.2d 1127, 1134 (1999) ("[T]he owner of the 
servient estate is entitled to use the estate in any manner ... which does not materially interfere 
with the use of the easement by the dominant estate owner.") ( emphasis added); Boydstun Beach 
Association v. Allen, 111 ldaho 370, 377, 723 P.2d 914, 921 (Id. Ct. App. 1986). Idaho courts 
have not specifically defined "injury" under Section 55-313, but it stands to reason that this same 
"materiality" requirement comes into play in determining the level of injury that must be present 
before a servient estate owner is stopped from exercising the right to move the easement under § 
55-313. 
The idea that injury must be significant before the right to relocate is eliminated is also 
supported by reasonable statutory construction principles. To allow injury to mean any minimal 
grievance less than substantial injury would negate the purpose of the statute and render it 
wholly absurd. Surely the legislature did not intend to create a right to relocate which could be 
so easily taken away with a complaint of any injury whatsoever. Here, it is incumbent upon this 
Court to give this statute an interpretation which will not render it a nullity. State v. Patterson, 
148 Idaho 166,219 P.3d 813 (Id. Ct. App. 2009); State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641,646, 22 P.3d 
116, 121 (Id. Ct. App. 2001). 
Persuasive authority from other jurisdictions also supports the significant injury standard. 
The Restatement (Third) of Property further defines injury to the dominant owner and allows the 
owner of the servient estate to change the location of an easement as long as the changes do not 
"(a) significantly lessen the utility of the easement, (b) increase the burdens on the owner of the 
easement, or ( c) frustrate the purpose for which the easement was created." Restatement (Third) 
of Property§ 4.8(3) (emphasis added). These parameters indicate that some sort of significant 
injury is needed before a Court should limit the relocation rights of the servient owner. This 
right of relocation is especially important when the servient owner can show the easement has 
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become more burdensome. Ogden v. Bankston, 398 So.2d 1037 (1981). Plaintiffs indeed have 
shown the burden of allowing the current access over the driveway to continue. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also agreed that when an easement does not define the 
access location, "the law bounds it by the line of reasonable enjoyment," which means an 
easement must not interfere with the servient owner's rights. Quinn v. Stone, 75 Idaho 243, 246, 
270 P.2d 825, 827 (1954). 
Plaintiffs' proposed relocation of the easement does not significantly injure Defendants 
because Defendants would maintain their rights to ingress and egress across Plaintiffs' land. In 
truth, Plaintiffs' adjustment furthers the goals of the easement language as the ingress and egress 
of Defendants is only to be "far enough" to allow the access. 
DATED this 1t7f"r day of February, 2010. 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
<1 
I hereby certify that on this (tJ day of February, 2010, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to the persons listed below the method indicated: 
Joseph L. Ellsworth 
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defranco P.L.L.C. 
1031 E. Park Boulevard 
Boise, ID 83712 
Facsimile: 345-8945 
Attorney for Defendants William J Campbell 
and Naomi Louise Campbell 
_ Hand Delivery 
'xF acsimile 
_ Overnight Courier 
U.S. Mail 
Thomas E. Dvorak 
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_____ JHOMAS_E._D_\lQRAK-
DATE: Wednesday, February 10, 2010 
PAGES (INCLUDING COVER): 10 
ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW: No 
G1VENs PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
Telephone: 208-388-1245 
Fax: 208-388-1300 
Email: ted@givenspursley.com 
RE: Manning v. Campbell 
TO: 
Case No. CV OC 0907350 
GP File No. 1 0493-1 
Name 
Clerk of the Court 
The Honorable Ronald J. Wilper 
Joseph L. Ellsworth 
MESSAGE: 
Please file the attached. 
Company 
Ada County Courthouse 
Ada County Courthouse 
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy, et al. 
- Thomas E. Dvorak 
Fax Number 
287-6919 
287-7529 
345-8945 
Jf this fax does not transmit fully or is difficult to read, please contact me or my secretary, Sharon 
Cuslidge, at (208) 388-1274. 
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE 
This facsimile may contain confidential information that is protected by the attorney-client or work product privilege. It is 
intended only for the use of the individual(s} named above. If you are not a named recipient or an employee responsible 
for delivering the facsimile, you are instructed not to deliver, distribute or copy this facsimile, nor should you disclose its 
contents or take any action in reliance on the information it contains. lf you have received this facsimile in error, please 
notify us immediately by telephone to arrange for the return of the transmitted documents to us. Thank you. 
647217 1 
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02/10/2010 WED 16: 37 388 1300 
JOB NO. 
PGS. 
TX IMCOMPLE:l'E 
TRANSACTION OK 
ERROR 
1016 
10 
92876919# 
92877529# 
93458945# 
**************~************ 
*** FAX MULTI TX REPORT*** 
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FAX COVER SHEET THOMAS E. DVORAK 
DATE: Wednesday, February 10, 2010 
PAGES (INCLUDING COVER): 10 
ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW: No 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
Telephone: 208-388-1245 
Fax:208-388-1300 
Email: ted@givenspursley.com 
RE: Manning v. Campbell 
TO: 
Case No. CV OC 0907350 
GP File No. 10493-1 
Name 
Clerk of the Court 
The Honorable Ronald J. Wilper 
Joseph L Ellsworth 
MESSAGE: 
Please file the attached. 
Company 
Ada County Courthouse 
Ada County Courthouse 
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy, et al. 
- Thomas E. Dvorak 
Fax Number 
287-6919 
. 287-7529 
345-8945 
14loo 1 
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RECEIVED 
l 20\0 
Thomas E. Dvorak (ID State Bar ID# 5043) ,..~ 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP Ada county VIVI"' 
601 West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
Telephone: 208-388-1200 
Facsimile: 208-388-1300 
953519 I 
Attorneys for Tom and Julie Manning 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, U\J AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THOMAS CRELLIN MANNU\IG and 
JULIE ANN MANNING, husband and 
wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL, an unmarried 
individual, and NAOMI LOUISE 
CAMPBELL, an unmarried individual, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0907350 
ORDER RE STIPULATION TO 
AUGMENT THE RECORD 
BASED on the parties' Stipulation to Augment the Record and good cause appearing, IT 
IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiffs' Supplemental Pretrial Memorandum attached to the 
Stipulation as Exhibit "A" shall be treated as if it were file stamped on February 10, 2010 and 
considered part of the official court record designated for appeal. 
Dated this /~ day of September, 2010. 
onald J. Wilper 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this _l_ day of ~f , 2010, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: 
Thomas E. Dvorak 
Givens Pursley LLP 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701 
Facsimile: 3 88-1300 
Attorney for Plaintiff Thomas and Julie Manning 
Joseph L. Ellsworth 
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defranco P.L.L.C. 
1031 E. Park Boulevard 
Boise, ID 83 712 
Facsimile: 345-8945 
Attorney for Defendant William J Campbell 
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'{.. U.S. Mail 
--r- Overnight Mail 
__ Hand Delivery 
Fax 
\_ U.S. Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Hand Delivery 
Fax 
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,, 
~ ;~J;.;;H\, 
Stephen W. Kenyon 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
451 W State Street 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
In re: Thomas Crellin Manning v. William J. Campbell, Docket No. 
37728-2010 
Notice is hereby given that on Thursday, September 9, 2010, I lodged a 
transcript of 535 pages in length for the above-referenced appeal with 
the district court clerk of Ada County in the Fourth Judicial District. 
The following files were lodged: 
Covers, Proceeding 02/17 /10, Proceeding 02/18/10, Proceeding 
02/19/10 and Proceeding 11 /30/09 
David Cromwell 
Tucker & Associates 
cc: kloertscher@idcourts.net 
PDF format of completed files emailed to Supreme Court 
ASCII format of completed files emailed to counsel 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THOMAS CRELLIN MANNING and 
JULIE ANN MANNING, husband and 
wife, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
VS. 
WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL, an unmarried 
individual, and NAOMI LOUISE 
CAMPBELL, an unmarried individual, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
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Pl 3 illus. map depicting proposed driveway changes-NE view i Adm-illus-2/17/10 
Pl 4 " "-NNE view Adm-illus-2/17 /10 
Pl 5 " "Wview I Adm-illus-2/17/10 
Pl 6 II "NW view Adm-illus-2/17/10 
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Pl 8 current parcel configuration Adm-illus-2/18/10 
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i Pl 10 i Idaho survey group description for access-7/29/09 Adm-2/18/10 
Pl 11 " "-2/9/10 Adm-2/18/10 
Pl 12 Photos of Property (1 thru 65) Adm-2/17 /10 
Pl I 13(1-29) documents attached to affidavit of Eric Nelson I Adm-2/17/10-(1 and 2 illus only) 
Pl 14 d db warranty ee etween c wa an Sh rtz dM anrnng-10/14/08 Ad 2/18/10 m-
Pl 15 List of talking points Adm- 2/17/10 
Pl 17 Home Occupation Application submitted by Campbell Adm-2/17 /10 
Pl 18 Letter to Joe Ellsworth from Dvorak not Adm 
Pl I 19 Boise City Planning and Dev. Services letter of denial Adm-2/17/10 
Pl 20 Application for Aooeal by Campbell Adm-2/17/10 
Pl i 21 Boise City Planning and Dev. letter of appeal denial i Adm-2/17/10 
I Pl 22 Isuzu Commercial Vehicle Specifications not Adm 
Pl 23 F. Scott Beechams biography Adm-2/18/10 
Pl 24 List of land entitlement work completed by LandWorks LLC Adm-2/18/10 
Pl 25 Gregory Carters biography Adm-2/18/10 
Pl 26 photo of sign left in Mannings yard notAdm 
Pl 27 ACHD driveway approach request Adm-2/18/10 
Pl . 27a Portion of 27 Adm-2/17/10 
Pl • 28 ACHD approval-11/3/09 Adm-2/18/10 
Pl 29 Affidavit of Eric Nelson Adm-2/17/10 
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I Pl ] 31 Chain of title 1950 to present Adm-2/17/10 1 
Def 501 Adm-2/17/10 
Def 502 Adm-2/18/10 
Def 503 Adm-2/18/10 . 
Def 506 Adm-2/19/10 
Def 507 Adm- 2/18/10 
Def 512 
Def 513 Adm-2/17 /10 
Def 514 Adm-2/18/10 
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ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
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--------
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By ________ ....,.._ _ _ 
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